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Abstract 
 
 
 
Recent scholarship has revisited conceptual art in light of its ongoing influence 
on contemporary art, arguing against earlier accounts of the practice which 
gave a restricted account of its scope and stressed its historical foreclosure. Yet 
conceptual art remains both historically and theoretically underspecified, its 
multiple and often conflicting genealogies have not all been convincingly 
traced. This thesis argues for the importance of a systems genealogy of conceptual 
art—culminating in a distinctive mode of systematic conceptual art—as a 
primary determinant of the conceptual genealogy of contemporary art. It 
claims that from the perspective of post-postmodern, relational and context art, 
the contemporary significance of conceptual art can best be understood in light 
of its “systematic” mode. The distinctiveness of contemporary art, and the 
problems associated with its uncertain critical character, have to be understood 
in relation to the unresolved problems raised by conceptual art and the 
implications that these have held for art’s post-conceptual trajectory. 
Consequently, the thesis reconsiders the nascence, emergence, consolidation 
and putative historical supersession of conceptual art from the perspective of 
the present. The significance of the historical problem of postformalism is re-
emphasised and the nascence of conceptual art located in relation to it. A 
neglected historical category of systems art is recovered and its significance for 
the emergence of conceptual art demonstrated. The consolidation of 
conceptual art is reconsidered by distinguishing its multiple modes. Here, a 
“systematic” mode of conceptual art is argued to be of greater current critical 
importance than the more established “analytic” mode. Finally, the 
supersession of conceptual art is revisited from the perspective of the present in 
order to demonstrate that contemporary context and relational practices 
recover problems first articulated by systematic conceptual art. It is from 
systematic conceptual art that relational and context art inherit their focus on 
the social relations and the social context of art. By recovering the systems 
genealogy  and systematic mode of conceptual art we provide a richer 
conceptual genealogy of contemporary art. 
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We should always be in a position to envisage a new context entirely. We 
have to keep our options open, to pose questions to which the answers are 
not predictable, to which answers might come in a different language, 
suggesting a different grammar – a different system, a changed consciousness. 
 
 — Harald Szeeman, “When Attitudes Become Form” (1969) 
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Q: “Who is the best conceptual artist?” A: “The one with the most children.”  
 
Lawrence Weiner’s joke elicits an awkward, almost reluctant, laugh. Our response is 
not ultimately attributable to the impropriety of its punch line, although this is 
evidently a contributing factor (the sexual pun undermines the intellectual gravitas that 
is conventionally held to characterise the “best” conceptual art). Such bathos is, 
however, only enough to raise a smile. The awkward, almost reluctant laugh is drawn 
forth by the punch line’s cognitive follow-through: the joke turns back on itself, 
undermining the assumption encoded in its question (an assumption with which the 
structure of the joke renders us unwillingly complicit). Here then we are made to laugh 
at ourselves, to acknowledge our own implication within those structures of art 
historical legitimation that seek to produce an answer to a question that goes against 
the spirit of conceptual art. As Victor Burgin has had cause to observe “Recollected in 
tranquillity conceptual art is now being woven into the seamless tapestry of ‘art 
history.’ This assimilation, however, is being achieved only at the cost of amnesia in 
respect of all that was most radical in conceptual art.”1 We laugh reluctantly then, 
because the joke is on us. 
 
Weiner’s joke challenges the habitual mechanisms and procedures of art history as 
they have been applied to an artistic practice that sought to undermine many of its 
foundational tenets, namely the coherence of artistic “movements,” the “genius” of 
particular artists and their concomitant “influence” on other, lesser or subsequent, 
ones. Since art history after conceptual art has taken many of these lessons to heart 
there is something of the straw man about such an encapsulation of the discipline. 
Nevertheless, it is incontestable that mainstream art history has, as Burgin charges, 
dealt with the challenge of conceptual art by turning it into something like a period 
style. This strategy overlooks the fundamental challenge to the ontology of art, and 
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thus to the discursive procedures of art history, that was posed by conceptual art. The 
challenge is thus to find  ways of writing about and exhibiting  conceptual art that are 
more faithful to conceptual art’s challenge, procedures that hold to its radicality.  
 
My own work on this thesis began from within this problematic and was stimulated by 
it. On 19th September 2005, at the Graduate Symposium of the Tate Modern’s “Open 
Systems” conference, I presented a paper based on an early version of my Master’s 
thesis entitled “All Systems Go: Recovering Jack Burnham’s Systems Aesthetics”. The 
conference was organised in conjunction with the Tate Modern’s “Open Systems: 
Rethinking Art c.1970” (2005) exhibition, curated by Donna DeSalvo. “Open 
Systems” was one of a series of large, retrospective survey exhibitions on conceptual 
art that had been produced by major Western art institutions over the previous 
decade. Other such exhibitions had included: “Reconsidering the Object of Art: 1965–
1975” (1995) at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, curated by Ann 
Goldstein and Anne Rorimer; “Circa ‘68” (1999) at Museu de Serralves, Porto, 
curated by Vicente Todolí and João Fernandes, (1999); and “Global Conceptualism: 
Points of Origin 1950s–1980s” (1999) at Queens Museum of Art, New York, curated 
by Luis Camnitzer, Jane Farver and Rachel Weiss.  
 
The scope and scale of these exhibitions, and their associated catalogues and 
conferences, contributed to a major reassessment of conceptual art that is still ongoing 
today. Inevitably then all of these exhibitions intervened in the historicisation of 
conceptual art. As such they were obliged to negotiate the double-edged risk of either 
simply representing received knowledge about the practice (offering nothing new to 
the established discourse) or of engaging in revisionist historiography (producing an 
unproductive intervention in the established discourse). Given that conceptual artists 
are notorious for having offered rigorous theoretical expositions of their own practices,  
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engaging in deep and sustained polemics over the scope and adequacy of the very term 
“conceptual art,” this danger was all the more keenly evident. 
 
Read within this historical conjuncture Weiner’s joke makes a final intervention, 
producing a critically salutary sting in the tail. It suggests a way to move beyond simply 
weaving conceptual art into the seamless tapestry of art history and instead offers a 
way to focus on what was, and remains, radical within the practice. Reconsidering the 
punch line after the uncomfortable laughter dies in the air we sense that it actually 
evinces a serious methodological strategy. Weiner’s joke suggests that we might 
approach the significance of conceptual art not primarily in terms of the self-
conception of its prime movers, nor principally in light of its historic achievements, but 
rather in terms of its ongoing influence, its genealogical inflection of contemporary art. 
Furthermore, Weiner intimates, from this perspective we may develop a different 
understanding of which conceptual artists were most productive.  
 
It is at this point that we must also insist on the limits of Weiner’s joke (or perhaps the 
sting in the sting of its tail) since we cannot conceive genealogy on the model of direct 
filiation (“the one with the most children”) without falling back in to the trap of 
“influence” about which the joke has rightly made us anxious. Genealogy must be 
thought on the Nietzschean model then, not as the pursuit of a fixed origin 
determining the meaning of the present but rather as an intervention questioning the 
stability of the past from the perspective of the present.2 Here then we will reject any 
account focused on tracing successive “generations” of conceptual artists. Instead we 
will approach conceptual art from the perspective of contemporary, post-conceptual 
art, that is to say from the viewpoint of its illegitimate and unruly, but thereby 
paradoxically dutiful, offspring. Despite the range, depth and quality of the scholarship 
already undertaken on conceptual art, work remains to be done that applies such a 
principle.  
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In order to understand the complex genealogical lines of contemporary post-
conceptual art it is necessary to revisit the historiography of the 1960s in order to 
challenge the existing, “settled” accounts of conceptual art in its intellectual and socio-
political context. This means doing exactly the opposite of monumentalising the sixties 
as a moment of lost promise, to be melancholically revisited and mourned. James 
Meyer has commented on “the legions of ‘younger’ art historians who compulsively 
ransack the archives of sixties practitioners and critics for fresh materials and insights,” 
observing that “much of the art writing on the period, my own included, bespeaks the 
melancholy of having not been present at the happenings and the exhibitions and the 
demonstrations we so assiduously describe.”3 Instead, we must understand the archive 
to be constituted only by its ransacking. In so doing it is also necessary to be alert to 
the danger of presenting rejectamenta as radical new discoveries.  
 
The analysis of conceptual art demands a critical art history. As I deploy the term I 
take it to have two principle implications: (i) Critical art history opposes itself to 
historicism and interrogates and judges the past from the perspective of the present;  
(ii) Critical art history aims to consider particular works of art within a broader, 
historically unfolding and philosophically self-reflexive conception of art.4 Conceptual 
art demands such an approach precisely because it explicitly sought to explore and 
challenge the ontology of art as understood by “normal” art history.5 Conceptual art 
demanded that the formalistic categories of art history such as “movement” and 
“style” be abandoned as inadequate. Actually doing so requires a critical art history, 
one prepared to revisit its foundational assumptions. As the conceptual artist and, 
latterly, academic, Terry Smith summarises the problem: “Art historians tend to 
mistrust philosophical critiques of their procedures… Like criticism, history is 
something you do according to models, rules of thumb, the prejudices of your peers – 
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its understructure, your theory of art and your theory of history, your ideology, your 
ontology and your psychic needs, habitually remain implicit, repressed even.”6  
 
Nevertheless, while conceptual art mounted a salient challenge to the methodology of 
the discipline that would seek to historicise it (a challenge which still holds and which 
has inspired this thesis), a critical art history cannot simply defer to artists’ self-
understanding of the implications of their practice. Conceptual art’s self-understanding 
was that it repudiated formalist modernism but it frequently overlooked its own 
historical location, such that it forgot that its own procedures were themselves 
influenced and implicated in the development of modernity. A critical art history 
necessarily looks as critically at art as it does at history.  
 
These then are the principles in accordance with which I have approached 
constructing an alternative genealogy of conceptual art. The alterity of the genealogy 
presented here lies in differing both from received art historical accounts of conceptual 
art as well as from the frequently self-legitimating alternatives advocated by conceptual 
art’s practitioners. The still-dominant account of the mature form of conceptual art as 
“linguistic” or “analytic” can be counterposed to an alternative, and revealing, 
narrative concerning conceptual art’s relation to a postformalist “systems” art. A 
primary claim of this thesis is that we can identify a marginalised historical category of 
“systems” art, arguing that it represented an early articulation of the artistic response 
to a set of distinctive artistic problems what would subsequently come to be identified 
as “conceptual” art. Rather than following Benjamin Buchloh’s entrenched, if no 
longer hegemonic, account of conceptual art’s origins in an “aesthetic of 
administration” and telos in a “critique of institutions”, I trace an alternative 
genealogy (one picked up by a contemporary generation of relational and context 
artists) that sees conceptual art as imbricated with  postformalist “systems” art such 
that we can identify a systematic mode of conceptual art. This alternative account 
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prioritises conceptual art’s relation to “technological rationality” (as borrowed from 
Herbert Marcuse by the critic Jack Burnham) instead of focusing on its relation to 
“administration” (as borrowed from Max Weber by Buchloh).  
 
Systematic conceptual art rejected Greenbergian formalism as a suitable account of 
the ontology of autonomous art. It turned instead to Systems, Information, Cybernetic 
and, somewhat inconsistently, Critical Theory, in an assault on an aesthetic art 
historically rendered heteronomous. Nevertheless, in so doing, it also risked complicity 
with the most advanced intellectual technologies of social control and thus laid itself 
open to a heteronomy of its own devising. Unpicking the implications of this knot and 
determining its significance for contemporary art constitutes the work undertaken by 
this thesis. 
 
Systematic conceptual art, in its most developed articulation, self-reflexively mediated 
between the art system and the social system; it related social and artistic technique. 
This alternative “systems” genealogy of conceptual art more clearly demonstrates a 
fertile critical legacy. Consequently, systematic conceptual art should be understood as 
at least as significant as “analytic” conceptual art in the conceptual genealogy of 
contemporary art. By reformulating the established historical and theoretical narrative 
concerning the origins and development of conceptual art, our understanding of the 
conceptual genealogy of contemporary art is enriched. In so doing the “canon” of 
conceptual artists is also re-ordered, according greater significance to artists not within 
Seth Siegelaub’s “stable” nor associated with Art & Language (in either UK or US 
incarnation): Adrian Piper, Victor Burgin, Mel Bochner, Hans Haacke, Mierle 
Lademan Ukeles and Mary Kelly. 
 
 
 
 xii 
I conclude here with a brief discussion of two notable features of the text that might 
both raise questions for the reader concerning the methodology of the thesis:  
 
First, my selection of artists remains “canonical” in that it treats only those artists 
whose careers have been played out within the discursive and institutional context of 
Anglo-American conceptual art. This decision was strategic. It serves of course to limit 
the scope of the study. However this limitation was conceived as an intervention. 
Much of the scholarly work that has recently been undertaken on conceptual art 
renders the category more complex by way of what we might call geographic 
differentiation, that is it demonstrates that conceptual art developed differently in 
different metropolitan centres. However I have sought to make a conceptual 
differentiation within “canonical” Anglo-American conceptual art, thereby 
destabilising the security of the category.  
 
Second, artistic “movements”—such as minimalism, tech art, pop art—have been set 
in lowercase throughout. This is in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style 
(which this thesis adheres to) but it also constitutes a point of principle. Here I aim to 
challenge the adequacy of designating artistic “movements” conceived on the model of 
a proper name. Instead I seek to focus on the shifting problem complexes addressed by 
art as it seeks to produce its autonomy out of changing historical circumstances.  
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Art’s Ongoing Uncertainty 
 
 
1970. The Sperone Gallery. Turin. Inside the gallery no paintings or sculptures can 
be seen. Instead, a short citation has been handwritten on one of the gallery’s 
walls in pencil. The citation reads “Some places to which we can come and for 
a while ‘be free to think about what we are going to do.’” Entitled Marcuse Piece 
(1970), the work was produced by the American conceptual artist Robert 
Barry. The quotation it cites is excerpted from the final lines of Herbert 
Marcuse’s An Essay on Liberation (1969).1 Barry has subsequently reproduced the 
work in different contexts and describes Marcuse Piece as a “work-in-progress.”2 
Such a claim argues for the continuing relevance of this work today.3 Indeed, 
Marcuse Piece prompts questions about the “relationality” and “context 
specificity” of art, issues that have been explicitly thematised in contemporary 
context and relational art practices. Here then conceptual art remains 
contemporary. Yet Jeff Wall has insisted on the “collapse” of conceptual art 
and asserted,  “Some artists, like… Barry, easily shed the trappings of the 
struggle for historical memory and moved toward orthodox commodity 
production, albeit of a refined and mildly ironic type.”4 On Wall’s account, 
conceptual art has grown old and died. How then, from the perspective of contemporary 
art, should we understand the character and critical legacy of conceptual art?  
 
This question can be opened up by way of a deeper consideration of Marcuse 
Piece. Though Marcuse noted that An Essay on Liberation was “written before the 
events of May and June 1968 in France” he also recognised the striking 
“coincidence between some of the ideas suggested in my essay, and those 
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formulated by the young militants…”5 Though cautiously framed in relation to 
“the present chance of these forces,” and insistent that “the radical utopian 
character of their demands far surpasses the hypotheses of my essay,” 
Marcuse’s text nevertheless decisively broke with the Marxian prohibition on 
utopian speculation and sought to outline, albeit tentatively, recipes for a 
liberated future.6 Here, in a Schillerian vein, Marcuse proposed that a free 
society would be characterised by the pervasiveness of aesthetic form: “the 
sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence 
and thereby the Form of the society itself.”7  
 
This preparedness to undertake utopian speculation distanced Marcuse from 
the official project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory and aligned him, for a 
time, with the cultural activism of the late 1960s. As Marcuse announced: “The 
new sensibility” had become “a political factor” which consequently required  
critical theory to  “incorporate the new dimension into its concepts” in order to 
“project its implications for the possible construction of a free society.”8 
“Marcuse” then, for Barry and many others of his generation, was a metonym 
for the political project of the New Left.9 Moreover, conceptual art, as Jeff Wall 
has argued persuasively, drew “its themes, strategies and content from the 
politicized cultural critique identified broadly with the New Left.”10 Similarly, 
for Daniel Buren, conceptual art took “the art world itself as a political 
problem” in order to question whether “that micro-system [was] a total 
revelation or reverberation of the general system?”11 More directly still, in 
Mary Kelly’s apposite summary, conceptual art set about “interrogating the 
conditions of the existence of the object and then going on to the second stage 
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and interrogating the conditions of the interrogation itself.”12 Given such 
claims, made by its practitioners, it follows that any substantive account of 
conceptual art and its critical legacy should acknowledge its relation to the 
political context addressed by the New Left.13 In other words, conceptual art’s 
ontological claims (challenging the definition of art) should not be considered 
dissociable from its political claims (defining the challenge of art).  
 
In An Essay on Liberation Marcuse considered, with little enthusiasm, the 
revolutionary potential of new forms of class composition attendant upon 
developments in advanced capitalist society, a process characterised by the 
“dematerialization of labour” and the emergence of a “new working class.”14 
Marcuse also, and with more enthusiasm, weighed the possibilities for an 
“instinctual” transformation freeing individuals from a “second nature” that 
had been inculcated by capitalism and which tied subjects libidinally and 
aggressively to the commodity form.  
 
For Marcuse, working within a philosophical tradition that sought to articulate 
the relation between artistic and individual and social autonomy,  the aesthetic 
dimension could “serve as a sort of gauge for a free society.”15 Marcuse, 
however, was nevertheless obliged to record the fact that art’s traditionally 
“aesthetic” character had been sacrificed by the historical avant-garde’s from 
which the new art of the 1960s derived much of their inspiration. The “free 
society” was thus prefigured anti-aesthetically: “The future ingresses into the 
present: in its negativity, the desublimating art and anti-art of today 
“anticipate” a stage where society’s capacity to produce may be akin to the 
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creative capacity of art, and the construction of the world of art akin to the 
reconstruction of the real world — union of liberating art and liberating 
technology.”16 Such a situation left the character of contemporary art, as art, 
uncertain and, as a result, Marcuse would only approach defining art 
negatively: “The emergence of contemporary art… means more than the 
traditional replacement of one style by another... The new object of art is not 
yet “given,” but the familiar object has become impossible, false.”17  
 
The status of “contemporary” art has remained uncertain ever since the crisis 
of modernism that Marcuse described in An Essay on Liberation. Yet it was 
Adorno, rather than Marcuse, who offered the most compelling formulation of 
this problem.18 In Adorno’s infamous introductory sentence to Aesthetic Theory: 
“It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident any more, not its 
inner life, not its relation to the world, not even its right to exist…”19 This 
ongoing crisis of contemporary art is characterised by the collapse of medium-
specific conventions, the exhaustion of clear disciplinary distinctions, the 
apparent failure of the avant-garde strategy of negation as well as by the 
suspicion of the new condition of art-in-general that has been ushered in as a 
result: “The forfeiture of what could be done spontaneously or 
unproblematically has not been compensated for by the open infinitude of new 
possibilities that reflection confronts.”20  
 
But has the character of art’s uncertainty remained stable? Questions about art 
after modernism (and the attendant arguments over the adequacy of 
postmodernism as a critical category) have regulated debates ever since. 
1. Contemporary Art’s Conceptual Genealogy                
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Conceptual art plays a pivotal role within them. Here, Barry’s Marcuse Piece 
stages a double injunction by insisting that we “think about what we are going 
to do:” it implicitly acknowledges the artistic and the political challenges facing 
“contemporary” art. Barry alludes to the politics of anti-aesthetics.  
 
Numerous attempts have been made, both progressive and reactionary, to 
produce some certainty in the face of the radical doubt about the actuality of 
contemporary art. To summarise some of the more influential: Michael Fried’s 
rejection of minimalist “theatricality” in favour of a renewal of medium-specific 
“conviction;” Rosalind Krauss’ speculations on the “expanded field” and “post-
medium condition;” Arthur Danto’s eschatological “end of art” and purgatorial 
“art after the end of art” theses; Thierry de Duve’s deduction of a “generic 
art;” Hal Foster’s fragile attempts to produce a “critical postmodernism.”21  
 
A common problem marks all of these accounts. These theorists have worked 
either to accommodate (Fried, early and late-period Krauss) or to overturn 
(middle-period Krauss, Danto, de Duve, Foster) a restricted concept of 
modernism inherited from Clement Greenberg. In the American context then, 
the crisis of artistic modernism has been run together with the crisis of 
Greenbergian formalist modernism. Given the influence of American art and 
American criticism since the 1960s, the deleterious character of such a 
“Greenberg effect” has been propagated globally.22 This has been to the 
detriment of other accounts of modernism, even those that are demonstrably 
more critically substantial, such as those elaborated by members of the 
Frankfurt School (principally Adorno, Benjamin and Marcuse).23 
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Consequently, artistic modernism remains paradoxically both over- and 
underdetermined as Greenbergian formalist modernism.24 In the absence of 
the widespread reception of any more articulated theoretical model then, 
Greenberg’s narrow conception of modernism and the artistic and critical 
reaction it provoked continues to inflect prominent accounts of contemporary 
art’s uncertainty. Even when Greenberg is disavowed he is affirmed. The space 
of his abstract negation is at the same time that of his confirmation. An entire 
generation of artists and theorists, beginning with the quarrel between Judd 
and Fried, have been defined by the Greenberg effect.  
 
Yet Barry’s citation of Marcuse suggests the presence, however faint, of an 
alternative modernist tradition at play in the 1960s and early 1970s, one 
engaged by conceptual art and oriented around the conceptual apparatus 
provided by Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This alternative modernist 
tradition was mediated, albeit incompletely, in the American context by the 
theorist Jack Burnham’s Marcuse-inspired writings on postformalist and 
conceptual art, specifically his elaboration of what he termed a “systems 
aesthetics.” This alternative modernist tradition was characterised by the 
attempt to think social and artistic developments in tandem, accounting for 
advanced art in relation to the development of an advanced industrial society. 
In this tradition the central problem was the question of art’s autonomy: a 
problem that raised issues including art’s critical character (or lack of it); art’s 
relation to reification; and the tension between aesthetic and 
instrumental/technocratic reason. All were artistic and philosophic problems 
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which were addressed by conceptual art and which continue to resonate in the 
present.  
 
This alternative modernist tradition has remained marginal to mainstream 
debates. Lacking a more substantive account of modernism has left 
postmodernist art and theory on unstable ground. Hal Foster has proclaimed 
the “critical” postmodernism that he was instrumental in defining to be over. 
For Foster, we now inhabit a cultural condition of “aftermath” characterised by 
a peculiar lack of productivity and stagnation: “the recursive strategy of the 
‘neo’ appears as attenuated today as the oppositional logic of the ‘post’ is tired: 
neither suffices as a strong paradigm for artistic or critical practice, and no 
other model stands in their stead.”25 The current theoretical exhaustion, even 
collapse, of postmodernism leaves art as uncertain as ever, forty years down the 
line. However, Foster’s position rhetorically stages an exhaustion of its own—
new critical models must be made rather than awaited.26 In order to do so it is 
necessary to reconsider the character of contemporary art today in light of its 
complex conceptual genealogy, a genealogy decisively inflected by an 
alternative, non-Greenbergian, modernist tradition.  
 
 
 
1. Contemporary Art’s Conceptual Genealogy                
 9 
Characterising Contemporary Art 
 
It is notoriously difficult to specify the contemporaneity of contemporary art.27 
Given the aging of both modernism and postmodernism as critical categories, 
and the absence of any plausible replacement for them, the “contemporary” 
has become a default cultural periodisation for the artistically current.  Yet the 
contemporary is also a present absolute. As a cultural periodisation then it is 
continually subject to slippage and displacement, to aging. And the 
“contemporary” necessarily ages far more rapidly than the “modern.” 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding these reservations about its suitability as such, 
faute de mieux, “contemporary” art is taken on here as a cultural periodisation, 
the generic name for the post-postmodern art that first emerged in the 1990s 
and which still lacks an adequate theorisation.  
 
This is not, however, to suggest that no one has attempted to theorise the 
artistic present. Johanna Drucker and Nicolas Bourriaud have both sought to 
elaborate new, post-postmodern, aesthetic paradigms for contemporary art: 
“complicit aesthetics” (Drucker) and “relational aesthetics” (Bourriaud). The 
deep problems associated with both these accounts of contemporary art— 
emblematised by the fundamentally ambiguous status of the “aesthetic” within 
both of them—help to clarify the problems associated with specifying the 
contemporaneity of contemporary art. 
 
For Drucker, modernist autonomy was negated by postmodern contingency, 
which in turn has been negated by the “complicity” of contemporary art: 
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Modernist autonomy serves as the background and contrast with what came 
to be identified as postmodernism’s insistence on contingency. But neither of 
these provides the critical frame for understanding the condition of replete, 
even contradictory, complicity that characterises art at the millennium. 
Complicit aesthetics acknowledge the beneficial relation of artist and fine art 
in the system in which they function.28 
 
Yet Drucker does not provide a convincing account of why the objects that she 
designates (anachronistically) “fine art” might not just as well be considered 
luxury goods. Against the grain of her own earlier work on modernism and 
autonomy, Drucker insists on valorising the proliferation of contemporary 
cultural production as art without providing compelling criteria demonstrating 
why one should do so.29 It is hard to see why an “art” complicit with its own 
commodification through and through (rather than recognising the 
unavoidability of the requirement to wrest its autonomy from its heteronomy) 
should lay claim to the name. In an attempt to justify her position Drucker falls 
back on the rhetoric of aestheticism once used to distinguish the “fine” from the 
“applied” arts: “Fine art gives form to expressive, imaginative gestures, 
demonstrating that value can be created in symbolic discourse.”30 However, 
“expressive, imaginative gestures” and “value… created in symbolic discourse” 
do not qualify an object as art when these characteristics have long been as 
much a part of the commodity aesthetics of any successful new product.31  
 
Brief allusions to formalist aesthetics is the closest Drucker comes to a 
substantive claim on the name of art: “the critical rerecognition of the aesthetic 
value of material experience as a point of departure for the discussion of works 
of contemporary art, is what allows the concept of affirmative ‘complicity’ to 
absorb and extend the idea of ‘contingency’ that prevailed in postmodern 
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writing in the 1980s and early 1990s.”32 Yet in this misguided deduction, 
Drucker mistakes the contemporary, post-conceptual recognition of what Peter 
Osborne has termed the “ineliminability (but radical insufficiency)” of the 
aesthetic dimension of the artwork for what she calls “the critical rerecognition 
of the aesthetic value of material experience.”33 
 
Overall, there is too much heteronomy in Drucker’s account of contemporary 
art. Despite having written on the critical tradition, Drucker nevertheless 
produces an argument that is not only hostile towards but also essentially 
illegible within it. John Roberts notes of this tradition that “autonomy is the 
name given to the process of formal and cognitive self-criticism which art must 
undergo in order to constitute the conditions of its very possibility and 
emergence.”34 Here then the attempt to negate the negation that was 
postmodernism produces a mistaken affirmation. Drucker produces an account 
of heteronomous art and valorises it as if it were autonomous while all the time 
denying the validity of artistic autonomy.  
 
Here it is worth recalling Jeff Wall’s definition of a “postautonomous” art in 
order to distinguish it from Drucker’s. For Wall, the crucial point about 
postautonomous art is that it remains, against appearances, autonomous. It 
produces its autonomy out of its postautonomy: 
 
Autonomous art had reached a state where it appeared that it could only 
validly be made by means of the strictest imitation of the nonautonomous. This 
heteronomy might take the form of direct critical commentary, as with Art & 
Language; with the production of political propaganda, so common in the 
1970s; or with the many varieties of “intervention” or appropriation practiced 
more recently. But in all these procedures, an autonomous work of art is still necessarily 
created. The innovation is that the content of the work is the validity of the 
model or hypothesis of nonautonomy it creates.35 
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Wall’s account of postautonomous art (excepting his egregious inclusion of Art 
& Language within the tendency) is broadly coterminous with Foster’s critical 
postmodernism: “intervention” and “appropriation” are two of the most 
prominent critical categories developed by the art of the 1980s. In seeking to 
characterise a post-postmodern art Drucker suggests that art can simply take 
the next “logical” step and negate postautonomous art. This however is a 
negation too far since so-called complicit art transcends (autonomous) 
postautonomous art only by becoming a commodity through and through. 
Drucker, paradoxically employing an avant-garde logic of negation, produces 
nothing less than a false sublation of art and an affirmation of the culture 
industry. She even states as much: “art is a culture industry, rather than being 
opposed to it.”36 
 
Where Drucker’s work is pertinent is that, by attempting to valorise the 
proliferation of “complicit” art, she draws attention to the complete collapse of 
the autonomy of the traditional production and reception contexts of art (the 
bourgeois institutions of studio and museum) and recognises the development 
of an art industry out of what had been, at least residually, a sphere of 
production outside that of planned production. Yet this collapse in the 
autonomy of the institutions of art does not mean that individual artworks 
cannot produce their own autonomy, just that it is more difficult to do so. Here 
Chantal Mouffe’s intervention is apposite. She accurately summarises the 
substantive problem for contemporary art: “Can artistic practices still play a 
critical role in advanced industrial societies where artists and cultural workers 
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have become a necessary part of capitalist production?”37 Mouffe specifies a 
means by which we might assess the status of the contemporary artwork 
(playing a “critical role”) and delimits the contemporary social conditions 
against which this evaluation must be made (the thoroughgoing integration of 
art into “capitalist production”). Mouffe thus summarises the artistic and social 
conditions that any contemporary art—and hence art theory—will be obliged 
to negotiate.38  
 
Mouffe’s remark was made in the course of a discussion of Carsten Höller’s 
work and Höller himself has commented on the problem of autonomy and 
postautonomy in relation to contemporary art: “If one assumes that art is 
autonomous, one may try to build a bridge between two spheres: art and 
fashion, art and science. That kind of dualism and its supposed dialectical 
outcome, in a chic “autonomy-is-over” attitude, is not valid. I prefer the 
“and…and…and” model to the banality of duality.”39 Here, we sense Höller 
rhetorically taking his generational distance from a certain form of “chic” 
postmodern art for which autonomy-was-over precisely because it was 
understood so superficially. Höller also demonstrates his distance from Wall’s 
account of the paradoxical autonomy of postautonomous art. However, it is not 
clear from his account what Höller’s own, updated, conception of autonomy 
might be. Are these concatenated social systems (‘art’ and ‘fashion’ and 
‘science’) all held to be autonomous but somehow immanently relatable? We 
hear echoes of Deleuze and Guattari in this conjunction of conjunctions. 
Perhaps, though, we should not look to the artist’s public statements to supply 
us with firm answers, especially given Höller’s irony. The artist’s accounts of his 
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work are deliberately contradictory, wilfully inadequate. They are designed to 
evoke exactly the feelings of doubt and perplexity that are thematised 
throughout his practice. Furthermore, even were Höller not so evasive, the 
theory of artistic intentionality should be challenged. Artists are not necessarily 
the surest guides to the significance of their work and Höller’s emphasis on 
doubt acknowledges this. Here then we are obliged to look beyond Höller’s 
own account of his practice in order to understand the artistic problems he 
addresses. 
 
Two broad contemporary art “movements,” originating in the 1990s, formed 
the backdrop against which Höller’s work emerged. Descended from the 
investigations of conceptual artists in the 1960s and 1970s, most identifiably via 
their negotiated relation to institutional critique, these practices have been 
resolved under the proper names of “context art” and “relational art.” In 
Relational Aesthetics the curator and theorist Nicolas Bourriaud has defined them 
both as follows: “Context [art]: In situ art is a form of artistic activity that 
encompasses the space in which it is on view;” “Relational (art): A set of artistic 
practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the 
whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent 
and private space.”40 Yet the fact that Höller has been read as belonging to 
both relational and contextual “movements” should indicate that these 
categories are not mutually exclusive, or not at least as they have been 
theorised so far.41 Bourriaud suggests as much, insisting that they are “mainly 
one and the same thing.”42 However, Liam Gillick, amongst others, has insisted 
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on the tension between “context” and “relational” art, disputing the accuracy 
of Bourriaud’s claim: 
 
In Cologne during the 1990s—well before the publication of Relational 
Aesthetics—a tension could be perceived between those artists who advocated 
transparency within art (Andrea Fraser, Clegg and Guttman, and others 
associated with Galerie Christian Nagel) and those who believed that a 
sequence of veils and meanderings might be necessary to combat the chaotic 
ebb and flow of capitalism (Phillipe Parreno, Dominique Gonzalez-Foerster, 
and others associated with the Galerie Esther Schipper).43 
 
For Gillick the tension was exemplified in the competing rosters of two Cologne 
galleries, rosters which were distinguished by their artists’ opposed responses to 
the problem of artistic critique. Gillick’s account thus gives a social basis for the 
division between context and relational artists in relation to their representation 
by Galerie Christian Nagel (context art) and Galerie Esther Schipper (relational 
art). More significantly for our argument here (since gallery representation will 
be considered principally an epiphenomenon of an artist’s position rather than 
constitutive thereof), Gillick names the differences between the approaches of 
the two artistic groups: “transparency within art” for context art, “a sequence 
of veils and meanderings” for relational art. Reformulating the elliptical quality 
of Gillick’s claims: self-reflexive immanent critique for context art, oblique 
immanent critique for relational art. Remarking on the break between 
relational art and other artistic strategies Walead Beshty states that: 
 
The conglomeration of strategies, and artists, that fit under the heading 
Relational Aesthetics indicate, if only for recent history’s lack of “movements,” 
a pronounced shift in the topography of contemporary art, and the need for a 
realignment of critical terminology. Despite its amorphous set of conditions 
and tenets, as they are expressed by Nicolas Bourriaud… it separates itself 
distinctly from early interventionist tactics (i.e. Institutional Critique, Identity 
Politics, Performance and Installation).44 
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Rather than understand context and relational art as discrete “movements” 
then, they will be understood as related, but not congruent, strategies within 
the development of the problematic of artistic critique, specifically the problem 
of how to produce an autonomous contemporary, post-postmodern, art. In this 
endeavour context and relational artists necessarily looked back to a pre-
postmodern (but ambiguously modern) conceptual art: Gillick has described 
“the peculiar way the early 90s mirrored the early 70s.”45  
 
In order to understand contemporary art it is necessary to articulate a nuanced 
account of conceptual art in its social, political and intellectual context. Despite 
the range, depth and quality of first and second generations of scholarship on 
conceptual art, work still remains to be done in this area. By looking again at 
the emergence, consolidation and dissolution of conceptual art we discover new 
lines in the conceptual genealogy of contemporary art. We begin to develop a 
critical history that can account for, and assess, the relation between the 
conceptual art of the late 60s and the contemporary, post-conceptual relational 
and context art of the 90s and beyond.  
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Modernism and Conceptual Art 
 
The protracted moment of uncertainty regarding art’s status coincides precisely 
with the advent and development of conceptual art. Conceptual art and the 
crisis of modernism are coincident phenomena. Furthermore, conceptual art 
can be understood as precisely the pre-eminent artistic response to the crisis of 
modernist art. As Charles Harrison suggests, ‘the representative critical 
character of conceptual art was established by reference to the epistemological 
conditions and implications of Modernist theory… to the ontological character 
of Modernist production, and to the moral and ideological character of 
Modernist culture…46 Memorably, Mel Ramsden has described conceptual art 
as “Modernism’s nervous breakdown.”47 Yet with equal legitimacy we might 
also claim that the uncertain status of contemporary (as opposed to modernist) 
art is conceptual art’s legacy, i.e. that what was latent in the crisis of modernist 
art was precisely conceptual art and that it is conceptual art which then goes on 
to set the terms of the crisis. Victor Burgin has elaborated on the ambivalence 
of this situation: “It seems likely that ‘conceptualism’ is destined… to be 
represented as that ‘movement’ which, by undermining ‘modernism,’ paved 
the way for ‘post-modernism.’ None of the ‘isms’ here, however, were, or are, 
unitary phenomena nor do such cultural phenomena simply give way to one 
another like television programmes in an evening’s viewing.”48 
 
Perhaps though it is not appropriate to think of conceptual art as an ‘ism’ at all. 
Rather, it should be understood as a set of interrelated practices that establish 
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the conditions for the production of (autonomous) art after the crisis of 
modernism.  This is the substance of Michael Newman’s position: 
 
The legacy of Conceptual art is not a solution, nor is it a ‘style’ to be 
imitated, but it is rather a problematic: the laying bare on the one hand of 
the conditions which all art has to face whether Conceptual or not… and, 
on the other hand, the specific conditions of its historical moment and 
socio-political milieu… Perhaps in this dual exigency Conceptual art 
renders explicit the aporia of modern art.49 
 
 
How then should we think the relation of modernism and postmodernism as 
mediated by conceptual art practice? In Foster’s condition of “aftermath,” this 
surely structures the “aporia” that Newman draws attention to. From our 
perspective, does modernism even “give way” to postmodernism at all? Höller’s 
work, for example, does not seem to fit within any familiar schema of artistic 
postmodernism.  
 
Neither Greenberg nor Adorno, as the pre-eminent theorists of high 
modernism offer us any real insight on conceptual art. Predictably, given his 
refusal of minimalism, Greenberg was unable to register the critical force and 
decisive reorientation of the ontology of modern art that conceptual art 
represented. He dismissed conceptual art and its anti-aesthetic challenge with a 
couple of throwaway lines in the late criticism. Adorno, in contrast, did not 
reflect on conceptual art precisely because he died just as it was beginning to 
gain widespread visibility. Both Greenberg’s medium-specific modernism and 
Adorno’s more complex “dissonant” modernism are points of departure, 
marking the end of a certain moment of modernist art but of little direct use in 
treating the conceptual art that effected it. 
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However, working within a broadly Adornian framework, Peter Osborne has 
developed a theoretical position that does not rely on the modernism/ 
postmodernism dyad. Instead, it elevates ‘conceptual art’ above the position of 
one movement amongst others, giving it a privileged ontological status and 
periodising claim. He asserts that it is through ‘conceptual art’ that the various 
and competing antimodernist strategies in the art of the 1960s should be 
conceived. For Osborne then, the modernism/postmodernism sequence should 
be replaced with: “An alternative periodization of art after modernism that 
privileges the sequence modernism/conceptual art/post-conceptual art over 
the modernist/postmodernist couplet, and treats the conceptual/post-
conceptual trajectory as the standpoint from which to totalize the wide array of 
other anti-‘modernist’ movements – where ‘modernism’ is used here in its 
restrictive and ultimately mystifying, but nonetheless still critically ‘actual,’ 
Greenbergian sense.”50 
 
Osborne goes on to observe, parenthetically, that: “(A philosophically adequate 
conception of modernism as a temporal logic of cultural forms would embrace 
the whole sequence; ‘postmodernism’ being the misrecognition of a particular 
stage in the dialectic of modernisms.)”51 On such terms, “modernism” would 
include conceptual art and post-conceptual art within its temporal logic, such 
that modernism is not in any simple sense superseded by conceptual art. 
Modernism is both a stage in the sequence (a specific period), and the sequence 
itself. Conceptual art, for Osborne, is succeeded by a set of post-conceptual 
practices derived out of its critical legacy (in a sense, from its failures): 
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By ‘post-conceptual’ art I understand an art premised on the complex historical 
experience and critical legacy of conceptual art. The critical legacy of 
conceptual art consists in the combination of four main insights, which 
collectively make up the condition of possibility of a post-conceptual art. These 
are: 1) the ineliminability but radical insufficiency of the aesthetic dimension of 
the art work; 2) the necessary conceptuality of the art work; 3) the critical 
requirement of the anti-aesthetic use of aesthetic materials; 4) the radically 
redistributive character of the unity of the artwork across the totality of its 
material instantiations (and the instability of the empirical borders of this 
totality).52 
 
According to Osborne then, conceptual art constitutes a finished project, but its 
various ends prove directly generative for a set of post-conceptual practices 
derived from it.  
 
Following this model, the question of contemporary art’s criticality should be 
resolved in relation to the distinctively post-conceptual character of 
contemporary art  (this being the defining ontological condition of 
contemporary art’s contemporaneity). Attempting to do so will require us to 
look again at the history of conceptual art. Höller’s work, and the broader 
context from which it emerged, will cause us to think again about the critical 
effectivity of past works of conceptual art. The adequacy and specificity of 
existing critical accounts of ‘conceptual art’ are at stake here. For, just as artistic 
postmodernism eventually falters as a result of its restricted reading of 
modernism (as Greenbergian) so the adequacy of the ‘post-conceptual’ as a 
category depends on how conceptual art is construed. Might the “complex 
historical experience and critical legacy” of conceptual art have further insights 
to offer us, insights that a contemporary generation of artists has picked up on 
but which has not yet been adequately reflected in existing accounts of their 
work? 
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In 1998 the artist Silvia Kolbowski sent letters to sixty artists inviting them to 
participate in a project on the history of conceptual art. Forty artists eventually 
agreed to her request to briefly describe a conceptual art work (not one of their 
own) which they personally witnessed or experienced between 1965 and 1975. 
Kolbowski deliberately gave a highly inclusive definition of conceptual art, 
including photography, film, video and performance. She also stipulated that 
neither the name of the artist, nor the title of the work described should be 
mentioned (though the place and date of installation might be). Subsequently, 
the artists who responded were filmed reciting their account, with only their 
hands in shot. The resulting responses were presented, also anonymised, in 
September 1999 at American Fine Arts Gallery in New York. The artists’ 
hands were projected on various walls of the gallery and the artists’ voices were 
broadcast, out of sync, on a sound system. Kolbowski’s entitled this work An 
Inadequate History of Conceptual Art.53 
 
The piece is suggestive on many levels, exposing the plurality of practices that 
have been considered “conceptual,” the instability of memory, as well as the 
ideological conflicts and personal tensions of a past era. At another level An 
Inadequate History of Conceptual Art has the quality of a highbrow parlour game, 
challenging the audience to test their knowledge of the period and to identify 
the artists speaking (the aggregate set of names of the participating artists was 
provided on a handout). Most pertinently to the discussion here, the work sets 
up a seemingly sceptical position with regard to historiography. By 
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foregrounding the inadequacy of the historical account, Kolbowski seems also 
to question historiography tout court. Yet at the same time her work is manifestly 
an example of oral history, albeit one in which no attempt has been made to 
corroborate or cross-check its sources or even to reconcile its many disparate 
voices into a coherent narrative. At a very straightforward level then the work is 
literally and self-consciously “inadequate” when considered from the 
perspective of even the most minimal set of historiographical conventions. An 
Inadequate History of Conceptual Art is profoundly ambivalent then, holding out the 
possibility that one might construct an adequate history at the same time as 
suggesting the impossibility of so doing.  
 
Arguably however, when one considers the piece still further, this ambiguity 
recedes a little. In its place arises the impression that Kolbowski’s work is in fact 
a profound reflection on the requirement that history be recognised as made 
from the perspective of the present. The voices narrate past events, events that 
occurred at different times and in different places. Yet the narratives combine 
in the present moment and must be made sense of as such. Kolbowski 
stipulates that she made the piece against the backdrop of the neo-
conceptualism of the 1990s and that she was concerned to “trouble the fluidity 
of the official return.”54 The piece alerts us to the dangers of believing that one 
can simply inherit a received account, independent of any individual’s vested 
interests. Instead the work argues that conceptual art is necessarily received in 
the light of the problems of the present moment and must be construed and 
constructed as such. An Inadequate History of Conceptual Art refuses the possibility 
of any simplistic neo- relation of recovery, and rather insists that true fidelity to 
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the history of conceptual art involves the difficult work of reconstituting it in the 
present. Kolbowski’s work does not ultimately propose that all historiography is 
inadequate, but rather holds open the question of what an adequate history of 
conceptual art might be. 
 
Conceptual art (and post-conceptual art), following Osborne, is a “critical 
category that is constituted at the level of the historical ontology of the art 
work; it is not a traditional art-historical or art-critical concept at the level of 
either medium, form or style.”55 At this level then, the degree to which an 
individual artist chooses to associate him or herself with the conceptual art 
“movement” is not relevant. The continuity of a tradition is not what is in 
question here. Rather, the critical character of any artist’s work will determine 
in what relation they stand to conceptual art and its post-conceptual legacy. As 
long as there are artists actualising the requisite ontological conditions of post-
conceptual art there will also be a requirement for a working concept of 
conceptual art. Its adequacy will be determined precisely by the sufficiency of 
the account it provides for the art being made which actualises these post-
conceptual conditions.  
 
Working towards an adequate history of conceptual art will involve working 
backwards from the present rather than simply digging in the archive. Precisely 
the grounds of what is of interest in the historical record will be constituted 
from the perspective of the present. In this regard, the phenomenological 
immediacy of the oral testimony that Kolbowski collected from the first 
generation of conceptual artists could be misleading. This is perhaps the reason 
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that she chose to sunder the hands of the makers from their voices and, 
moreover, had the artists reflect on each others’ work rather than their own. 
Kolbowski used these devices in order to make it clear that what was of 
significance in the past, what was actual even, can only be constructed 
discursively in the present (even for conceptual artists themselves). 
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Histories and Theories  
 
The first generation of the historiography of conceptual art was for the most 
part conducted by its practitioners or those very closely associated with them. 
Here the most influential figures have been Lucy Lippard, Charles Harrison, 
Benjamin Buchloh and Jeff Wall (other artists and critics having made 
important but more local contributions): Wall started his career as a conceptual 
artist; Buchloh edited and published Interfunktionen (a magazine strongly 
associated with conceptual art); Charles Harrison, after an early career as an 
independent critic, joined Art & Language as their official historian (“I write 
both as a participant in the practice of Art & Language and as an advocate for 
its various productions”); and Lucy Lippard openly announced that she 
“identified with artists and never saw myself as their adversary.”56 This 
situation was not coincidental but rather resulted directly from conceptual art’s 
challenge to the traditional structures of critical authority and validation. As 
Ursula Meyer noted in one of the first survey texts dedicated to characterising 
conceptual art: “Conceptual artists take over the role of the critic in terms of 
framing their own propositions, ideas and concepts.”57 Yet from the perspective 
of accepted historiographical method, accounts provided by first hand sources 
(and a fortiori by interested observers) are considered at best partial and at worst 
biased. Such accounts risk taking on the character of memoirs or polemics. 
Lucy Lippard exemplifies this problem in an almost comic manner: 
 
There has been a lot of bickering about what Conceptual art is/was; who 
began it; who did what when with it; what its goals, philosophy, and politics 
were and might have been. I was there, but I don’t trust my memory. I don’t 
trust anyone else’s either. And I trust even less the authoritative overviews by 
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those who were not there. So I’m going to quote myself a lot here, because  
I knew more about it then than I do now, despite the advantages of hindsight.58 
 
 
On the criteria that Lippard evinces here there would be no legitimate 
historiography other than that of participant observers and thus no 
historiography at all. Though the accounts of conceptual art provided by 
Lippard, Harrison, Buchloh and Wall are important in many respects—often 
in fact still constituting the most substantial critical positions on aspects of the 
period—they are not without flaws, flaws which alternative genealogies of 
conceptual art need to correct. The authority that has accrued to these first 
hand accounts has produced a situation where the historiography proper of 
conceptual art appears to be revisionist, precisely because it challenges the 
authority of participant observers.  
 
Characterising conceptual art proved controversial from the very beginning. 
Lucy Lippard and John Chandler’s article “The Dematerialization of Art” 
(1968) noted the emergence of an “ultra-conceptual art” opposed to a previous 
generation’s “emotional/intuitive” artistic strategies, opining that: “such a 
trend appears to be provoking a profound dematerialization of art, especially of 
art as object, and if it continues to prevail, it may well result in the object 
becoming wholly obsolete.”59 Terry Atkinson, on behalf of Art & Language, 
immediately critiqued Lippard and Chandler’s metaphoric use of the term 
“dematerialization.” For Atkinson, already employing the pedantic yet ironic 
tone that would come to characterise much of Art & Language’s output, 
“dematerialization” was strictu sensu “the conversion… of a state of matter into 
that of radiant energy” and consequently “if one were to speak of an art-form 
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that used radiant matter, then one would be committed to the contradiction of 
speaking of a formless form.”60  
 
This critique did not stop Lippard from publishing an anthology of “so-called 
conceptual or information or idea art” in 1973 that explicitly used 
dematerialization as the conceptual basis for its periodising claim (Six years: The 
Dematerialization of the art object from 1966-72). Lippard did however publish an 
excerpt from Atkinson’s letter in the volume and has subsequently conceded 
Atkinson’s point in her preface to the 1997 reissue of the original: “it has often 
been pointed out to me that dematerialization is an inaccurate term… but for 
lack of a better term I have continued to refer to a process of dematerialization, 
or a de-emphasis on material aspects.”61 Such a concession leaves her claim to 
critically characterise conceptual art looking underfounded with the result that 
Six years is reduced to the status of a loose historical compendium, a fact 
Lippard perversely affirms as a point of principle.62  
 
If Lippard’s claims are self-admittedly too broadly founded then Charles 
Harrison’s work actively embraces the opposite danger. Having taken up the 
role of in-house historian for Art & Language, Harrison’s critical neutrality was 
necessarily and openly disavowed for an activist commitment to a particular 
critical politics from an Art & Language point of view. Notwithstanding his 
explicit partiality, Harrison’s critique of loose definitions of conceptual art is 
apposite: 
 
There was talk of a ‘Dematerialization of Art,’ of a ‘Post-Object Art’, and so 
on. It can also be said that the supposed ‘critique’ of the art object on which 
various artists were engaged… was not addressed to all art objects in general 
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but specifically to the high-art object as construed in the Modernist theory of 
the 1950s and early 1960s… I mean to suggest that Conceptual art can be 
distinguished by the different focus of its critique of Modernism and of its 
typical object.63 
 
For Harrison, much conceptual art is in fact simply an extension of the logic of 
minimalism: “In their American forms at least – ‘Conceptual art’ and 
‘Dematerialization’ were secondary historicist consequences of the qualitative 
shift which Minimalism represented… this ‘post-Minimal’, anti-formal art was 
characterised by nothing so much as its reaction to negative example.”64 
Harrison is unfailingly hostile to minimalism: “the Minimalist downgrading of 
relations within the work was… the means by which the Minimal object 
established a relation of compatibility with the representing institution – a type 
of institution for which the modern American museum was the token.”65 In 
Harrison’s view, minimalist art, and by extension the type of conceptual art 
which he asserts was the direct descendent of it, was complicit with its 
recuperation by the art system: “sections of the supposedly anti-Modernist 
avant-garde were able to represent themselves as subverting the system while in 
truth meshing the more closely with its operations as the curators of 
themselves.”66  
 
On Harrison’s account conceptual art proper emerged only in Art & 
Language’s work. Insisting that art had “disappeared into the 
conceptualisations of its discourse” Art & Language were to draw the 
conclusion that “it was the inquiry which therefore had to become ‘the 
work.’”67 Harrison recognises that this did not entail avoiding production of 
material objects, asserting that the task “was not to invent a form of high art 
without objects – logically speaking, an absurd enough idea – but rather to 
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evade in practice those predicates which the beholder was wont to attach to the 
objects of his attention.”68 Such a “suppression” of the beholder was necessary 
not only as a completion of the negation of Modernism (as conceived on 
Greenbergian and, subsequently, Friedian lines) but also as the grounds of any 
possibility of constituting new constituencies for art. For Art & Language the 
displacement of the beholder was “the pursuit… of the idea of a public that was 
intellectually and not just culturally franchised.”69 What Harrison’s account 
refuses to countenance however is the suggestion that post-minimal conceptual 
art might enact a genuine or effective critique of the institutions with which he 
asserts it was simply complicit. This then is the ground of his difference from 
Buchloh’s highly influential account of the character and significance of 
conceptual art. 
 
Buchloh’s account of the origins and development of conceptual art remains, if 
no longer hegemonic, the dominant critical position and the one from which or 
against which subsequent debates have most clearly developed. Buchloh traces 
conceptual art’s origins to an “aesthetic of administration” and describes its 
development into a “critique of institutions.”70 According to this well-known 
account, conceptual art subjected art (understood as that which elicited 
“traditional aesthetic experience”) to the “vernacular of administration” 
wherein “administration” is understood as a direct mimicry of “the operating 
logic of late capitalism and its positivist instrumentality.”71 Buchloh traces this 
aesthetic of administration from its origins in post-minimalism (Morris, LeWitt) 
to what is taken to be its exemplification in Joseph Kosuth’s tautologous 
definition of the work of art. Buchloh asserts that the triumph of such an 
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aesthetic of administration was followed by an extension of its logic which 
nevertheless also constituted a critique: “That was the moment when Buren’s 
and Haacke’s work from the late 1960s onward turned the violence of that 
mimetic relationship back onto the ideological apparatus itself, using it to 
analyze and expose the social institutions from which the laws of positivist 
instrumentality and the logic of administration emanate in the first place.”72 
This development, while an advance over the essentially affirmative character 
of an aesthetic of administration nevertheless remains highly ambiguous. For 
Buchloh, developing an Adornian thematic, it is unclear whether conceptual 
art simply colludes in the subjection of aesthetic experience to the logic of the 
totally administered world leaving none of art’s traditional autonomy, none of 
its resistance to the logic of commodity production under capitalist social 
relations.73 Furthermore, Buchloh concludes his assessment of conceptual art 
by gloomily reflecting on the return of the traditional medium-specific, 
aesthetic art that conceptual art had sought to invalidate.  
 
Here though Buchloh seems unduly pessimistic in that he fails to account for 
the fact that conceptual art remains a permanent challenge to the validity of 
the return of the “displaced painterly and sculptural paradigms of the past.” It 
is not clear that painting and sculpture return as art, that is as a paradigm, 
rather than as commodities, unable to convincingly ground their claims to art 
status. Buchloh’s otherwise dialectical elaboration also seems to grind to a halt 
in the un-historical fixity of such an absolutised “return” and, given its 
melancholic insistence on posthistoire, may now simply look hostage to its 
postmodern moment of articulation.  
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Buchloh’s avowed pessimism can also perhaps be traced to another source, 
namely as a covert response to Jeff Wall’s pointed critique of Buchloh’s critical 
position prior to “Conceptual Art 1962–69.” For Wall, Buchloh’s earlier work 
on conceptual artists including Dan Graham, Daniel Buren and Michael Asher 
could best be described as a “functionalism” characterised by the requirement 
that advanced art act “as an element of social planning for liberated order.”74 
According to Wall, in Buchloh’s position “the negativity of the Adorno-
Horkheimer position is combined uncomfortably with the activism of Walter 
Benjamin’s Brechtian writings.”75 Wall notes that in such a confusion of 
incompatible positions Buchloh’s work shared the conceptual flaw of much 
New Left thinking.   
 
While Buchloh does not abandon his “functionalism” in the face of Wall’s 
criticisms there is a strong sense in which his subsequent history of conceptual 
art takes them on board and is inflected by them (albeit without acknowledging 
this directly) such that the effectiveness of conceptual art’s “critique of 
institutions” is viewed, from the perspective of the present, as historically 
foreclosed, suggesting a move away from his original attempt to hold on to an 
ideal of activism and towards what Wall, arguably inaccurately, characterises as 
Adorno’s “defeatism.”76 In reality, Adorno insisted on the radical uncertainty 
of art as a corollary of the irrevocability of its autonomy. That art exists at all is 
due to its dialectic with anti-art (albeit an inherently degenerative one): “If all 
art is the secularization of transcendence, it participates in the dialectic of 
enlightenment. Art has confronted this dialectic with the aesthetic conception 
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of antiart; indeed, without this element art is no longer thinkable. This implies 
nothing less than that art must go beyond its own concept in order to remain 
faithful to that concept.”77 
 
Wall uses Buchloh, Benjamin and Adorno as foils for his own account of the 
development and significance of conceptual art. In so doing he does not always 
give a persuasive characterisation of his sources. Wall ventriloquizes 
unconvincingly when he claims, “For Buchloh the dematerialization of art into 
a more direct form of critical cognition is the essential achievement of 
conceptualism” since for Buchloh, in his mature account of conceptual art at 
least, it was only in the turn to a critique of its enabling material and discursive 
institutions that conceptual art evaded complicity with the logic of 
administration.78 Wall’s critique of Buchloh’s account of conceptual art is 
principally a device with which to hone his own version of the history. For 
Wall, conceptual art can best be characterised with reference to its “mimicry” 
and its “exhibitionism.” Its mimicry consists in deploying “the discourses of 
academicism, publicity and architecture,” against the traditional “image or 
object” of art.79 Historically however, for Wall, “publicity” is the dominant 
discourse into which “academicism” and “architecture” have been 
incorporated. Consequently conceptual art, in mimicking the devices of 
publicity in its attack on aesthetic art, unwittingly conspired in the broader 
social process of the reification and instrumentalisation of critical language. 
Here in fact Wall and Buchloh are in accord. Wall’s account of conceptual art’s 
“exhibitionism” is the point at which they diverge.  
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For Wall, “Conceptualism’s exhibition strategy” self-consciously presented the 
“museum-gallery system” as the crucial social arena of this synthesis of 
discourses.80 This is held to be inseparable from the “appropriation of existing 
media forms such as magazines, TV or billboards.”81 Yet, and this is the crucial 
point for Wall, such a strategy, rather than representing a recovery of the 
historical avant-gardes’ project to reconnect art and life via a critique of 
corporatised social institutions—as Buchloh insists it did—merely staged the 
limit of conceptual art’s criticality: “conceptual art carries only the mortified 
remains of social art silenced by three decades of capitalist war, political terror 
and ‘prosperity’ out into the city. Its display of these remains can only be 
exhibitionistic…”82  
 
Here though much centres on how one conceives the social content of art. For 
Wall social content seems to be construed in opposition to formalism. 
Reflecting on conceptual art’s incomplete negation of minimalism he observes, 
“conceptual art is still far from free of the negative formalism which has 
disappointed it.”83 Nevertheless, from an Adornian perspective, formalism is 
not incompatible with social content, quite the opposite in fact since the 
conventionally presented social content of realism has become complicit with 
the forces of reaction: “Art struggles against this kind of collusion by excluding 
through its language of form that remainder of affirmation maintained by 
social realism: This is the social element in radical formalism.”84  
 
Wall’s account of conceptual art proves most useful then from the perspective 
of its genealogy rather than its teleology. For Wall, conceptual art emerged 
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from the “reflection on the institutionalization of a radical but still puristic 
Minimal art” and was linked to “the concurrent revival of Critical Theory on 
the New Left.”85 Wall’s persuasive elaboration of the links between conceptual 
art and Critical Theory (broadly construed) provides useful ground on which to 
situate an examination of the conceptual genealogy of contemporary art.  
 
If Lippard’s curatorial energy and catalysing role in the documentation of 
conceptual art was highly significant, her own theoretical claims for 
“dematerialization” as a critical conceptualisation of conceptual art have been 
less so. Consequently it is Harrison’s, Buchloh’s and Wall’s accounts of 
conceptual art that have largely set the terms of the critical debate. All three 
are, as has been noted, historical accounts by participant observers. 
Consequently they occupy the unstable discursive ground between art critical 
and art historical discourse. Nevertheless, the historiography “proper” of 
conceptual art has modelled its interventions according to the broad terms 
established by these three accounts. A central axis for many more recent 
interventions has however involved disputing these earlier accounts’ narration 
of conceptual art’s “failure.” 
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Unresolved Problems of Conceptual Art 
 
Despite having reconfigured their social and artistic landscapes, both 
conceptual art and the New Left are frequently held to constitute failed 
projects. The New Left, it is argued, did not bring about a lasting social 
revolution, nor did conceptual art bring about a lasting artistic one. The forces 
of counter-revolution overcame the artistic and political insurgencies of the late 
1960s. Ultimately, it is concluded, both conceptual art and the New Left were 
recuperated by the social systems that they challenged. As Buchloh has 
infamously remarked, “the Enlightenment triumph of Conceptual Art—its 
transformation of audiences, its abolition of object status and commodity 
form—would most of all only be short-lived…”86 Harrison provides a strikingly 
similar formulation: “It would also be true to say that the degeneration of 
conceptual art as a form of cultural project largely coincided with the 
degeneration of the movements of ’68 and with the gradual reimposition of 
Cold War culture in a more sophisticated form.”87 Furthermore, Harrison 
observes “If the moment of the later 1960s was a form of failed cultural 
revolution, there could be no doubt about the success of the counter-
revolutionary culture which was the culture of the 1980s.”88 Wall is perhaps 
even more brutal than either Harrison or Buchloh—he dates the failure of 
conceptual art practically to its inception:  
 
The anti-objects of conceptualism were ‘absorbed’ and ‘negated’ (to use the 
Marcusian terms of the period) as critical intervention by the aura of value 
imposed upon them by speculation. Conceptual art’s feeble response to the 
clash of its political fantasies with the real economic conditions of the art world 
marks out its historical limit as critique… What is unique about conceptual art 
is its reinvention of defeatism; of the indifference always implicit in puristic or 
formalist art. The grey volumes of conceptualism are filled with sombre ciphers 
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which express primarily the inexpressibility of socially-critical thought in the 
form of art.89  
 
 
Yet although Wall undertakes extensive discussion of Benjamin and Adorno, 
and notwithstanding his insistence on the close relationship between conceptual 
art and the New Left, Wall makes only this single, fleeting, allusion to 
Marcuse’s work. Given that Marcuse is arguably the most important theoretical 
influence on the New Left such an oversight is puzzling. Its origin perhaps lies 
in the fact that that Marcuse himself had relatively little to say on the 
development of the postformalist visual arts. Yet neither Adorno nor Benjamin 
commented on an art after modernism whereas Marcuse’s thought did enter 
“artworld” debates in the 60s, both directly through Marcuse’s contributions to 
art magazines (summarising the central features of his aesthetics) and indirectly 
via Jack Burnham’s systems aesthetics which was inflected by his reading of 
Marcuse’s philosophy.90  
 
Furthermore, and this is something neither Wall, nor Harrison nor Buchloh 
reflect on, the neutralization of the New Left critique was not achieved without 
cost to the established order: recuperation didn’t proceed without incident, 
capitalism and its threatened social systems had to thoroughly remake 
themselves in the face of the social movements of the 1960s. Defeating the 
challenge to the established order involved refounding that order in an altered 
form. Advanced industrial capitalism was compelled to refashion itself, 
reanimated by a new spirit.91 In fact, in a morbid détournement of détournement, 
counter-revolutionary forces actually took up revolutionary social demands all 
the better to oppose them. This, then, was no simple rappel a l’ordre, but rather a 
1. Contemporary Art’s Conceptual Genealogy                
 37 
fundamental reorganisation of advanced industrial capitalism along new lines 
for which the name postfordism has now been widely, if not universally, 
adopted. This dynamic was noted by Marcuse at the beginning of the 1970s. In 
Counterrevolution and Revolt Marcuse noted the “preventive” measures taken up by 
the counter-revolution stimulated by the cultural revolution: “Capitalism 
reorganizes itself to meet the threat of a revolution which would be the most 
radical of all historical revolutions. It would be the first truly world-historical 
revolution.”92 Where, however, Marcuse now looks mistaken is in his 
suggestion that anti-aesthetic art (of which conceptual art was the vanguard) 
was unconsciously complicit with a reorganised advanced industrial capitalism 
because both represented the destruction of traditional high culture which 
Marcuse claimed, rather tenuously in light of his earlier insights on the 
affirmative character of culture, resisted its bourgeois context by virtue of an 
ultimately “antibourgeois” character.93 Here Marcuse risked simply affirming 
aesthetic art ignoring the necessary dialectic of art and anti-art persuasively laid 
out by Adorno.  
 
Demonstrably then, conceptual art and the New Left were events that 
produced effects that have been constitutive for our contemporary political and 
artistic situation. Advanced contemporary art understands itself as 
constitutively post-conceptual, advanced contemporary politics proposes itself 
as distinctively, if tendentiously, “post-political.” In this sense, conceptual art 
and the New Left succeeded, if only in order to fail.  Conceptual art and the 
New Left succeeded in fundamentally remapping the terrain of art and politics 
but, by not securing this new terrain, are held to have failed.  
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It is worth emphasising that such an assessment must take the form of a 
retrospective totalisation (in greater or lesser bad faith with the movements’ 
original aims). Conceptual art and the New Left “fail” only from the 
perspective of the present, their failure depends on the present’s continued 
inadequation to their challenge, that is on the continuing artistic and political 
shortcomings of the present. In fairness to Wall, he insists on the failure of 
conceptual art while also noting the dialectical potential of this failure: “This 
failed and unresolved aspect of conceptualism remains crucial. The movement 
appears today above all as incomplete.”94 Yet Wall, in noting the “social 
ascendancy of Pop” with “its compulsive and unreflective mimicry of all forms 
of culture” at the expense of the “conceptualist struggle,” ultimately submits to 
the force of an ascendant (reactionary) postmodernism.95 This postmodern 
logic continues to stand as the prevailing cultural periodisation of the present 
(even as its critical purchase no longer feels secure). Here, then, postmodern 
theory can be understood, following Habermas, as an ultimately conservative 
ideology of counter-revolution. 
 
Consequently, the question of how to both produce and theorise a genuine 
“contemporary” art presents itself as increasingly urgent. The consequence of 
failing to endow conceptual art with sufficient determinacy is that its 
possibilities are subjected to premature closure in a peremptory account of its 
“failure.” This situation results in the persistent problem of having to 
perpetually cast subsequent waves of advanced art production (that is, art that 
is both ontologically and politically ambitious) as lying in a ‘neo’ relation to an 
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authentic, originary moment of conceptual art which, on closer inspection, 
reveals itself to have been riven with its own competing claims to origination 
and authenticity.  
 
Hal Foster summarises the problem precisely, though draws the wrong 
conclusion: “The 1990s and 2000s have witnessed various attempts to recover 
unfinished projects of the 1960s as well – that is, to set up a further “neo” 
relation of recovery vis-à-vis Conceptual, Process and Body art in particular. 
Yet this work has not yet demonstrated whether critiques as singular as 
Conceptual, Process, and Body art can be transformed into a tradition (or 
tradition substitute) coherent enough to support contemporary practice.”96 
Foster accurately diagnoses the fatigue of the ‘neo’ relation but fails to realise 
that this fatigue is the necessary result of the perpetual search for artistic and 
critical novelty that he himself subconsciously instantiates. This requirement to 
produce the new is structural to a modernism that Foster claims to have 
overcome and the rhetorical impulse towards its development here leads Foster 
to make the surprising claim that conceptual art constituted a highly “singular” 
critique. Only the narrowest reading of conceptual art—as Anglo-American 
analytic conceptual art perhaps—could render a global artistic movement 
directed against a variety of art, mainstream media and socio-political 
institutions “singular.” It is in fact demonstrably just such a narrow reading of 
conceptual art that leads to the necessity of asserting its failure. 
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* 
 
In considering the unresolved problems of conceptual art it quickly becomes 
clear that we need to indicate exactly which “conceptual art” we are referring 
to. At the least this involves distinguishing between analytical, or ‘strong,’ 
conceptual art and a more inclusive conceptual art. If inclusive conceptual art 
can be read as developing from Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” 
(which remains a transitional, object-producing practice), then analytical 
conceptual art comes to focus exclusively on the propositional definition of the 
concept of art, principally through the work of Joseph Kosuth and Art & 
Language. Analytical conceptual art is famously hostile toward more inclusive 
conceptual art for what it perceives as its residual aestheticism—hence Kosuth’s 
categorisation of his own art as “Theoretical Conceptual Art” and that of other 
conceptual artists as “Stylistic Conceptual Art.”97 Yet analytical conceptual art 
faltered with the discredited linguistic positivism on which it depended 
philosophically. Apparently then conceptual art’s success (demonstrating that 
art and aesthetics are not coincident) was precisely its failure (the realisation 
that they cannot finally be distinguished comprehensively).98 
 
Joseph Kosuth reflected on conceptual art and the problems it raised in his 
contribution to the catalogue for Jack Burnham’s Software show produced at the 
Jewish Museum in 1970 (Burnham’s first and last curatorial endeavour). For 
Kosuth, his art consisted of “placing this activity (investigation) in an art 
context (i.e. art as idea as idea).” This was not to be confused with the inevitable 
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decisions of taste he exhibited when installing his investigations. He expanded 
on this: 
 
This problem exists because of the still prevalent belief that there is a 
conceptual connection between art and aesthetics—thus it becomes assumed 
that there is artistic relevance to my choices based on taste. Fifty years from 
now if my idea of art is extant it will be so only through the activities of living 
artists, and the taste I showed in my choices of the installation for this show will 
be dated and irrelevant.99 
 
 
Kosuth’s “idea of art” is not very evident in the activities of artists, less than 
forty years after he staked his claim to posterity. However conceptual art’s 
critical legacy should not be confused with the contemporary standing of 
Joseph Kosuth’s work, nor even with Art & Language’s broader account of 
conceptual art with which he is connected, albeit contentiously.100 Other 
conceptual artist’s idea of art is very much alive in the work of living artists.  
 
Returning then to Kosuth’s admonishment and inflecting its terms we might 
generate the following formula: “if an idea of art is extant, it will be so only 
through the activities of living artists.” This neat formulation is apparently 
complicated by the fact that most of the first generation of conceptual artists 
are themselves still alive and making work and thus might be expected to be 
continuing their own “idea of art” themselves. As Liam Gillick has observed (no 
doubt considering the status of his own relation to conceptual art): “most 
conceptual artists are still alive and can be questioned in person…”101 To the 
extent to which they have worked through the implications of their own 
practice from the late 60s and 70s, rather than repeating it in a reified fashion 
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(as Wall accuses Barry of doing), then they might be considered to keep the 
idea of conceptual art extant in their own practice. 
 
Here then we need to extend the account of conceptual art beyond this 
opposition of the inclusive and the analytical, at a minimum giving “inclusive” 
conceptual art greater historical specificity. Buchloh’s caution continues to 
obtain:  “Precisely because of this range of implications of Conceptual Art, it 
would seem imperative to resist a construction of its history in terms of a 
stylistic homogenization, which would limit that history to a group of 
individuals and a set of strictly defined practices and historical interventions 
(such as, for example, the activities initiated by Seth Siegelaub in New York in 
1968 or the authoritarian quests for orthodoxy by the English Art & Language 
group).”102 
 
Despite his own caution, Buchloh’s account remains overdetermined by 
precisely the suspects he names, such that conceptual art’s “failure” is glossed 
through the failure of its anti-aesthetic aspect: “the specular regime, which 
Conceptual Art claimed to have upset, would soon be reinstated with renewed 
vigour.”103 Though Buchloh considers non analytic conceptual artists (Sol 
LeWitt, Edward Ruscha, Dan Graham, Hans Haacke) it is ultimately from the 
standpoint of Anglo-American analytic conceptual art that he totalises the 
“movement.” His account ultimately fails to register the significance of diverse 
conceptual practices. In fact, the narrow context of Buchloh’s account, as well 
as its neglect of any broader social and cultural context, has been challenged by 
Joseph Kosuth and Seth Siegelaub. Kosuth and Siegelaub’s response to 
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Buchloh presents a long list of  “actors ‘missing in action’… who contributed, 
in one way or another, to the formation of the art historical moment called, for 
lack of a better term, ‘Conceptual Art’…”104 Buchloh’s account is ultimately 
too narrow. In contrast, Jack Burnham (one of those named as missing by 
Siegelaub) had emphasised the “multitudinous forms of Conceptualism.”105 
 
A related problem is simply to assert that conceptual art constitutes an 
“unfinished project” which might simply be resumed in the present. Michael 
Newman illuminates the problems with this approach by demonstrating that 
conceptual art “needs to be continually reinvented in order to stay one step 
ahead of its own reification” and consequently that “how to do so without 
entering into alliance with the actually existing forces of reaction remains the 
problem all neo-conceptual art has to face.”106  
 
Yet any definitive specification of the post-conceptual character of 
contemporary art depends on having identified all that was significant in the 
history and legacy of conceptual art. Given historical changes in the perceived 
critical effectiveness of conceptual art it seems probable that any account of 
post-conceptual art will also be obliged to reconsider its terms in order that it 
continues to remain critical in the face of historical developments in the 
concept of art. Doing so involves combining the work of historical recovery and 
reassessment, deploying the necessary theoretical resources to determine the 
critical significance of what one uncovers. It will be the unresolved problems of 
conceptual art that are of interest.  
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A second wave of conceptual art historiography (which is, in fact, properly 
speaking, the first) has focused on developing an account of these unresolved 
problems within conceptual art. Summarising the overall tenor of recent 
scholarly contributions to the debate on art after conceptual art, Alexander 
Alberro asserts that the new scholarship “dispute[s] claims, made as early as 
Rosalind Krauss’s “Sense and Sensibility” (1973) and continuing in various 
form in the present, that this art movement was merely a period style that has 
had its day. Instead… although in highly reconfigured forms, it thrives today 
more than ever before.”107 Recent scholarship has sought to argue for an 
enlarged canon of conceptual art as well as for its ongoing relevance to 
contemporary art. Here, three broad argumentative strategies can be 
discerned: (i) Inclusion: an insistence on the “conceptual” status of artists not 
formerly considered within the rubric; (ii) Expansion: a geographical extension of 
the boundaries where a legitimately “conceptual” art is deemed to have 
appeared; (iii) Differentiation: a finer differentiation of “canonical” Anglo-
American conceptual art, such that the category itself is rendered more 
nuanced. As Alberro insists, there are “many histories and legacies of 
Conceptualism” and the genealogy of conceptual art has multiple “strands.”108 
 
Luis Camnitzer has been instrumental in the development of an expanded 
geographical account of conceptual art. In 1999 Camnitzer co-curated (with 
Jane Farver and Rachel Weiss) the exhibition “Global Conceptualism: Points of 
Origin 1950s–1980s,” a show which insisted that the category of conceptual art 
should not be restricted to American and Western European artists. More 
recently Camnitzer has published Conceptualism in Latin American Art: Didactics of 
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Liberation (2007) where he argues for a distinctively Latin American conceptual 
art, an art more markedly political than its Western counterpart, one 
emphasising “contextualisation” over “dematerialization.” Camnitzer also 
reflects on the markedly more “sensorial” quality of Latin American conceptual 
art. He even goes as far as to argue, in certain respects, for the priority of Latin 
American Conceptualism. Camnitzer productively stresses the importance of 
artists hailing from Latin America. Nevertheless, the regionalist character of 
Camnitzer’s claims militates against his own earlier insistence on the global 
quality of conceptual art and misrepresents the importance of the transnational 
context from which it emerged.  
 
Alberro’s own work combines the strategies of expansion and differentiation, 
but with the latter strategy paradoxically taking on the character of a restrictive 
definition of conceptual art that seems to sit awkwardly with the former. In his 
article “A Media Art: Conceptualism in Latin America in the 1960s” Alberro 
outlines artistic strategies whereby Latin American artists appropriated “ready-
made media forms and structures”, in some cases “recharging them with a 
radical and often political content.”109 For Alberro this “forms the particular 
character of Latin American Conceptual art” making it “uniquely relevant to 
the history of Conceptual and Post-Conceptual practices everywhere.”110 In his 
Conceptual art and the Politics of Publicity, Alberro makes advertising the “model” 
for conceptual art, deriving this account from the innovative promotional 
strategies crafted by Seth Siegelaub for the stable of artists he represented 
(Joseph Kosuth, Lawrence Weiner, Robert Barry and Douglas Huebler). By 
fleshing out a single episode in the development of conceptual art—one already 
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discussed by both Buchloh and Wall—but characterising this as exemplary, 
Alberro’s history effectively restricts the category of conceptual art. Though 
Alberro acknowledges the geographical, temporal and gender limits that his 
strategy imposes on his study, this does not mitigate the overarching character 
of his claims.  
 
Furthermore, Alberro’s provocative thesis inverts the conventional claim that 
these artists subverted the advertising strategies they deployed in favour of an 
argument which asserts that, caught up in a new moment of advanced 
capitalism, conceptual art simply produced a new class of managerial artist: 
“the egalitarian pursuit of publicness and the emancipation from traditional 
forms of artistic value were as definitive as the fusion of the artwork with 
advertising and display.”111 Consequently, borrowing from Antonio Negri’s 
work, Alberro asserts that conceptual art effectively utilizes and enacts a 
“deeper logic of informatization.”112 That “informatization” is, in Negri, a 
synonym for postmodernisation is not developed by Alberro with the result that 
the crucial question of how conceptual art should be thought in relation to 
modernism is omitted. Here Alberro’s work suffers by not situating Negri’s own 
work, and his borrowings from it, within its post-Marxist context of 
articulation. Consequently, Alberro lacks Wall’s attention to the detail of the 
relation between conceptual art and Critical Theory. 
 
Sabeth Buchmann also makes use of Negri in her study treating art’s relation to 
advanced industrial, or postfordist capitalism: Denken gegen das Denken: Produktion, 
Technologie, Subjektivität bei Sol LeWitt, Yvonne Rainer und Hélio Oiticica. Buchmann’s 
1. Contemporary Art’s Conceptual Genealogy                
 47 
study productively restores to focus conceptual art’s complex relationship with 
the Art & Technology movement of the 1960s as well as stressing the 
importance of Yvonne Rainer and Hélio Oiticica to a full history of conceptual 
art. Consequently her work embodies strategies of inclusion and differentiation. 
Buchmann situates the development of conceptual art against the backdrop of 
the shift from an industrial to an advanced industrial economy (or from a 
fordist to a postfordist one, as she characterises it borrowing Negri’s 
articulation). Rather than Alberro’s restricted analogy with the logic of 
“informatization” then, Buchmann produces a more nuanced account of 
conceptual art’s relationship to the development of the forces of production.  
 
Consequently Buchmann is more ambivalent than Alberro on the issue of 
whether conceptual art should be regarded as something like the vanguard of 
immaterial labour: “It is relevant then to ask whether the convergence of 
conceptualism, new technologies and systems theory actually contributed to the 
building of the “social factory” which Hardt and Negri describe as an 
enlargement and modification of factory-oriented labour.”113 Buchmann 
forestalls judgment, noting, only that conceptual art “was able to effectively 
touch significant questions concerning the relation between the new 
technologies, art market and corporate culture.”114  
 
Taking a different, though related approach, Branden Joseph’s recent work has 
sought to argue for the importance of John Cage’s critical legacy for the 
development of North American art. Though in the context of a discussion of 
Henry Flynt and Tony Conrad’s “Concept art” (which Joseph clearly 
1. Contemporary Art’s Conceptual Genealogy                
 48 
distinguishes, both temporally and thematically, from a later conceptual art), 
Joseph has a suggestive remark to make on Cage’s significance that does bear 
on the development of conceptual art: “It was against what Adorno saw as 
capitulation to the forces of instrumental reason that he accorded Cage and his 
followers, in their invocations of chance and indeterminacy, a certain critical 
dimension of protesting, however ineffectively, “the terrorism of the 
phenomenon which has come to be known by the phrase ‘the technological 
age.’””115 Cage’s emphasis on chance and indeterminacy will also be significant 
for conceptual art as it emerges from minimalism and process art.116 Joseph’s 
suggestive move is to link the history of post-Cagean 1960s art practice to 
Adorno’s insight about the development of instrumental reason in a 
technological age, an insight Marcuse developed explicitly as a “technological 
rationality.”117 
 
Liz Kotz’s recent study Words to be Looked At: Language in 1960s Art constructs an 
account of the development of conceptual art proper from roots in “post-
Cagean aesthetics. Nevertheless her work depends on Buchloh’s 
characterisation of conceptual art as primarily linguistic. She notes the necessity 
to distinguish conceptual artists’ use of language from the earlier deployment of 
language-based artistic strategies in Happenings and Fluxus. For Kotz the 
distinctively “‘conceptual’ use of language… employed it as both iterative 
structure and representational medium.”118 Noting this particular “turn to 
language” Kotz inscribes the turn within a broader and “pervasive logic 
structuring 1960s artistic production.”119 This is characterised by the fact that 
“A “general” template or notational system—be it musical scores, fabrication 
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instructions, architectural blueprints or diagrams, or schematic 
representations—generates “specific” realizations in different contexts.”120 
Kotz even accounts for conceptual artists’ use of photography in linguistic 
terms, noting, reciprocally, that language was conceived in “photographic” 
terms.121  
 
While Kotz’s insights about conceptual artists use of language and photography 
as part of a broader systemic logic of artistic articulation are suggestive her 
insights ultimately remain overdetermined by their inscription within the 
thematic frame of her text. Kotz does not break with a “linguistic” account of 
conceptual art even as she develops a more sophisticated reading of how 
language operated in conceptual art. Consequently her work takes on the 
character of a restricted differentiation of conceptual art. Ultimately then 
Kotz’s argument about the broader relation between conceptual art’s 
deployment of a systemic logic and its relation to its broader social context 
remains underlaborated. 
  
Despite the range and depth of these more recent contributions to conceptual 
art scholarship, it is clear that several unresolved problems continue to present 
themselves. Looking again in close detail at “canonical” Anglo-American 
conceptual art from the perspective of the present reveals new lines in the 
conceptual genealogy of contemporary art. The specific approach taken here 
will be to offer a contribution to the ongoing differentiation of conceptual art 
that will also, by arguing for a different interpretation of the influence of 
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individual conceptual artists, constitute a contribution to a more inclusive 
account.  
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A Systems Genealogy of Conceptual Art 
 
From the perspective of contemporary, post-postmodern relational and context 
art (that is, an art focused on the artwork’s immanence to its social context and 
its social relations) conceptual art arguably looks more “systematic” than 
“analytic,” more like (an expanded version of) the “systems art” that emerged 
from the competing postformalist strategies of 60s art in general and, more 
particularly, out of a negotiated relationship between minimalism, pop and 
tech art, than analytic conceptual art, an art of the linguistic proposition, which 
has remained the dominant critical characterisation of it. As Osborne notes in 
his survey of conceptual art: “It is conventional to think of conceptual art as 
Western art’s linguistic turn. Yet the conceptual work that emerged out of the 
minimalist negation of medium by a generic conception of ‘objecthood’ was 
less concerned with language than with ideal systems of logical, mathematical 
and spatio-temporal relations.”122 Reconsidering the “systems” genealogy of 
conceptual art illuminates the conceptual genealogy of contemporary art. 
 
Just as Frankfurt School modernism can be opposed to Greenberg’s narrow but 
hegemonic account, giving us a richer account of modernism in the process, so 
the still-dominant narrative of conceptual art as “analytic” has a revealing 
alternative in conceptual art as “systematic”. This mode of conceptual art, in 
conceiving the conceptual content of conceptual art quite broadly as a system, 
rather than more narrowly as an idea, or a linguistic proposition, came to focus 
on the context of art, on art’s interrelation with other social systems. From an 
initial concern merely to avoid subjective compositional methods by the use of 
1. Contemporary Art’s Conceptual Genealogy                
 52 
a system, a systematic conceptual art subsequently sought to relate art to the art 
system, the art system to the social system and, ultimately, though precariously, 
to the totality of the capitalist system. Systematic conceptual art was a politicised 
and critical mode, one that sought to secure art’s autonomy by combining an 
ontological and a political challenge to a still dominant aesthetic paradigm.  
 
Such an interpretation of conceptual art, while not unremarked in the existing 
scholarship, remains under-theorised. Lippard notes that, “For artists looking 
to restructure perception and the process/product relationship of art, 
information and systems replaced traditional formal concerns of composition, 
colour, technique, and physical presence. Systems were laid over life the way a 
rectangular format is laid over the seen [sic] in paintings, for focus.”123 Robert 
Morgan has pointed out “A number of artists became involved in the use of 
systems and seriation as an anti-Formalist method and as a means to get 
beyond the constraints of expressive ordering.”124 Similarly, Wall has observed 
that “Conceptual art,” in constructing its critique of formalism by means of a 
turn toward reality, employed “a strategy of active intervention into the existing 
complex of social forces constituted by urban communication and 
representation systems.”125  
 
Yet this “systematic” reading of conceptual art finds its earliest expression in 
the work of the critic Jack Burnham, specifically in a series of “systems” essays 
written between 1968 and 1970.126 Kosuth notes Burnham’s priority here: 
“With the exception of two articles by Jack Burnham, conceptual art was by 
and large ignored during this period [the late 60s].”127 Burnham’s attempt to 
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theorise the emergent moment of conceptual art through a “systems aesthetics” 
again proves of interest today in the light of contemporary claims for a 
“relational aesthetics.” It is revealing that in her early interviews with artists 
who were to become known as “conceptual,” Patricia Norvell features 
Burnham heavily in her questioning and most of the artists take up a position 
either explicitly in accordance with, or strongly seeking to refute, his theory.128 
It is precisely at the moment of its emergence then that we might now learn 
most about “conceptual art,” that is before it was even named and marketed as 
“conceptual” art as such. Burnham pointed to the way in which the ideal 
systems of logical, mathematical and spatio-temporal relations that 
characterised early post-minimalist work were expanded in character to include 
physical, biological and, crucially, social systems (predominantly, but not 
exclusively in the work of Hans Haacke).129 Other artists who explicitly 
deployed a “systematic” methodology in their practice included Mel Bochner, 
Douglas Huebler, Hanne Darboven, Adrian Piper, Mary Kelly, and Mierle 
Lademan Ukeles. Here then a stress on conceptual art’s “systematic” mode 
reorients the canonical focus, producing a more inclusive and more pertinent 
account of the conceptual character and critical legacy of conceptual art. 
 
Burnham explained the development of a “systems aesthetic” both in relation 
to art’s internal development as well as in relation to a broader societal shift 
towards a systems-oriented, technocratic society. Burnham suggested as early as 
1968 that “art does not reside in material entities, but in relations between 
people and between people and the components of their environment.”130 
Compare here Bourriaud’s gloss of relational art as: ‘A set of practices which 
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take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human 
relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private 
space.’131 The terms could hardly be closer though they are separated by 
almost four decades. 
 
It has in fact become conventional to link the history of conceptual art to a wider 
social shift towards an advanced industrial, or postfordist, society. The much-
noted political urgency of conceptual art is in a significant sense directly related 
to it. Furthermore, this social shift and its cultural ramifications in no small part 
also accounts for the simultaneous, global appearance of conceptual art in the 
UK, Europe, US and Latin America (in a way that questions traditional art 
historical attempts to trace artistic movements through the influence of individual 
movements or practitioners).132 Burnham made this parallel from the beginning, 
explicitly attempting to produce a systems aesthetics in relation to structural 
changes in “the System.”  
 
Burnham’s account of the shift to a systems-oriented society must itself be set in 
the context of the theories of the development of an ‘advanced’ or ‘post’ 
industrial society in the West with which it was contemporaneous. Jacques 
Ellul’s fatalistic The Technological Society had appeared in translation in 1964, 
Daniel Bell was shortly to publish his controversial The Coming of Post-Industrial 
Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (1973). Between these two politically opposed 
readings lay a multitude of others. Arguably though it is the Frankfurt School 
critical tradition, with its broader historical account of the developmental link 
between instrumental and technological rationality that constitutes the most 
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substantial examination of these themes. In this tradition, art is understood as 
resistant to the logic of technological rationality (which it nonetheless is obliged 
to mimic) and this is precisely why its status holds such stakes and its 
uncertainty constitutes such a problem.  
 
Though it is not immediately evident from his systems essays because he does not 
clearly acknowledge the influence, Burnham’s work was explicitly indebted to 
Marcuse’s philosophical aesthetics and account of technological rationality. 
Burnham sought to frame the advanced art of his day in light of Marcuse’s 
argument concerning the development of an advanced industrial society. Given 
this fact, it can be seen that Burnham’s work not only represents an important 
early attempt to theorise conceptual art but also, and more significantly, 
constitutes an alternative account to Greenbergian modernism, one elaborated 
from a reading of Frankfurt Schoool critical theory. Yet Burnham’s theory of 
systems aesthetics also elided first generation critical theory with first generation 
systems theory, Burnham relied on Ludwig von Bertalanffy alongside Marcuse. 
Such an awkward elision compromised the legibility of Burnham’s theory. 
 
Nevertheless, Burnham’s work proposes a more substantive account of artistic 
modernism than Greenberg’s, one linked to a critical theory of modernity. This 
early mediation of critical theory in the American context will prove central to 
the attempt to demonstrate the way in which certain artists and theorists 
counteracted and moved beyond the ‘Greenberg effect’ in a historically actual 
way. Whatever the problems with his theory, it is incontestable that Burnham, 
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engaging Marcuse, was the first to try and think conceptual art and critical 
theory together.  
 
Here then we might start to outline a response to Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
challenge to contemporary artists and theorists: “perhaps the artistic critique 
should, to a greater extent than is currently the case, take the time to 
reformulate the issues of liberation and authenticity, starting from the new 
forms of oppression it unwittingly helped to make possible.”133 In order to take 
up such a challenge in a critical art history it is necessary to revisit the history 
and theory of conceptual art as the decisive legacy that any contemporary 
reformulation of artistic critique must negotiate. 
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Last Paintings 
 
Hans Haacke’s challenge to the tenets of Greenbergian formalist modernism 
appeared notably early. His career serves as a trajectory by means of which to 
orient the systems genealogy of conceptual art. Painted while undertaking studies 
at Stanley William Hayter’s printing atelier in Paris, just before his departure to 
the Tyler School of Fine Arts in the US on a Fulbright scholarship, B1-61 (1961) 
[Fig.1] was to prove Haacke’s last painting.1  
 
B1-61 is stretched on a mid-sized frame, eighty-five centimetres by eighty-five 
centimetres. Its surface is covered with thin, closely spaced, dashed lines in yellow 
acrylic. Thirty-nine vertical and thirty-three horizontal lines compose a grid. 
Slanting upwards from the left-hand side of the canvas at a twenty-degree angle, 
thirty-four diagonal lines intersect the grid. The lines disrupt the regularity of the 
picture plane, breaking up the flatness of the support. Since they run only from 
left to right, the diagonals hint at, but do not resolve into, an orthographic 
projection. The design of the painting works against any confident identification 
of the pictorial space as either two or three-dimensional. Its surface oscillates 
awkwardly, pulling at the eye.  
 
Haacke’s completion of B1-61 followed closely on from the first appearance of 
“Modernist Painting” (1960), widely considered Greenberg’s most important 
summation of his formalist position. Haacke thus stopped painting just as 
Greenberg reached the height of his influence. What, then, can B1-61 tell us 
about the genealogy of conceptual art?  
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Fig.1. Hans Haacke, B1-61 (1961). 
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Though many of the American conceptual artists who emerged through and out 
of minimalism followed a similar trajectory to Haacke by renouncing medium-
specific practice, most were still painting well into the 1960s. Lawrence Weiner 
worked on a series of Propeller Paintings [Fig.2] executed in household paints on 
canvas and wood from 1960-1965 followed by a series of Removal Paintings in 
spray enamel on geometric notched canvases from 1966–68. Weiner later 
explained these works with reference to the necessity of working through the 
conventions of the traditional, medium-specific categories in a deliberate and 
methodical manner: “Those categories just completely collapsed on me. I 
wanted them to collapse but I wasn’t going to hasten their collapse. I was going 
to follow it through to where it collapsed.”2 Earlier, he had put it more directly: 
“Somehow the shit residue of art history made me make paintings and 
sculptures. But now I feel no contact with or relevance or need for a place in art 
history.”3 Mel Bochner made a series of untitled grey panel paintings in oil on 
Masonite until 1965 before moving on to a (transitional) phase of minimal 
sculpture. He nevertheless remained interested in painting as a problematic 
throughout his career, returning to medium-specific practice in the 1980s stating, 
“without the history of the practice of painting as the background for all my 
work, it becomes a series of disparate gestures.”4 Joseph Kosuth was producing 
word paintings as late as 1966.  Mel Ramsden’s series of 100% Abstract paintings-
as-parody-of-painting were executed in 1968. Robert Barry gave up painting in 
1968. John Baldessari’s “The Cremation Project” [Fig.3] (a work in which he 
burnt all of his pre-1966, non-delegated paintings, baking some of the resulting 
ashes into cookies) was not executed until 1970. 
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Fig.2. Lawrence Wiener, Propeller Paintings (1960-1965). 
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Fig.3. John Baldessari, The Cremation Project (1970). 
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Completed when Haacke was just 25 and not included in his major late-career 
retrospective “For Real: Works 1959-2006” (2007), B1-61 is usually considered 
to be a work of minor importance, juvenilia even. Yet the painting was produced 
in the same year as a series of mirrored reliefs—A7-61 (1961), D6-61 (1961), A8-
61 (1961) [Fig.4] —which are regularly cited by Haacke and his critics as being 
of formative significance for the evolution of his practice. Writing on the mirror 
works around the time of their production, the artist stated: “Observing my 
mirror objects made of polished stainless steel, I note: there is neither a correct 
nor an incorrect point of view from which to look at them. Their 
environments—including the spectator—form an integral part of them. The 
environment is constantly participating in their creation. They are not fixed; 
their appearances are infinite.”5  
 
Although B1-61 clearly shares the destabilisation of a “correct… point of view” 
with the mirror reliefs, the painting incorporates the environment not at all and 
the viewer in a less direct way, namely through a destabilisation of vision more 
sophisticated than, but superficially similar to, the visual effects solicited by op 
art. Yet the influences bearing on Haacke’s last painting were less those of op 
than of the Zero Group and the Groupe de Recherche d’Art Visuel (GRAV); 
that is European avant-garde collectives whose investigations proceeded from a 
founding interest in kineticism, an approach to art-making inspired in part by 
Duchamp’s early kinetic works.6  
 
The paintings of GRAV member François Morellet were a particular influence 
on Haacke and this can clearly be seen in B1-61 which exhibits a clear affinity to 
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Fig.4. Hans Haacke, A8-61 (1961). 
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Morellet’s work.7 However, we need to pass over questions concerning the 
originality of Haacke’s last painting since its significance for our argument will 
prove of a different type. B1-61 is important for two principle reasons: first, its 
early and emphatic negation, via experiments in systematic composition and 
viewer engagement, of formalist modernism (as he was departing for its 
heartland); second, its intimation of the move to externalise systematic relations, 
out from the framing edge of the painting (where they remain, however 
residually, a problem of composition) and into the environment (where they 
become a problem of context).8 The painting’s argument then is far more 
important than its formal novelty or aesthetic “quality.”  
 
It is instructive to note not only how early but also how precisely B1-61 refutes 
Greenberg’s terms. Just as the critic was asserting that “for the sake of its own 
autonomy painting has had to divest itself of everything it might share with 
sculpture,” Haacke was making serially produced painting and sculptural reliefs 
which shared a numbering scheme and the same aims with regard to the 
incorporation of the spectator.9 If, for Greenberg, it was “the ineluctable flatness 
of the support that remained fundamental in the processes by which pictorial art 
criticized and defined itself under Modernism,” Haacke drew attention to the 
flatness of the support only to disrupt it.10 In a related manner, Haacke signalled 
the residual illusionism of painting as a medium (by adumbrating orthographic 
projection) even as Greenberg was insisting that what modernism had 
“abandoned in principle” was “the representation of the kind of space that 
recognizable, three-dimensional objects can inhabit.”11 Five years before John 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 66 
Latham chewed up the Greenbergian rulebook in Still and Chew: Art and Culture 
(1966-67), Haacke had thoroughly defaced its pages.12  
 
Here though, remembering that B1-61 was to some degree derivative of 
Morellet’s work, it is important to insist that Haacke’s critique of formalist 
modernism was not unique. Rather, Haacke’s move from Europe to America 
involved transplanting the critical concerns of a contemporary European avant-
garde into the American context. Haacke’s early work thus threw the restricted 
Greenbergian modernism that dominated the establishment art world at the time 
into relief. The artist insinuated an alternative modernist tradition directly into a 
New York art world then obsessed with asserting its independence.13 A German 
artist smuggled an alternative modernism past Greenberg’s border control.14  
 
This was a modernism decisively inflected by its self-conscious relation to 
constructivism and Dada, avant-gardes towards which Greenbergian modernism 
was hostile. Haacke’s US status as a resident alien resonated in more ways than 
one. Haacke’s oblique relation to the received history of conceptual art forms a 
primary facet of our account of its emergence and development as a systems art. 
Recovering the systems genealogy of conceptual art requires us to 
reconceptualise conceptual art. It necessitates questioning the terminological 
triumph of the very term “conceptual art” which, as Peter Wollen has observed, 
“eventually superseded that of arte povera, systems art, language art, information 
art, and so on.”15  
 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 67 
In an October roundtable on “Conceptual Art and the Reception of Duchamp,” 
Rosalind Krauss hinted at the importance of this systems genealogy (without 
then following up on her own insight). In the context of a discussion of the origins 
of Dan Graham’s investigation of the “art system,” Krauss suggests that it is 
necessary to consider the immediate precedent inflecting Graham’s 
investigations: “But all the European artists who are investigating systems in the 
early 1960s should be factored into this. I’m thinking about Hans Haacke… The 
systems connections are already developed. What is Haacke’s relation to 
Duchamp?”16 Yet it was not only the (belated) reception of Duchamp by New 
York based artists that contributed to the overthrow of formalist modernism and 
the formation of conceptual art. Alongside the obligatory acknowledgment of 
Duchamp’s importance and the much-discussed relation to minimalism and pop, 
we need to enrich the received account of conceptual art’s development by 
restoring to view those other artistic influences that inflected it, principally kinetic 
art and its cognate tech art.  
 
Nor should these artistic developments be abstracted from the social context of 
the 1960s, characterised as it was by worldwide economic and socio-political 
upheavals in the system of advanced capitalism, by an intensification of 
technocracy and by the resistance to this intensification. The art and the social 
context were of a piece. Indeed, the recognition that art’s social context impacts 
its character constituted a fundamental tenet of the alternative to formalist 
modernism. Conceptual artists came to realise, in Adorno’s terms, “Art’s double 
character,” that is, “its autonomy and fait social” a situation “expressed ever and 
again in the palpable dependencies and conflicts between the two spheres.”17  
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By the end of a turbulent decade, Greenbergian formalism was no longer in the 
ascendant; on the contrary, it no longer seemed credible as a viable theory of 
advanced art.  
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Counter Greenberg 
 
In his 1971 article “Counter Avant-Garde,” Greenberg demonstrated just how 
out of touch with advanced art he had become. The critic began his argument by 
coining the awkward term “advanced-advanced art” to distinguish a category of 
avant-gardist art, derived from Duchamp’s example, whose interest was held to 
be “more historical, cultural, theoretical than it is esthetic” in contradistinction to 
Greenberg’s own account of “advanced” avant-garde art, for which aesthetics 
remained essential and Futurism the historical model.18 Despite having correctly 
identified an art that was not concerned with aesthetics, Greenberg nevertheless 
pondered how this could have been the case: “But you can still wonder exactly 
why it is that all the phenomenal, configurational, and physical newness—why 
most of it comes out so banal, so empty, so unchallenging to taste. In the past 
phenomenal newness used almost always to coincide with authentic artistic 
newness… Why does the equation between phenomenal and esthetic newness no 
longer seem to hold today?”19  
 
The obvious conclusion was that “advanced-advanced art” was not aiming to be 
challenging to taste, but rather to challenge “taste.” Greenberg, however, refused 
or was unable to conceive an art beyond aesthetics. As he unambiguously 
expressed it: “art and the esthetic don’t just overlap, they coincide.”20 Given that 
Robert Morris had framed his Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal [Fig.5] as early as 
1963, Greenberg’s 1971 position reads as wilfully retardataire.21 Greenberg’s limit-
case for formalist modernism had in fact been reached earlier than Morris with 
the work of Frank Stella and Ad Reinhardt, perhaps the two most significant 
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Fig.5. Robert Morris, Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal (1963).
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forebears of minimalism, neither of whom Greenberg would admit to his canon 
of modernist painting. 
 
Greenberg’s intransigent aestheticism can be contrasted to Harold Rosenberg’s 
contemporaneous reflections on “de-aestheticisation.” Rosenberg’s position was 
more nuanced than Greenberg’s. Directly stimulated by Morris’ example—his 
reflections started out from a consideration the Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal—
Rosenberg situated de-aestheticisation as an explicit reaction to the “formalistic 
over-refinement of the art of the sixties,” noting that: “Ultimately, the 
repudiation of the aesthetic suggests the total elimination of the art object and its 
replacement by an idea for a work or by the rumour that one has been 
consummated–as in conceptual art.”22  
 
Although Rosenberg was more careful in his conceptualisation of materiality, his 
account of de-aestheticisation thus had much in common with Lippard and 
Chandler’s contemporaneous discussion of the putative “dematerialization” of 
art: “Despite the stress on the actuality of the materials used, the principle 
common to all classes of de-aestheticized art is that the finished product, if any, is 
of less significance than the procedures that brought the work into being and of 
which it is the trace.”23 Rosenberg however, in contrast to Lippard and 
Chandler, anticipated the failed negation of the aesthetic character of art that 
would eventually contribute to the “failure” of conceptual art: “Yet aesthetic 
qualities inhere in things whether or not they are works of art. The aesthetic is 
not an element that exists separately, to be banished at the will of the artists”24 In 
this sense, Rosenberg recognised that art and the aesthetic overlapped, but was 
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insistent, contra Greenberg, that they did not necessarily coincide: “the program 
of de-aestheticization has been of practical use in the art of the past few years in 
that it has promoted… a salutary disregard for prevailing aesthetic dogmas.”25  
 
We are not concerned with Greenberg’s “Counter Avant-Garde” as persuasive 
criticism but rather as a symptomatic period piece. Greenberg could not accept 
the possibility of an art constituted by aesthetic withdrawal (or, perhaps better, 
de-emphasis) and as a result was obliged to stress a distinction between art’s 
dependence on either an “esthetic” or “non-esthetic” context (with the 
Readymade as the historical model for the latter): “All art depends in one way or 
another on context, but there’s a great difference between an aesthetic and a 
non-aesthetic context.”26  Yet Greenberg was also forced to discriminate a third 
category: 
 
There are, however, other varieties of avant-gardist art that do not rely on 
extrinsic context, and which do aim at intrinsic visual or situational originality: 
Minimal art (which is not altogether avant-gardist), technological, “funky,” earth, 
“process,” “systems,” etc., etc. These kinds of art more emphatically pose the 
question of why phenomenal novelty, and especially spectacular phenomenal 
novelty, seems to work nowadays so differently from the way it used to.27 
 
These were the problematic “varieties of avant-gardist” art that Greenberg could 
not classify other than as “sub-art” because they produced only “phenomenal,” 
but not aesthetic, “novelty.”28 Of most significance for our argument, 
Greenberg’s third category listed out the range and diversity of practices that 
were then challenging the hegemony of his own formalist modernism. It is 
important to note the inclusion of tech art (“technological”) and to observe that 
“minimal art” is distinguished from “systems” art which is listed as a distinct 
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category. Greenberg’s list constitutes a useful role call of the tendencies that were 
to matter in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
 
Conceptual art emerged from, and positioned itself in relation to, the full range 
of practices cited here by Greenberg (as well as pop, which he mentions earlier in 
“Counter Avant-Garde”, and a contemporary kinetic avant-garde which he does 
not). Greenberg seemed to recognise as much. The critic concluded his essay by 
running together all of the “varieties of avant-gardist art” in his awkward third 
category under the title of an emergent “Conceptualist” art: “It’s as though 
Conceptualist art in all its varieties were making a last desperate attempt to escape 
from the jurisdiction of taste by plumbing remoter and remoter depths of sub-
art–as though taste might not be able to follow that far down. And also as though 
boredom did not constitute an aesthetic judgment.”29 
 
Greenberg’s struggle to account for “conceptualist” practice was not a problem 
unique to the fading hegemon. Most established critics were also failing to 
articulate a persuasive account of the new art. Max Kozloff analysed the reasons 
for the pervasive critical malaise of the period: “Modern art has traditionally 
obscured the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly, but rarely so 
systematically as now has it blurred the categories of good and bad, the 
indifferent and the committed. Even the affectivity of pleasure and pain, once 
such reliable cues to meaning, can… be anesthetized to insignificance.”30 
Consequently, the artistic situation of the late 1960s came to be characterised, for 
lack of a more persuasive theoretical paradigm, as subsisting in a “postformal” 
condition. Much like the postmodernism that would eventually succeed it 
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terminologically, the category was formulated as the abstract negation of that 
which it was held to supplant, rather than being defined by determinate terms. 
Given the not insignificant theoretical challenge of unifying “postformalism” as a 
category most critics simply stuck to the description of local tendencies or 
incipient “movements” rather than venturing any more far-reaching assessment. 
Greenberg’s confident ability to totalise “advanced art” appeared to be a thing of 
the past.  
 
Though Marcuse also struggled to give an account of the advanced art of the 
1960s and 70s, remarking on its uncertain character and form, he did insist on 
the requirement that art theory consider the relation between (anti-) aesthetics 
and politics. Such considerations were lacking from, or even suppressed in, 
Greenberg’s work. Marcuse more accurately described what Greenberg 
identified as “Conceptualist” art’s experiment with “sub-art” as an experiment in 
anti-art inspired by the recovery of the strategies of the historical avant-gardes: 
“The radical character, the violence… in contemporary art seems to indicate 
that it does not rebel against one style or another but against “style” itself, against 
the art-form of art, against the traditional “meaning” of art. The great artistic 
rebellion in the period of the first World War gives the signal.”31  
 
Any substantive account of anti-art recognises that art’s challenge to the 
legitimacy of the aesthetic order also challenges the legitimacy of the political 
order. Greenberg had to produce the contorted category of “sub-art” in order to 
avoid acknowledging the political challenge represented by “Conceptualist” anti-
art. However, the political challenge of postformalist art became unambiguous 
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only once “Conceptualist” art had exited minimalism (with its affinity to 
industrial production), for a fully systematic conceptual art (which sought to 
challenge art’s incorporation by capitalist production) via a transitional systems 
art (which self-consciously reflected on art’s systemic entanglement with capitalist 
production). Greenberg’s turn away from his early pre-War Marxism and 
towards a Cold War era liberalism necessarily affected his account of the 
character of the avant-garde. While Greenberg had insisted on the politically 
compromised character of a (bohemian) avant-garde tied to the bourgeoisie via 
an “umbilical cord of gold” in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (1939) he nevertheless 
concluded this essay with a claim for the political function of the avant-garde 
(albeit a paradoxically conservative one): “Today we no longer look toward 
socialism for a new culture… Today we look to socialism simply for the 
preservation of whatever living culture we have right now.”32 In contrast, by the 
time he wrote “Looking for the Avant-Garde” (1977) Greenberg’s account had 
morphed into a straight equation of the avant-garde with the advanced culture of 
the ruling class  (albeit with the “Marxist” caveat that one might legitimately 
disapprove of such a situation).  
 
Here then the avant-garde’s “only raison d’être” was considered to be its 
“insistence on aesthetic quality, aesthetic value” since “when it stops harping on 
quality, the avant-garde becomes something other than itself.”33  This then was 
an account of avant-garde art entirely divested of its critical, anti-art character 
and, concomitantly, its revolutionary politics. For Greenberg artistic modernism 
and industrial modernity marched in lockstep. Caroline Jones summarises 
Greenberg’s position, explicitly contrasting it to the Frankfurt School’s: 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 76 
 
For Greenberg bourgeois enlightenment came to be a good thing; Benjamin and 
his interlocutors in the Frankfurt School were much less sure, having witnessed its 
bankruptcy at the source. Similarly, for Greenberg positivism could be deployed 
as a seamless continuation of the Enlightenment, while among Benjamin’s 
surviving colleagues (Horkheimer and Adorno), the instrumentation of 
Enlightenment rationalism through positivism became the focus of their 
critique.34 
 
Perplexingly, Jones makes no mention of Marcuse in her reference to the critique 
generated by Benjamin’s “surviving colleagues,” omitting any reference to him 
from her otherwise meticulously researched text. In this sense she misses the 
alternative modernism that was in play in New York in the 1960s, deferring to 
the received history of twentieth century American art which asserts that a 
theoretical alternative to Greenberg’s authority was only seriously developed in 
the “critical” postmodernism of the late 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Given the breakdown of hegemonic, formalist modernist, art critical authority in 
the late 1960s a new breed of artist/theorist sought to remedy the cultural lack, 
in the process challenging the necessity of the critic as a middleman. Donald 
Judd, Robert Morris, Sol LeWitt, Mel Bochner, Robert Smithson, Joseph 
Kosuth, Daniel Buren, Adrian Piper and others all made substantive 
contributions to an emergent genre of artist-led criticism. Here however the less-
discussed artist/theorist Jack Burnham proves of greatest importance because he 
attempted a theory of postformalist or “conceptualist” art as a whole, albeit with 
ambiguous results. Burnham is perhaps better designated a theorist/artist since, 
despite modest initial success, his artistic career did not take off and he came to 
focus exclusively on criticism and teaching. However, Burnham formed an early 
and close association with Hans Haacke whose practice became influential for 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 77 
Burnham’s theoretical reflections (acting almost as a surrogate for his own 
abandoned work). Burnham’s theory also influenced the development of 
Haacke’s practice. Consequently, if only at an early stage of their respective 
careers, Burnham and Haacke’s work can be considered as closely related. 
 
Burnham’s theory of “systems aesthetics” aimed to totalise the artistic field of 
postformalism, bounding the “Conceptualist” artistic tendencies Greenberg 
could not account for (“Minimal art, technological, ‘funky,’ earth, ‘process’… 
etc.”). Consequently, systems aesthetics should be understood as a speculative 
replacement for Greenberg’s formalist aesthetics. Thierry De Duve has 
recognised as much, explicitly contrasting Greenberg’s resistance to a post-
aesthetic “art at large” with Jack Burnham’s enthusiasm for the dissolution of 
artistic boundaries. De Duve, however, caricatures Burnham as a pot-smoking 
“utopianist of art’s dissolution into life” unintentionally producing the rhetorical 
effect of reinforcing the reactionary tenor of his own Greenberg-inspired neo-
Kantianism.35  
 
This is not, however, to suggest that Burnham’s theory of system aesthetics 
should be uncritically adopted. There have been good reasons for its relative 
obscurity and these must be acknowledged. De Duve’s accusation of 
“utopianism” is not without some critical purchase: the Marcusean motifs in 
Burnham’s thought emerged from an engagement with Marcuse’s early thought, 
before Marcuse’s disavowal of his utopianism. More significantly, Burnham left 
the precise status of the “aesthetic” within his theory under specified. 
Furthermore, Burnham failed to recognise the critical priority of (an incipient) 
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systematic conceptual art from amongst the competing postformalist tendencies. 
Conceptual art (understood as emerging through “systems” art) had critical 
priority amidst the competing postformalisms because it changed the function 
and the ontology of art in a way that other postformalist practices did not. 
Ultimately then, Burnham, like Greenberg, flattened out the distinctive features 
of different “Conceptualist” tendencies. Before assessing Burnham’s theory of 
systems aesthetics in relation to Marcusean critical theory, a task which will be 
undertaken in chapter three, we need to give an account of how the “system” 
entered art practice, and thereby art theory, as a critical object. It did so largely 
as a device used by minimal, pop and tech art to oppose Greenberg’s claims that 
“advanced art” was obliged to remain aesthetic. 
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Postformalisms 
 
A wide range of artistic precedents for, and influences on, conceptual art have 
been regularly cited in the existing scholarship, including Duchamp’s assisted 
and unassisted readymades, Yves Klein’s investigations into the “immaterial,” 
John Cage’s aleatoric compositional method, Fluxus instruction and 
performance work, Henry Flynt’s “concept art,” Robert Morris’ meta-artistic 
works, principally the Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal, as well as Card File (1962) 
[Fig. 6] and Box with the Sound of its Own Making (1961). However, it is three of the 
contemporary “conceptualist” tendencies identified by Greenberg—pop, 
minimalism and tech art—and one that he conspicuously overlooked (but which 
was closely related to tech art)—the international kinetic avant-garde—that 
concern our alternative systems genealogy of conceptual art. All four share an 
explicit reaction against the generation of modernist painters immediately 
preceding them and a relation to the historical recovery of constructivism which 
occurred in the 1960s as a consequence of art’s attempt to resist assimilation to 
the productive forces of technocratic, advanced industrial capitalism. As Jeff Wall 
has insisted: 
 
The Minimalist and the Pop artists based themselves on a repudiation of the 
extravagant inwardness of the Forties generation. Both groups stressed the 
impingement of the division of labour upon the image of the unified and organic 
artistic process taken over by Abstract Expressionism from its European sources. 
Both were “Constructivist” in this regard, and therefore implicitly re-opened an 
artistic argument which characterized the early decades of this century.36 
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Fig.6. Robert Morris, Card File (1962). 
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Here we can expand Wall’s genealogy by adding tech and kinetic art to his 
claims about minimalism and pop. All of these tendencies shared the 
“repudiation of the extravagant inwardness of the Forties generation” and 
minimalism, tech and kinetic art demonstrated this through a re-deployment of 
constructivist motifs.37 Less directly, they shared an engagement with theoretical 
antihumanism, largely mediated through artists interest in the achievements of 
the nouveau roman.38 Antihumanism manifested itself in the art world as a 
reaction against Abstract Expressionism, art informel, and the model of expressive 
human agency that underlay both of these traditions. By using systematic 
compositional procedures artists sought to repudiate the aestheticism and 
humanism of the preceding generation. These tendencies resulted in the 
development of an explicit “systems art,” as recorded by Greenberg in “Counter 
Avant Garde.” 
 
If Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, Ad Reinhardt and Frank Stella are widely 
acknowledged as the artists who decisively challenged the dominance of Abstract 
Expressionism in the US, then Piero Manzoni, Yves Klein and François Morellet 
fulfilled a similar role with respect to the overthrow of art informel in Europe. This 
process happened on both sides of the Atlantic within a broadly concurrent 
timeframe and the developments were broadly accepted as parallel. It was 
however with the emerging generation of American minimalists that questions of 
originality and influence became more fraught. The minimalists, though they 
acknowledged a shared genealogical root in constructivism, strongly insisted that 
their work be distinguished from European Geometric Abstraction because of 
the latter’s perceived commitment to the compositional relationship of component 
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parts (an objection that had in fact already been formulated by the New York 
School). 
 
Yet it is far from clear that this sweeping characterisation of the European art of 
the period was accurate. Certainly, as suggested earlier, François Morellet was a 
clear exception. From 1952, influenced by encountering Max Bill’s work in 1951 
in Brazil, Morellet started using a systematic method to organise his painting in a 
way that could be considered both non-compositional and proto-conceptual, at 
least in the sense that “conceptual” would be articulated by Sol LeWitt (namely 
using the idea as a “machine” with which to make the work).39 Morellet’s 
association with Julio Le Parc, Horacio Garcia Rossi, Francesco Sobrino, Jean-
Pierre Yvaral and Joël Stein under the banner of the Groupe de Recherche d’Art 
Visuel (GRAV) influenced his work in this respect.40 As Le Parc has 
retrospectively outlined GRAV’s concerns: “Find a unitary system to rule the 
surface, the forms and their relation to the plan, depending on a set program… 
We forbid ourselves to interfere “artistically” and break the homogeneity of the 
outcomes, once the system had been mechanically thrown on the surface.”41  
 
Morellet and LeWitt were to come into conflict in 1973 when a German gallery 
took out an advert in Flash Art accusing LeWitt of plagiarising Morellet’s work, 
including side-by-side illustrations of the works in question as “proof.” The 
accusation was ill-founded, neglecting to put forward any evidence of plagiarism 
beyond the apparent formal similarities of the work. Yet although the artist 
defended himself by insisting his work had been taken out of context, LeWitt 
nevertheless stopped making similar works.42 Clearly there was enough in the 
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claim to spur LeWitt towards a more differentiated articulation of his own 
concerns. The young Haacke, however, did “plagiarise” Morellet and yet his 
work is no less important for that. Haacke quite consciously worked through and 
beyond Morellet’s systematic method in the course of his artistic development, 
renouncing painting on the back of Morellet’s example even as Morellet 
continued to paint.  
 
Haacke’s work was also impacted by another artists’ collective, the Zero Group. 
Comprising three principal members, Heinz Mack, Otto Piene and Günther 
Uecker (all based in Düsseldorf), the core members also had looser connections 
with other German artists and with associated groups in France, Holland, Italy 
and Yugoslavia. Benjamin Buchloh has remarked on Haacke’s association with 
Zero, treating it as an unfavourable influence.43 For Buchloh, the Zero group 
operated “along an axis between the mystification of technology and the project 
of a scientific enlightenment freed from the suspicion of political ideologies” 
which constituted “the perfect disguise of historical amnesia.”44 Yet this 
assertion runs contrary to how the group articulated its own concerns. 
Revisiting their statements, it is hard to share Buchloh’s conviction. Operating 
in the context of German post-war reconstruction, Piene remarked: “Our 
suspicion of the soulless efficiency and shabby neatness… was fundamental. We 
despised the encompassing Christian materialism and saw in it a Western 
version of the Socialist materialism of the Marxist world, or as American 
materialism in miniature.”45 The group also reacted against the previous 
generation’s artistic response to these social conditions: “We angrily resented 
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the sentimental pessimistic humanism which occupied literature and the fine 
arts in the Fifties, when misery was a fashionable convention.”46  
 
Instead, rejecting both economic development and the intellectual consolation 
of despair, Piene recognised that the group was forced to adopt an “absurd” 
position of optimism, a “positive attitude” whereby they sought to “change 
things from bad to good, darkness to light, decay to life, ugliness to beauty, 
stagnation to movement, illustration to pulsation, intellect to integration, drama 
to sensibility, obscurity to purity, naturalism to nature, individualism to 
responsibility, nationalism to internationalism, internationalism to 
universalism… observer to actor, onlooker to engagé.”47 This ambitious 
trajectory—from “onlooker to engagé”—might be accused of a naïve 
utopianism then, perhaps even a perverse affirmativeness, but cannot 
accurately be judged historically amnesiac or as simplistically “freed from the 
suspicion of political ideologies.”  
 
Rather, Zero should be positioned within the broader sweep of theoretical 
antihumanism then current. Two Zero-influenced pieces by Haacke (both made 
from polished stainless steel and transparent acrylic), directly evidence this 
intellectual cross-fertilisation. Both La Bataille de Reichenfels (1961) and Les Couloirs 
de Marienbad (1962) [Fig.7] refer to Alain Robbe-Grillet’s writing. These two 
works by Haacke are distinctive in that they enact Haacke’s definitive transition 
from the two-dimensional space of painting (still associated with manual 
realisation), via the liminal category of the relief, into three-dimensional work, 
with the minimal “look” of industrial manufacture. Similarly, GRAV’s 
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Fig.7. Hans Haacke, Les Couloirs de Marienbad (1962). 
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anti-gestural systems work, described by Le Parc as “getting rid of the marks of 
manual realisation (the ‘coup de pinceau’ of the master)” and Zero’s use of 
contemporary materials, purged of conventional art historical connotation, 
should be understood as part of the same broad tendency. Both move away from 
the individual expressive agency of a unified organic subject conceived as the 
producer of a recognisably handcrafted art object.  This then was a shared 
problem for art after Abstract Expressionism. Furthermore, the essential 
continuity of these European concerns with those of the American minimalists 
should be noted, even as it is acknowledged that the manner in which these 
concerns were addressed must be distinguished. 
 
GRAV and Zero were linked to a wider international avant-garde via their 
association with kinetic art. As the art critic George Jappe observed: “kineticism 
was not seen as a programme in itself, but as one means among many in the 
struggle to cast off art informel, subjective, aesthetically neutral abstract 
painting.”48 Though both groups produced much work that was not kinetic (as 
has been discussed), the motives underlying kineticism united their approach. 
These motives, and their relation to contemporary social developments, were 
well captured by Willoughby Sharp (the principle American advocate of kinetic 
art): 
 
The new age, the electric age, has created an environment which has 
reconfigured our senses… This radically alters our aesthetic needs. Today 
painting and static sculpture are no longer wholly satisfying. We need an art of 
greater energy. We need an art of total environment. We need an art that unites 
us with the real rhythms of our era. The art of light and movement is dynamic, 
environmental, and inclusive. It involves all of our senses. This is only one feature 
that separates it from older art. The old art saw time as lineal. The new art sees 
time as configurational. The old art depicted space as uniform and enclosed. The 
new art perceives space as organic and open. The old art was an object, the new art is a 
system.49 
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Here then was an explicit statement about the post-object, systems-based 
concerns taken up by the new age’s new art. As Pamela Lee has observed “it [is] 
difficult to imagine the excitement that greeted kinetic work in the postwar era; 
how radical this work was considered by many; and its currency as a Sixties 
phenomenon as new, as fashionable, and as experimental as any other form of 
popular culture.”50 In kinetic art the artwork was conceived as a dynamic system 
rather than a fixed object, one, crucially, in contact with its environmental 
context and viewing public.51 
 
Related to, and often overlapping with, kinetic art was the tech art or Art & 
Technology movement. As Gustav Metzger succinctly put it: “Technological art 
is kinetic art plus a lot of money.”52 Running parallel to what is generally 
understood as postformalist art today; tech art explicitly advocated the fusion of 
advanced art and advanced technology.53  Again, Metzger summarised 
appositely “Kinetic art failed to keep in step with an unprecedented technology 
that went through fundamental transformations every ten years or so. The 
equation of art media with present—and future—industrial and research 
techniques is the aim of technological art.”54 Major universities were engaged in 
supporting art and technology based practice, Gyorgy Kepes CAVS centre at 
MIT is perhaps the best known of these and Jack Burnham spent a year with 
Kepes on a fellowship, developing his own luminist practice.55 In tech art then 
artists attempted to enhance the post-object, systematic forms of kinetic art by 
“upgrading” them to the most advanced postindustrial technologies. Tech art 
rewired kinetic art. 
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As such, tech art now looks both misguidedly teleological and suspiciously 
affirmative. Yet, in moving away from the traditional mediums, as well as away 
from received notions of aesthetic “quality,” tech art still conceived itself in 
opposition to conventional, formalist modernism. In the late 1960s, tech art 
enjoyed as much visibility as other postformalist practices.56 Due to its high 
production costs and emphasis on cross-disciplinary collaboration, tech art 
tended to be produced by groups. Robert Rauschenberg and Billy Klüwer’s 
Experiments in Art and Technology (EAT) initiative, responsible for the 
seminal “Nine Evenings” show in 1966, is probably the best known of these 
groups today.57 In the 1960s, however, other groups such as USCO (an 
American kinetic/light art group) and Pulsa (a group focusing on computer-
controlled light environments) were also prominent. Furthermore there were 
also attempts in both the UK and the US to place artists directly into industrial 
roles. John Latham’s Artist’s Placement Group formed an important model 
here, one echoed in the US by schemes initiated by EAT as well as the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art’s “Art and Technology” program.58  
 
Several artists who would come to be associated with conceptual art were 
involved in some way with the tech art movement. Mel Bochner undertook 
three EAT residencies, including one with the Singer Corporation where he 
first began work on what would become his celebrated Measurement series. 
Haacke proposed several works to Maurice Tuchman’s Art & Technology 
project at LACMA (even though all were ultimately refused). Robert Smithson 
rendered “consultation and advice as an ‘artist consultant’ to Tippetts-Abbett-
McCarthy-Stratton (Engineers and Architects)” on their “development of an 
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air terminal between Fort Worth and Dallas.”59 The early history of Art & 
Language also involved technological experimentation as Charles Harrison has 
noted: “Bainbridge and Hurrell’s joint ‘Hardware’ show at the Architectural 
Association, London, in Spring 1967, contained devices with mechanical 
functions which were employed as ‘analogical source material’ for 
consideration of art functions.”60 Indeed, one way that the development of 
conceptual art has been read is as a transition from a “hardware” to a 
“software” based art practice. This was the premise of Burnham’s “Software, 
Information Technology: Its New Meaning for Art” exhibition at the Jewish 
Museum in 1970 and, albeit less explicitly, Kynaston McShine’s “Information” 
exhibition at MoMA in 1969. Alhough the analogy is reductive it perhaps 
offers more than Lippard and Chandler’s claims about the dematerialization of 
art since software always relies on hardware to function.61  
 
Though the utopian technological hopes of the early 1960s, and the tech art 
which emerged in concert with them, came to look naïve at best, particularly 
given the subsequent counter-cultural reaction against a burgeoning 
technocracy, it is important to mark just how pronounced the Art and 
Technology movement of the early Sixties was, and how many of the most 
important artists of that decade were involved in one way or another with its 
postformalist experiments. Tech art stands as the high water mark in the 
attempt to directly relate advanced artistic and advanced industrial production. 
In the process it insisted on the requirement that the condition of producing an 
autonomous art after formalist modernism would involve working within the 
social relations of technological mediation.  
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In a related sense, the character of pop was in no small part linked to its 
technological enthusiasms. Pop, from its earliest incarnation in the activities of 
the Independent Group, troped the productive means of consumer culture as 
well as its products. Jeff Wall has stressed the “aggressively mechanistic and anti-
expressive” qualities of pop art (which, for Wall, it shares with minimalism).62 Yet 
pop can be distinguished from minimal and tech art both by the ironic manner 
of its technological appropriation, and the restricted scope of its technological 
enthusiasms (pop predominantly addressed consumer technology). Furthermore, 
pop tended to treat its engagement with such technology in an emblematic way 
(Lichtenstein paints his Benday dots, Warhol has his cardboard boxes manually 
silk-screened) whereas tech art, in contrast, was concerned with the direct use of 
esoteric new technologies.63  
 
It was, however, in minimalism that the systematic logic of advanced industrial 
production was most directly thematised. If Lawrence Alloway’s “Primary 
Structures” (1966) is now regarded as the seminal minimalist exhibition then his 
less-discussed companion show, “Systemic Painting” (1966), more explicitly 
suggests minimalism’s links with other systems-derived postformalist practices of 
the 1960s. Systemic painting, derived from Stella’s example, rationalized 
painterly gesture to a series of pre-planned procedures, stressing the materiality 
of the painted canvas rather than the subjective intentions of its producer.64 
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Beyond Specific Objects 
 
For a certain critical tradition, minimalism stands as a “crux,” the decisive post-
war practice through which subsequent developments should be understood. As 
Hal Foster elaborates it, minimal art determines the trajectory of art from the 
1960s to the present: “In this genealogy minimalism will figure not as a distant 
dead end but as a contemporary crux, a paradigm shift toward postmodernist 
practices that continue to be elaborated today. Finally this genealogy will lead 
back to the 1960s, that is, to the place of minimalism in this critical conjuncture 
of post-war culture, politics, and economics.”65 Though a younger generation of 
critics in this same tradition has sought to enrich Foster’s account of the 
“genealogy of art from the 1960s to the present” by offering a more nuanced 
account of minimalism’s own genealogy, in these accounts the purported 
centrality of minimalism to post 60s artistic practice is implicitly confirmed rather 
than challenged.66 Here, minimalism is accepted as that practice which enacts a 
“paradigm shift” from modernism and “toward postmodernist practices.”  
 
Peter Osborne, noting the restricted definition of modernism (as Greenbergian 
formalism) that such an account depends on, has commented critically on it, 
noting that: “The problem with this periodization… is that it fails to endow the 
complexly interacting set of anti-‘modernist’ artistic strategies of the 1960s with 
either sufficient conceptual determinacy and distinctness or adequate historical 
effectivity.”67 In effect, minimal art is mis-totalised, produced as both internally 
coherent and as the movement that overturns Greenberg. Yet, as we have already 
seen, a varied set of postformalist practices understood themselves to be 
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undertaking the same task as minimal art. Osborne goes on to note the effect of 
this over hasty generalisation: “it fails to register both the critical priority of 
conceptual art within this field and the historical and critical significance of its 
‘post-conceptual’ legacy. It thus fails to provide a theoretical basis on which we 
might specify the ontological distinctiveness of contemporary art.”68 
  
It can be argued that systems art serves to connect “the complexly interacting set 
of anti-‘modernist’ artistic strategies of the 1960s.” At the least, systems art exists 
both between and as part of “minimal” and “tech” and “conceptual” art 
“movements.” Seth Siegelaub has observed that:  
 
You could say that a lot of avant-gardisms have been directed at their immediate 
predecessors and have developed in relation to, antithesis or contravention of 
them. Here was something which didn’t have that quality, it dealt with 
something else. I suppose in terms of generations, the people who came 
immediately before would be Carl Andre and, as a borderline case, Sol LeWitt: 
minimal sculptors anyway. Conceptualism wasn’t developed in opposition to 
that, and, in fact, there are a lot of people who fall just on the line between the 
two.69 
 
What Siegelaub names as falling “just on the line between” minimalism and 
conceptual art was systems art. This awkward incongruity perhaps accounts for 
its near invisibility within the existing historiography of Sixties art. Yet its 
taxonomic irregularity is precisely its virtue. The “awkwardness” of systems art as 
a category lies in failing to conform to that intellectual scheme whereby visual 
resemblance and historical and geographical proximity are viewed as valid 
criteria by which to locate individual practices within a defined “movement.” 
“Movements” are the extant legacy of formalist art criticism. As Siegelaub notes: 
“I think all art movements are fictions… They are promotional and, ultimately, 
economic devices.”70 “Movements” are precisely what conceptual art challenged 
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as adequate to any account of art. The diverse practices that constitute a 
contemporary, post-conceptual art must be considered and grouped by means of 
their conceptual relations, not via morphological similarity, nor temporal or 
geographical proximity.  
 
It is useful therefore to reconsider the construction of minimalism as a 
purportedly coherent “movement.” A single issue of Artforum, the Summer 1967 
special issue on American sculpture, saw the publication of three seminal essays 
in this debate: Robert Morris’ “Notes on Sculpture, Part 3;” Michael Fried’s “Art 
and Objecthood;” and Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art.” We can 
characterise these three essays as representing the dominant (Morris, 
minimalism), residual (Fried, Formalism) and emergent (Le Witt, 
“Conceptualism”) positions and practices of the (Anglophone) art world in the 
late 1960s.71 As such, the Summer 1967 issue crystallizes a set of forces held in 
tension and about to shift in relation. 
 
Michael Fried’s “Art and Objecthood” is renowned for its attempt to secure a 
post-Greenbergian formalism through its dual-pronged attack on the 
“objecthood” and “theatricality” of minimalist, or, as Fried preferred, “Literalist” 
art. Fried totalised a discrete set of practices under a single position, “Literalism,” 
and asserted that this work had value only in so far as “it is in relation to 
modernist painting and modernist sculpture that literalist art defines or locates 
the position it aspires to occupy.”72 Yet the beginning of Fried’s essay implicitly 
acknowledged a challenge to his own subsequent pronouncements, in that it 
demonstrated precisely the variation confronting his attempt at totalisation: “The 
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enterprise known variously as Minimal Art, ABC Art, Primary Structures, and 
Specific Objects is largely ideological.”73  
 
Given the fact that all art is both ideological and ideologically determined, 
Fried’s suggestion that minimal art’s “ideological” nature “distinguishes it from 
modernist painting and sculpture” sounds an unconvincing note. Though we 
may object to Fried’s confident totalisation, it is not the attempt, but rather the 
manner, of his synthesis that is in question here. All historical or critical accounts 
are obliged to frame their empirical objects with conceptual schema, yet it is 
imperative that this be done with due care and consideration, acknowledging the 
limitations inherent to any given approach as well as its strengths. Though we 
might broadly agree that minimal art in its Juddean “specific object” formulation 
was too closely tied to the simple negation of Greenbergian formalism, it is the 
fact that Fried runs together Judd’s work and minimalism that is problematic.74 
Most objectionable here is Fried’s conflation of Judd and Morris’s positions. For 
while Fried spelt out the differences between the two artists (“Judd… seems to 
think of what he calls Specific Objects as something other than sculpture, while 
Robert Morris conceives of his own unmistakeably literalist work as resuming the 
lapsed tradition of Constructivist sculpture…”) he proceeded to conflate them 
anyway: “But this and other disagreements are less important than the views 
Judd and Morris hold in common.”75 Fried’s attack on minimal art depends on 
constructing a “Literalist” position by privileging Judd’s theoretical 
pronouncements while downplaying or wilfully misreading Morris’.  
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Simply flicking through a few pages of the same magazine in which “Art and 
Objecthood” first appeared upsets Fried’s conflation of Judd and Morris’ 
position. Already in “Notes on Sculpture, Part 3” Morris was taking his distance 
from the interest in “specific objects” which preoccupied Judd.76 With the benefit 
of hindsight it is predictable enough that this should have been the case, given 
Morris’ subtitle for “Notes on Sculpture, Part 4,” namely, “beyond objects.” It is, 
however, the specific character of Morris’ post-object trajectory that is of interest, 
for it serves to differentiate his dominant (but waning) position from the emergent 
conceptual focus of LeWitt. Morris put a paragraph on “structures” alongside 
one on “objects” in “Notes, part 3,” observing that: “Sets, series, modules, 
permutations, or other simple systems are often made use of. Such work often 
transcends its didacticism to become rigorous. Sometimes there is a puritanical 
skepticism of the physical in it. The lesser work is often stark and austere, 
rationalistic and insecure.”77 Though Morris was nothing if not cautious in his 
enthusiasm for the work made from the “simple systems” he discusses here, his 
statement can be instructively compared to an earlier one, from “Notes, part 2:”  
 
One of the worst and most pretentious… situations in some of the new work is 
the scientistic element that shows up generally in the application of mathematical 
or engineering concerns to generate or inflect images. This may have worked 
brilliantly for Jasper Johns (and he is the prototype for this kind of thinking) in his 
number and alphabet paintings, in which the exhaustion of a logical system 
closes out and ends the image and produces the picture. But appeals to binary 
mathematics, tensegrity techniques, mathematically derived modules, 
progressions, etc., within a work are only another application of the Cubist 
esthetic of having reasonableness or logic for the relative parts.78 
 
In contrast to these remarks, by the time Morris wrote “Notes, part 3” he was 
coming to recognise the force of some of the new work, albeit only that which, 
for him, transcended its “didacticism.” Though Morris’ post-minimal trajectory 
was in the direction of process and Anti-Form work, this shift in his public 
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position (from “Notes, part 2” to “Notes, part 3”) with regard to the emergent 
systems-based, conceptual work was significant.79 Though he did not subscribe to 
its direction of investigation, Morris was obliged to recognise its claim to 
significance. Here we sense Morris carefully positioning himself in relation to a 
strong, competing artistic tendency.  
 
It is hard to avoid relating Morris’ comments specifically to LeWitt’s work, all the 
more so since “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” sits in the same binding as 
Morris’ “Notes, part 3.” Morris’ charge of “puritanical skepticism of the 
physical” was effectively rebuffed by LeWitt’s assertion that: “In conceptual art 
the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses 
a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made 
beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a 
machine that makes the art.”80 Furthermore, Le Witt also dispatched any 
accusation of “scientism” with regard to his work: “Conceptual art doesn’t really 
have much to do with mathematics, philosophy or any other mental discipline. 
The mathematics used by most artists is simple arithmetic or simple number 
systems.”81 LeWitt had his own scepticism to manifest, specifically towards the 
benefits of the “physicality” of new materials:  
 
New materials are one of the great afflictions of contemporary art. Some artists 
confuse new materials with new ideas. There is nothing worse than seeing art 
that wallows in gaudy baubles. By and large most artists who are attracted to 
these materials are the ones that lack the stringency of mind that would enable 
them to use the materials well. It takes a good artist to use new materials and 
make them into a work of art. The danger is, I think, in making the physicality of 
the materials so important that it becomes the idea of the work (another kind of 
expressionism).82 
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The impression here is that Morris and LeWitt were covertly trading fire. While 
implicitly recognising the validity of each other’s position, they simultaneously 
made the case for the superiority of their own approach, insisting on the ease 
with which the opposing tendency could result in artistic failure.  
 
Predictably enough then, Morris had a response to LeWitt’s challenge 
concerning the fetishisation of materials (the depth of the unplanned dialogue 
between the two articles is striking). Its ramifications go well beyond the implicit 
debate between the two competing artists however: 
 
It is not in the uses of new, exotic materials that the present work differs much 
from past work… The difference lies in the kind of order that underlies the 
forming of this work. This order is not based on previous art orders, but is an 
order so basic to culture that its obviousness makes it nearly invisible. The new 
three-dimensional work has grasped the cultural infrastructure of forming itself 
that has been in use, and developing, since Neolithic times and culminates in the 
technology of industrial production.83 
 
Morris’ embrace of industrial materials and processes stood in stark contrast to 
LeWitt’s suspicion. Yet neither position is sufficiently dialectical. Morris was 
fascinated by the latest developments in art’s relation to the “cultural 
infrastructure of forming” but did not speculate on the significance of these 
developments. Was sculpture infinitely expandable across any and all new 
materials or would it not at some point become necessary at some point to 
renounce a specifically sculptural project? LeWitt renounced the “gaudy baubles” 
of new industrially-manufactured materials yet, arguably, the logic of industrial 
production was even more deeply insinuated into his artistic project than 
Morris’.  
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Interestingly, Morris adumbrated a suggestive insight into these problems in a 
footnote to his concluding essay in the series, “Notes, part 4:” “An advanced, 
technological, urban environment is a totally manufactured one. Interaction with 
the environment tends more and more toward information processing in one 
form or another and away from interactions involving transformations of matter. 
The very means and visibility for material transformations become more remote 
and recondite.”84 Morris’ comment suggested a dawning awareness of an 
environmental change, namely the development of an advanced industrial 
society out of an industrial one.  Here Morris’ text revealed the influence of his 
dialogue with Jack Burnham: the two had worked closely together on a planned 
Earthwork at Northwestern University (Burnham’s then employer). Though the 
work was not realised due to a conflict with the University administration over 
the scale of the proposed work, Morris’ explicit reference to “information 
processing” would seem to suggest Burnham’s influence on his thinking at the 
time. Morris commented on his relationship to Burnham’s work in a letter to the 
critic: “Mainly I want to say that what you’ve reflected back to me about my 
work – your careful thought, insight, criticism – is deeply appreciated. And in 
general your thinking about art and where it’s headed is more meaningful than 
anyone else’s thought about art today.”85  
 
Both Morris’ and LeWitt’s practices ultimately remain enmeshed in the 
problematics that had attended art’s relation to industrial society. There has been 
much debate about whether minimalism constitutes an affirmation of industrial 
culture, and thereby of capitalism, or not. 86 What is not questioned by any of its 
proponents is that minimalism exhibits a clear relation to industrial culture. 
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Whether minimalism is complicit with industrial society or not, what quickly 
came to be a critical issue for art after minimalism was a self-consciousness about 
what relation art should take with advanced, or post-industrial culture. This 
proved to be a political at least as much as formal question. Or, better expressed, 
it was a question that would reveal the politics of form that had been so 
energetically repudiated in Greenberg and Fried’s formalist modernism and 
even, arguably, by Judd who, while politically active, preferred to believe his art 
and his politics could and should be separated. Here Ian Burn and Karl 
Beveridge’s scathing assessment of Judd’s work precisely specified the problem: 
 
The issue is fundamental and crucial – whether we might be able to express (at 
least) a negative relation to the modes of capitalist production, or whether we are 
forced to reproduce a positive relation to these modes. Your form of art 
represents a final stage in the reduction of art to a mode of capitalist production. 
When the object of our “creativity” becomes so objectified, “creativity” becomes 
a concept  external to us, indeed alien to us, losing its dynamic as a personal-
practical transformational force and instead seeming to have a “life of its own.” 
The work appears to make itself… Subjectivity becomes the enemy!87 
 
Several artists developed a practice that contested Judd’s apparent equation of 
art with “Good Design,” that is, the uncomfortably close relation between the 
sleek industrial lines of a professionally fabricated art and the rationalized 
cultural products of the technocracy.  Paul Thek, in Rundfahrt (1964) [Fig.8], the 
first work in his Technological Reliquaries (1964-67) series, graphically portrayed the 
limit case of a certain form of specific object minimalism, staging its exclusion of 
the corporeal. In a graphic return of the repressed, Thek inserted (fake) flesh into 
pristine Perspex cubes symbolising minimalism. Robert Smithson splintered the 
minimalist cube from within in Four Sided Vortex (1965). In Accession II (1967) 
[Fig.9] Eva Hesse laced the inside of a fabricated metal cube perforated with 
thirty thousand holes, tying a length of plastic tubing through each one. A tactile
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Fig.8. Paul Thek, Rundfahrt (1964). 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 101 
 
 
Fig.9. Eva Hesse, Accession II (1967).
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interior surface was generated, uncannily disrupting the conventionally placid 
surfaces of the minimalist specific object.  
 
But an alternate strategy to all of these critiques was found in a “systematic” 
approach that pushed the logic of the relation to the “cultural infrastructure of 
forming” still further. Bochner developed its terms but Haacke was to prove its 
most consistent exponent, noting: “In order to contribute to the gradual 
decomposition of the belief structure of today’s fantastically resilient capitalism, 
one cannot but mimic and play along with some of its ways. Only history will tell 
in retrospect who was co-opting whom, if one can really speak of co-optation in 
such a dialectically complex setting.”88 
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From Series to Systems 
 
Also published in the summer of 1967, but in Arts Magazine, Mel Bochner’s article 
“Serial Art, Systems, Solipsism” helps to contextualise, arbitrate and extend the 
claims and counter-claims put forward by Fried, Morris and LeWitt in the 
Summer 1967 issue of Artforum. Though his argument was left understated, or 
perhaps not fully developed, Bochner’s essay implied a progression through its 
key terms (from serial art to systems to solipsism). We can elaborate the logic of 
Bochner’s argument without fully subscribing to it (systems art avoided becoming 
solipsistic in ways that Bochner was not yet able to envisage, principally by 
Haacke’s “opening” of the system to its external context but also in Bochner’s 
own later Measurement series).  
 
Bochner began by delimiting the scope of his observations (“certain art being 
done today”), strongly insisting on how it should be correctly interpreted (“this 
work cannot be discussed on either stylistic or metaphoric grounds”).89 Here he 
made a swift disavowal of Fried’s project to resuscitate formalism as a viable 
artistic strategy (which at this stage was having to rely on asserting the 
questionable merits of Colour Field painting). Proceeding from a discussion of 
Carl Andre and Dan Flavin’s work, Bochner argued for the emergence of an 
artistic method which could “only be termed systematic.”90 He observed that: 
“Systematic thinking has generally been considered the antithesis of artistic 
thinking. Systems are characterized by regularity, thoroughness, and repetition 
in execution. They are methodical. It is their consistency and the continuity of 
application that characterises them. Individual parts of a system are not in 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 104 
themselves important but are relevant only in the way they are used in the 
enclosed logic of the whole series.”91 
 
Bochner opposed “systematic thinking” to an “artistic thinking” that should be 
understood to comprise not only the expressive gesture and metaphysical freight 
of Abstract Expressionism (which had been disavowed by minimalism) but also 
the residual “artiness” of Morris’ anti-form and process based pieces, whose 
brute materiality was characterised by an interest in material forming alien to the 
concerns of a systematic methodology: “No stylistic or material qualities unite the 
artists using this approach because what form the work takes is unimportant.”92 
 
Moving through a brief gloss on solipsism understood as the rejection, rather 
than non-existence of mind-independent reality (and therefore as epistemological 
rather than ontological in character), Bochner discussed serial art that he 
considered to be “likewise self-contained and non-referential.” Serial art was then 
defined as a separate methodology in its own right: “Seriality is premised on the 
idea that the succession of terms (divisions) within a single work is based on a 
numerical or otherwise predetermined derivation (progression, permutation, 
rotation, reversal) from one or more of the preceding terms in that piece.”93 
Bochner explained his understanding of serial methodology in more detail in an 
Artforum article published later in 1967, “The Serial Attitude.” Here Bochner 
took significant pains to distinguish work that was produced “in series,” or work 
that was “modular” from that which could properly be called “serial.”94 Both 
articles used LeWitt as an exemplar, stressing the artist’s importance for any 
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consideration of serial methodology. Expanding on his earlier definition, 
Bochner produced the following account of seriality: 
 
1. The derivation of the terms or interior divisions of the work is by means of a 
numerical or otherwise systematically predetermined process (permutation, 
progression, rotation, reversal). 
2. The order takes precedence over the execution. 
3. The completed work is fundamentally parsimonious and systematically self 
exhausting.95 
 
From Bochner’s two articles we have the identification of two distinct 
methodologies (“systematic” and “serial”) that were both being deployed in the 
advanced art of the time. Yet Bochner made no observations as to how, or even 
if, these terms should be related (and he frequently ran them together). Serial 
methodology appeared to be the privileged term for Bochner (who drew parallels 
with serialism in music) but at the same time he acknowledged that a series was a 
simple system, which logically implied that serial methodology formed a subset of 
systematic methodology. For Bochner, writing in 1967, it was simply the case 
that the artists he discussed were using a methodology that might best be 
characterised as “serial.”  
 
This situation was about to change as artists began to make self-consciously 
systematic works. If we contrast Bochner’s sole surviving “minimalist” work One, 
Two, Three (1966) [Fig.10] with another work produced that year 36 Photographs 
and 12 Diagrams (1966), we note a marked difference in approach and a rapid 
development in the originality and sophistication of Bochner’s own concerns. 
One, Two, Three seems heavily influenced by Judd. Although the piece explored 
simple serial permutation it remained within the scope of the specific object. In 
marked contrast 36 Photographs and 12 Diagrams comprises a series of twelve 
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Fig.10. Mel Bochner, One, Two, Three (1966) 
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diagrams of six by six number grids filled with various instances of numeric 
progressions from one to four. Each grid is realised as a block “sculpture” (with 
the number one corresponding to one block, two to two, and so on). Each 
“sculpture” is also photographed in plan, section and elevation, producing the 
thirty-six photographs. Here then a simple system produces markedly different 
results. Such a stark contrast of approach is made more comprehensible by 
looking at Bochner’s various hand drawn studies for works derived from simple 
numerical progression. A work such as Three-Way Fibonacci Progression (1966)  [Fig. 
11] comprises a series of permuted sculptural forms in series, each derived from 
the preceding form by way of a Fibonacci progression which had initially been 
worked out on graph paper, as can be seen in Untitled (Study for a Three-Way 
Fibonacci Progression) (1966). The specific object, still integral to One, Two, Three, is 
pulled apart into multiple instances derived from the same logic. 36 Photographs 
and 12 Diagrams takes the process further, incorporating the schema into the form 
of the work and de-emphasising the significance of its material realisation by the 
use of photographic documentation. The system, rather than the objects it 
produces, moves toward the foreground. 
 
Here then we will insist on a distinction between serial and systematic 
methodology since it leads into a discussion of how we might define a systems art. 
Broadly, we can state that minimalism deployed a serial methodology as part of 
its move beyond specific objects but that a systematic methodology was deployed 
as a means of exit from minimalism’s residual emphasis of the material qualities 
of the work of art. In this regard, it is instructive to compare Sol LeWitt’s Serial 
Project #1 (ABCD), first published as a proposal in Aspen Magazine 5/6 (1966),  and 
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Fig. 11. Mel Bochner, Three-Way Fibonacci Progression (1966). 
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subsequently fabricated and exhibited at the Dwan Gallery in New York in 1967, 
with Victor Burgin’s Carton Programme (1968) published in the fourth issue of 
Stephen Willats’ underground art magazine Control, but never actually realised as 
a physical structure. Sol LeWitt’s Serial Project #1 ABCD (1966) [Fig.12] was 
captioned in the following way: 
 
One set of nine pieces.  
The individual pieces are composed of a form set equally within another and centred. Using 
this premise as a guide no further design is necessary. 
The cube, square and variants on them are used as grammatical devices. 
These pieces should be made without regard for their appearance but to complete the 
variations that are pre-set. 
A row of three in any direction, including diagonals will complete the idea of one series, 
which is autonomous. 
All pieces made of aluminium with baked enamel. 
Each individual piece of the nine is autonomous and complete. All major permutations are 
accounted for within the set of 9. 4 sets of 9 complete the idea. The grid system is a 
convenience. It stabilizes the measurements and neutralises space by treating it equally.  
Further variations are in complete sets of nine pieces each. This plan includes only Set A. 
Set B is the same in all respects except the inside form of each piece is enclosed (solid-sided) 
while the outside form remains open. In Set C the inside form is open and the outside is 
closed. All forms are closed in Set D. All sets seen together represent the completion of the 
plan. 
 
In Serial Project #1 (ABCD) a simple system of serial progression and variation 
generated a complex visual result. Here LeWitt extended the strategy he had 
begun with simpler works such as Wall Structure (1963) and Floor/Wall Structure 
(1964). In these works LeWitt, though generating the form of the works from 
simple permutational schema, was still working within a minimalist rubric: his 
“structures” were clearly negotiating their way out of a residual relation to the 
categories of painting or relief or sculpture as well as challenging the specificity of 
Judd’s specific objects by means of their permutations. Though LeWitt’s strategy 
went beyond the straightforwardly repetitious series of Judd, there was no 
apparent reflection beyond the limits of the work evident in the work itself. No 
suggestion as to why this systematic logic presented itself at this time, and in this 
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Fig.12. Sol LeWitt, Serial Project #1 (ABCD) (1966). 
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place. LeWitt remained consistent with minimalism’s infamous refusal of 
signification and did not obviously consider the “cultural infrastructure of 
forming” that had begun to preoccupy Morris.   
 
In contrast, Burgin’s Carton programme displayed an ironized relationship to 
minimal, pop and tech art. Running on binary code, Burgin’s work was a basic 
computational program. If LeWitt’s Serial Project can be read crudely, yet not 
superficially, as unconsciously reproducing the systematic logic of advanced 
industrial production, then Burgin’s Carton programme explicitly and rather archly 
drew attention to this. Burgin submitted Carton programme to Control magazine just 
as he was preparing to return to the UK having concluded his MFA at Yale in 
1967. Here the young artist had been exposed to the full ensemble of debates 
surrounding minimalism (Robert Morris was a tutor at Yale during Burgin’s 
studies). Burgin’s Carton programme remains little-known and even less commented 
on. This stands in marked contrast to the sustained critical attention that has 
been directed toward other magazine-based works of the period, arguments 
which support key claims concerning the development of conceptual art out of 
minimalism. It impinges on our account to briefly rehearse some of the claims 
that have been made on behalf of conceptual magazine pieces since Burgin’s 
work functions rather differently from them. 
 
Alexander Alberro has argued that Robert Smithson and Mel Bochner’s 
“Domain of the Great Bear” (published in Art Voices in 1966) “pushes the critique 
of the art-critical categories developed in the sculptures of Dan Flavin and Carl 
Andre past the point these minimalist artists seemed willing to take them.”96 Jeff 
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Wall, writing on the magazine works of Dan Graham, develops a similar line, 
observing that “Just as Dan Flavin made sculptures by repositioning common 
lighting equipment, Graham moved toward making textual art works or 
‘magazine pieces,’ as he calls them, by writing about various subjects as if he 
were writing the essay about its possible status as a work of art.”97 Here, Wall 
restricts his observation to the familiar claim that conceptual art extended the 
ontology of the artwork across an extended set of possible material supports. It is 
Buchloh’s reading of the significance of magazine works which remains the most 
thorough. Focusing on Graham’s Homes for America [Fig.13] (published in Arts 
Magazine 1966-67), he observes that: “Anticipating the work's actual modes of 
distribution and reception within its very structure of production, Homes for 
America eliminated the difference between the artistic construct and its 
(photographic) reproduction, the difference between an exhibition of art objects 
and the photograph of its installation, the difference between the architectural 
space of the gallery and the space of the catalogue and the art magazine.”98 
 
Earlier in the same article, however, Buchloh addresses himself explicitly to the 
magazine piece’s relation to minimalism: “the work linked Minimalism’s esoteric 
and self-reflexive aesthetics of permutation to a perspective on the architecture of 
mass culture…”99 Here Buchloh acknowledges the incipient interest in external 
context and its framing relationship to the ontology of the artwork, but restricts 
his claims to the architectural relation. It is Brian Wallis who has taken the 
reading in the most suggestive direction: “Homes for America was an attempt to 
disclose, through an investigation of one aspect of American culture, the larger 
systemic logic that governed the field of mass consumption.”100 For Wallis then, Graham’s
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Fig. 13. Dan Graham, Homes for America (1966-67)
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magazine piece opens on to an entire “systemic” logic, with architecture serving 
as an exemplar of it.  
 
This reading would seem to find support from Graham himself who 
acknowledges that in Flavin’s use of fluorescent tubes (work which he openly 
admired) there was already more at stake than any particular material object’s 
“possible status” as a work of art: “Use of electric light is related to a specific time 
in history. Flavin has observed that when the existing system of electric lighting 
ceases to exist, his art will no longer function.”101 Electric lighting (as art) is 
suggestively linked to an epoch. Though Graham subsequently returns his 
discussion to the “cultural framework of the magazine,”  his brief reading of 
Flavin’s relation to the cultural framework en tout is both bold and suggestive.102 
Graham’s magazine work brings the art system into focus at the same time as 
acknowledging its relation to the wider socio-economic system.103  
 
Burgin’s work for Control, however, operates differently from all of the above. If 
for Smithson, Bochner and Graham the intention was to intervene in the 
commercial space of the (commercial) art magazine, to hypothesise the ability for 
an artwork to be produced out of a non-art context, then Burgin’s goals were 
more satirical, sceptical about the constitution of an art context altogether.104 In 
part, this was related to the different distributional vehicle constituted by Control 
magazine.  Willats’ publication was neither mass produced nor widely distributed 
in the manner of Artforum or Arts Magazine. Rather, it was produced according to 
a DIY, artisanal ethic and was proudly marginal to the mainstream art system. 
More fanzine than glossy, Control was obtained by sending Willats payment and 
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an SAE. Having a small print run and incorporating craft-based personalisation 
strategies in many of the individual issues (cut-outs, block prints, crayoned 
sketches etc), Control conceived of itself more along the lines of an artist’s book.105 
At one level then, Control is anti-industrial in form even as it proselytises for an 
advanced industrial society.  
 
Set up in 1965 and published sporadically since then, Control magazine’s 
explicitly stated “main function” was to “publish articles by the personalities 
which make up the new attitude to visual communication.”106 A graduate of 
Roy Ascott’s Ground Course at Ealing College, Willats’ understanding of the 
“new attitude to visual communication” was heavily inflected by Ascott’s 
teaching linking art and cybernetics (as the magazine’s explicit emphasis on 
control and communication would suggest).107 Early issues of Control set 
themselves up in opposition to the established art world: “It is of vital 
importance that a platform exists outside of the old established mechanisms of 
the Art Hierarchy which allows for completely free discussion of concepts by 
the artist: this magazine is an attempt to provide this position.”108 They also 
reflected on the contemporaneous ramifications of the global roll out of a 
society of control and its implications for artistic practice: “The platform 
devised for the second issue of this magazine, is the artist’s relationship with the 
Control Mechanism which governs our spheres of operation.”109  
 
Yet Control was perhaps most notable for its largely uncritical acceptance of this 
“Control Mechanism.” The maintenance of an “Art Hierarchy” and the latest 
techniques of social hierarchisation were not perceived to be of the same 
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order.110 Furthermore, the emergence of a cybernated society was read, 
dubiously, as directly determining both the necessity and desirability of a 
cybernated art. As Mary Kelly notes of Control: “The essays were solicited by 
the editor Steve Willats, whose main interest was in politically engaged but 
conceptually oriented art informed by systems and communication theories. 
Semiotics, which could accommodate the disruptive notion of unconscious 
processes, was largely ignored (with the exception of Victor Burgin and Dan 
Graham).”111 
 
Control’s contributors, however, did not necessarily subscribe or even stick to the 
magazine’s editorial line. Here, as Kelly notes, Burgin was exemplary. Burgin’s 
magazine publication gently militated against its medial support, rather than 
seeking to disappear into it. He parodied both the art aspirations of Control and its 
ideological focus by way of an early critique of art’s relation to its realisation. 
Here perhaps its closest analogue would be Fluxus instruction pieces. Burgin 
described Carton programme (1968) in Control as follows: 
 
A column of binary notation, expressing the square 212101212 in a state of rest over any given 
period of time is section from left to right (Fig. 1). Reversal of the half-columns generates five 
additional configurations (Fig. 2 and 3). Inversion of the column raises the number of 
configurations to 12 before the cycle is repeated. 
 
Applying an arbitrary directive that only one unit at a time may move, the total number of moves 
required to complete the cycle is 67. Therefore in addition to the 12 “main states” there are 55 
subsidiary states of the system. 
 
Although these drawings refer, for ease of explanation, to the movement of cardboard cartons, any 
unit might be used over any available plan. The programme is also applied to the movement of 
cars about a parking-lot—the elapsed time between moves to be determined by random periodic 
occurrences in the immediate environment. 
 
The transitional moves between main states (Fig.4) were determined by the criteria of symmetry 
and economy of effort. More subjective considerations are involved in the specific details of choice 
of unit and location, so obviously there is an equal possibility of “success” or “failure” in the 
aesthetic sense—whatever these terms mean in the aesthetic sense. 
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Burgin’s long commentary accompanying Carton programme, entitled “Art-Society 
Systems,” glossed the thinking behind the piece. It should be understood as a 
central part of the work itself.112 Here Burgin demonstrated his cynicism with 
regard to Control’s framing problematic “In approaching the problem of social 
control in art it would seem necessary to first establish, in principle, the particular 
province of art within the broad area of social control in general.”113  
 
Burgin’s words reflected the oppositional politics of their historical moment as 
well as challenging the value-neutral concept of control with which Willats’ 
magazine operated. Marcuse’s longstanding dissection of  “the new forms of 
control” proved widely influential in the formation of a New Left politics, and 
Burgin’s challenge was informed by a similar spirit to that which animated 
Marcuse’s critical account of the one-dimensional society. The artist made it 
clear that a positivist, communication-based model of artistic practice did not 
persuade him: “technological inquiries into “new” media is the result of focusing 
on the message content and message-carrying capabilities of the object. Failure is 
inherent in this attitude due to the reverse polarity of object-viewer exchange. 
Before considering any particular function of an “art object” it would be as well 
to examine the process by which such a category even exists.”114  
 
Here Burgin explicitly stated his belief in the futility of experiments in cybernated 
art and “‘new’ media,” demonstrating how they failed to be socially self-reflexive 
and remained tied to an object-centred artistic paradigm. Burgin instead insisted 
on the requirement to inflect artistic practice in the direction of ontological 
enquiry, leaving behind questions of media. The provocation towards 
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conventional art practice could hardly be more explicit, nor the incipient relation 
to the anti-aesthetic concerns and ontological questioning of a nascent 
conceptual art more manifest. 
 
 
2. The Postformal Condition                
 
 119 
Exit Strategies  
 
Yet just as Burgin was no advocate of “technological enquiries” neither did he 
support formalist modernism’s restriction of art to its conventional media: 
“Conceptualism administered a rebuff to the Modernist demand for aesthetic 
confections and for formal novelty for its own sake. It disregarded the arbitrary 
and fetishistic restrictions which ‘Art’ placed on technology – the anachronistic 
daubing of woven fabrics with coloured mud, the chipping apart of rocks and the 
sticking together of pipes – all in the name of timeless aesthetic values.”115 Carton 
programme, Burgin’s first mature work, referenced the gamut of postformalist 
practices: the procedural element of the work clearly relates to the serial 
permutations of late minimalism; the invocation of the variable commodity 
“unit” is pure pop (either Warholesque cardboard “cartons” or “cars” are 
suggested for possible realisations of the piece); and the fact that Carton Programme 
depended on “binary notation” suggests tech art’s reductive technological 
determinism. Yet the work  announces its distinction from all three 
“movements.”  
 
Most markedly, Burgin’s Carton programme operates at the moment of relay 
between minimalism and conceptual art. Tracking the trajectory of this work 
opens up a set of debates about the relationship between the two “movements.” 
Systems art stands as a largely forgotten mediator in existing art-historical 
accounts of the development of conceptual art out of minimalism and in reaction 
formation to pop art and tech art. Discussion of serial art or seriality has so far 
filled the role of linking minimal and conceptual art (with the systematic regularly 
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mistakenly equated with the serial). Yet “serial art” as a category is neither 
sufficiently critically substantive, nor sufficiently historically actual, to fulfil this 
task. By recovering systems art (both as critically substantive and demonstrably 
historically actual) and attempting to provide it with some conceptual specificity, 
we begin to fill in the notoriously ill-delimited category of post-minimalism as 
well as revisiting a hitherto marginalised narrative concerning the development 
of conceptual art. 
 
Robert-Pincus Witten coined the term “postminimalism” to describe the art of 
the middle 1960s through into the 1970s. Glossing his own earlier coinage, 
Pincus-Witten has described the evolution of postminimalism in the following 
terms:  
 
Younger artists, excluded from a golden circle of elect painters and sculptors and 
repulsed by an agenda based in modernist self-referentiality, came to view a 
reflexive formalism and the gallery system that sponsored it as alien and 
pernicious. In short, the academy of abstraction became The Enemy and the 
activities covered by the term Postminimalism emerged. The opposition 
continued on from the 1960s and 1970s with the conflation of Conceptualism 
and Minimalism. When that occurred, the cognomen Postminimalism began to 
take on its own life and the idea that there was this thing out there, this style 
called Postminimalism, gained ground…116  
 
As this short extract demonstrates, postminimalism’s problem as a category stems 
from its excessive breadth and its positioning of minimalism as the “movement” 
by means of which to totalise the diversity of competing postformalisms. Yet 
minimalism might be considered a failed negation of Greenbergian formalism as 
much as a successful foundation for a new cultural periodisation. Burgin reflected 
on these contested stakes, writing in 1973 that: “Although what was to be 
rejected in the post-minimal period of the late 1960’s was, to a greater or lesser 
extent, held in common” what was to be done by way of revision was “still in 
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dispute.”117 Systems art was one significant thing done “by way of revision” 
and Carton programme announced its trajectory. Systematic methodology emerged 
as a means to deal with, and attempt an exit from, the postminimal 
intensification of an already amorphous postformal condition. Rather than 
continuing to read the development of art’s problematics formalistically, as a 
series of challenges relating to the status of the modernist object, it became 
necessary for artists to  open the artwork out in the direction of its social context 
or, in Burgin’s terms, to consider the “Art-Society System.”  
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 Problem Complexes 
 
If conceptual magazine works subverted the art system’s demand for discrete, 
saleable art objects by situating art directly at the level of reproduction (in the 
process interfering with art’s support structure and challenging its promotional 
function) then Haacke’s Photo-Electric Viewer-Controlled Coordinate System (1968) 
[Fig.14] intimated a shift in focus to art’s interrelation with other social systems, 
of which the media was just one. Planned in 1966, but not executed until the 
artist’s second solo show at the Howard Wise Gallery in 1968, Photo-Electric 
Viewer-Controlled Coordinate System presented an expanded and more developed 
commentary on the “Art-Society System” than that found in Burgin’s Carton 
Programme of the same year. Burgin’s work challenged the affirmative character 
of pop and tech art by ironising them. Haacke’s practice, in contrast, suggested 
a deeper critical engagement with a technocratic capitalist system. 
 
Photo-Electric initiated a critique that would come to define Haacke’s later, more 
demonstratively socio-political works such as Gallery-Goer’s Birthplace and Residence 
Profile, Part 1 (1969) and Part II (1970) [Fig.15] and, most notably, Shapolsky et al. 
Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971) 
[Fig. 16]. With Photo-Electric Haacke went a step beyond the condensation 
cubes, towers and tablets that he had begun making in Europe.1 These 
“weather boxes” [Fig.17] as he originally referred to them retained the object, 
albeit “minimalised” (as transparent Plexiglas) in an attempt to frame a natural 
system of evaporation and condensation. Haacke now dropped the framing 
object altogether and made a play, almost a pun, of turning the gallery space 
into a system. Using motion sensors Haacke created an invisible grid through 
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Fig. 14. Hans Haacke, Photo-Electric Viewer-Controlled Coordinate System (1968).
3. Systems Art and the System                           
 
 125 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Hans Haacke, Gallery-Goer’s Birthplace and Residence Profile, Part II (1970).
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Fig.16. Hans Haacke, Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time 
Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971). 
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Fig.17. Hans Haacke, Weather Boxes (1965). 
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which the spectator tripped on or off states triggering bulbs mounted in the 
gallery walls directly above each motion sensor. The modernist grid still evident 
in LeWitt and Burgin’s work here took on a spectral presence. In Serial Project 
#1 (ABCD) LeWitt had retained the grid as the material base from which to 
elaborate, literally to anchor, his residually object-producing systems. In Carton 
programme, Burgin had permuted hypothetical objects on the grid in order to 
ironise the systematically derived production of art objects. Haacke, in contrast, 
concealed the grid, in a “dematerialised” form, only to announce all the more 
thoroughly the work’s systematic locus. The gallery-as-system was made to 
comment on the gallery system: Photo-Electric drew attention to the 
technological rationality animating the social system of which art was a sub-
system.  
 
Haacke’s practice announced the arrival of a distinctive “systems art,” one that 
was clearly distinct from an increasingly museologically incorporated 
minimalism as well as the affirmative quality of pop and tech art. For while 
Photo-Electric might be read as a technophilic promotion of liberatory play and 
viewer emancipation, the rigid grid of motion sensors and harsh glare of naked 
light bulbs were more ambiguous than this, also constituting a critical reflection 
on the advanced surveillance made possible by technological development. 
Lured by promises of free interaction, the viewer was in fact ensnared in a 
highly controlled cell, his or her every movement tracked and scrutinized. 
Participation amounted to no more than the coreography of  a routinised 
existence.2 Haacke explained in the catalogue for the exhibition “Conceptual 
Art and Conceptual Aspects” (1970) that his working premise was “to think in 
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terms of systems; the production of systems, the interference with and the 
exposure of existing systems,” noting that “systems can be physical, biological 
or social; they can be man-made, naturally existing, or a combination of any of 
the above.”3   
 
In recovering and emphasising the term “systems art” the intention is not to 
produce a “movement” where art history does not currently acknowledge one. 
Rather, the aim is to refocus attention on a specific set of artistic problems. 
Movements are notoriously imprecise designations and individual artists almost 
invariably resist the subsumption of their artistic practice under them. By 
insisting that systems art was constituted by a diverse group of artists working 
on a complex of artistic problems, movement-oriented constructions are placed 
in question.4 Nevertheless, such an approach does not simply reject the art 
historical convention of the “movement.” The historically constitutive nature of 
the critical convention cannot simply be discarded, however much artists or 
theorists might wish it away—a shorthand way to refer collectively to individual 
artists pursuing related projects remains indispensable to writing on art. 
However, by insisting on not resolving systems art’s relation to other, more 
established artistic “movements” as a “movement” we work both with and 
against the convention. Like (unevenly) interlocking segments of a three-set 
Venn diagram, systems art sits as part of minimal, conceptual and tech art as 
well as being distinct from all three of them. It shares some of each of their 
problems as well as possessing its own proper concerns. Drawing out the 
precise nature of systems art’s interrelation with more art historically “settled” 
problem-complexes gives us reciprocal purchase on all of them.  
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Thinking about artistic movements in terms of shared problems helps 
emphasise the continuity, as well as the discontinuity, that exists between them. 
Problem-complexes entail response-complexes, but certain boundary 
conditions serve to distinguish individual “movements” from each other. For 
example, pop, minimal, tech and conceptual art make different and 
incompatible responses to the question of artistic technique’s appropriate 
relation to social technique. Schematically, and necessarily reductively: pop 
and tech art affirm social technique, minimal art aims to neutrally present it 
(but is arguably incorporated by it) whereas conceptual art critiques it (albeit by 
imitating its logic).5 Such responses serve to distinguish pop from minimalism 
from conceptual art, even where they hold a problem in common.  
 
Systems art has faded from view along with its proper name. Yet the problems 
raised by systems art were not comprehensively resolved. These problems—the 
residually aesthetic presentation of the artwork; the ontologically constitutive role of the 
situation for the artwork; the relation of artistic and social technique; the relationship of art to 
the art system; the relationship of the art system to other social systems—have resurfaced in 
more recent “relational” and “context” art. Consequently, it becomes clear that 
the analytical conceptual art that supplanted systems art historically, did not, in 
fact, definitively supersede it. Rather, to the contrary, we can recover a 
distinctive “systems art” that evolved into a “systematic” mode of conceptual 
art and which, from the perspective of the present, is more pertinent to the 
genealogy of contemporary art. In the movement from the “production of 
systems” to the “interference with and exposure of existing systems” noted by 
Haacke there was both an increasing conceptualisation and an increasing 
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politicisation of the art so produced. As Haacke was later to make explicit, 
systems could be turned on “the System,” producing “a critique of the 
dominant system of beliefs while employing the very mechanisms of that 
system.”6 The trajectory of Haacke’s development—from the utilisation of 
logical systems of ordering in B1-61 to intervention in socio-political systems in 
Shapolsky et al.—was one tracked, albeit with significant variations, by other 
artists including Mierle Lademan Ukeles, Mel Bochner, Adrian Piper and 
Mary Kelly. 
 
Before discussing the different modes of conceptual art in depth in chapter four 
it is necessary to consider in greater detail the emergence and consolidation of 
systems art as a distinctive response-complex rather than merely a “systematic” 
method internal to minimalism as had been described by Bochner. 
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Art and Technological Rationality 
 
For Charles Harrison there is a strong distinction to be drawn between 
conceptual art “proper” and conceptual art as a “broad category” which he 
holds to designate “a cluster of ‘post-minimal’ forms of practice in which 
objects are mapped or nominated and in which those same or other objects are 
presented to view, if at all, only as contingent illustrations or demonstrations of 
some ‘idea’.”7 Harrison argues that systematic strategies of art production 
emerged from within minimalism: “Except in the individual practice of Don 
Judd… the moment of ‘geometrical’ Minimalism… lasted no more than two or 
three years. By 1967, the ‘Minimal’ artists Morris, Andre, LeWitt and 
Smithson, though they continued to produce forms of geometrical object and 
arrangement for display, all appeared at least as much concerned with the 
systematic or quasi–systematic nature of hypothesized ‘works’…”8 Yet Harrison 
also acknowledges that systems art went beyond the limits of minimalism: 
 
The following are among the labels variously tried on for relevant 
components of the late sixties avant garde, or in attempts to catch the 
unifying flavour of the whole: Post-Object Art, Multiformal Art, Non-Rigid 
Art, Concept Art, Conceptual Art, Ideational Art, Earthworks, Earth Art, 
Land Art, Organic-Matter Art, Process Art, Procedural Art, Anti-Form, 
Systems Art, Micro-Emotive Art, Possible Art, Impossible Art, Arte Povera, 
Post-Studio Art, Meta Art.9 
 
Nevertheless, as Harrison explains it: “in their American forms at least – 
‘Conceptual art’ and ‘Dematerialization’ were secondary historicist 
consequences of the qualitative shift which minimalism represented.”10 
Harrison thus insists that an American, dematerialized, post-minimal art 
should be rigorously distinguished from those properly “conceptual” artists who 
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began to make work asking direct questions about the ontology of the art work, 
the constitution of its audience, and the disposition of its spectators.  
 
Was systems art a means of exiting the postformal condition then, or merely its 
continuation? In order to address this problem it is necessary to discriminate 
more finely between the different “systematic or quasi-systematic” artistic 
strategies that Harrison runs together. There is more that can be said of 
conceptual art as a “broad category” than Harrison’s intemperate caricature: 
“in New York artist-artisans crossed Dematerialization with the ready-made or 
with systems theory or with concrete poetry and were transformed into artist-
intellectuals or McLuhanite savants or neo-Dada mystics.”11 As Harrison has 
conceded “Principally because it coincided and at points overlapped with a 
broad and international ‘anti-formal’ tendency, it has always been less easy to 
circumscribe the Conceptual Art movement than it is to date it.”12  Might 
systems art constitute a moment in conceptual art then? Peter Osborne has 
argued that the convergence of systems-based concerns in minimalism and pop 
led to an early formulation of conceptual art as a systems art: 
 
A distinctive type of conceptual work exploring the properties of ideal 
systems of logical, mathematical and spatio-temporal relations emerged from 
the elaboration of conceptions of reduction and objecthood forged at the 
limits of formalist modernism by Frank Stella, Donald Judd, Morris and 
LeWitt, in the early to mid 1960s. At the same time, a related body of work 
was produced (notably, by Andy Warhol and Ed Ruscha) that was broadly 
similar in its formal structures of modular units, serial systems and repetitive 
ordering, but grounded technologically and socially (rather than 
mathematically) in relation to machino-facture, photography, film and the 
commodity form. Subsequently, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these two 
kinds of work increasingly converged in a conceptual art that reflected upon 
the relations between these formal mathematical and social dimensions.13 
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In Osborne’s scheme, Greenbergian formalist modernism was confronted with 
its formal limits by minimal art (exploring the minimum set of properties that 
could count as an art object) and its social limits by pop art (exploring formalist 
modernism’s suppression of social content – albeit in an ambiguous sense, 
because pop used the commodity and commodity aesthetics as a cipher for the 
social).14 Convincing as both of these readings are another 60s art “movement” 
bears strongly on the development of systems art, namely tech art.  
 
Tech art’s contribution was to confront formalist modernism with its material 
limits by exploring new technological materials as replacements for the 
traditional mediums. Tech art, however, was problematic as an example of 
advanced art. Its introduction of new technology held out the utopian horizon 
of a direct convergence of artistic and social technique in a schema that now 
looks both suspiciously affirmative of the dominant culture and misguidedly 
teleological. Tech art also exhibited the tendency to ontologise technology as a 
new ‘medium.’ In this regard it was sociologically and philosophically naïve 
(diverse technologies cannot be amalgamated in this way, either functionally or 
by “essence”) as well as, paradoxically, residually modernist (in the 
Greenbergian sense): effectively, technology was set up as another logical 
medium to be explored. Harrison has commented on tech art’s failings in 
exactly these terms: “The task was to appropriate the technologies of 
electromagnetic and cybernetic systems and to deploy these either to aesthetic 
or to ‘critical’ ends. Such work tended to suffer from a trivial equation of 
‘modernity’ with scientific and mechanical development. It also tended to be 
co-opted by the very representational technologies it set out to exploit.”15 
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The significance of the systematic strategies employed in minimalism and tech 
art can best be elaborated as an attempt to reinstate the constructivist program 
to harmonise artistic and social technique.16 Jeff Wall captures the importance 
of constructivist elements in the art of the 1960s concluding: “Even by the end 
of the 1960s it had become clear that the Constructivist elements in 
Minimalism were only a feeble residue of the socially-aggressive aspects of the 
original movement, filtered through Bauhaus streamlining and American 
‘systems’ ideas.”17 However Wall’s account here, as with Harrison’s, is not 
sufficiently nuanced. Wall associates “‘systems’ ideas” only with minimalism 
and mistakenly assumes that the systems ideas in play were all “American.” In 
fact, it was the (often awkward) elision of European (critical) and American 
(positivist) “systems ideas” that merged in systems art and which constitute the 
basis of its development into a systematic conceptual art.  
 
As we saw in chapter two, an internal case for the emergence of a distinctive 
systems art in the late 1960s can be made, principally through the rejection of 
artistic expressivity and the various postformalist attempts to develop minimal 
art’s avoidance of compositional relationships beyond the formal confines of 
the specific object. Yet the broader influence of systems thinking on multiple, 
external domains of intellectual enquiry must also be brought to bear on this 
issue. Furthermore, the prevalence of systems thinking across academic 
disciplines must itself be contextualised in terms of broader socio-economic 
developments, specifically the ramification of advanced industrial society as 
facilitated by the rollout of the first computer revolution. Jameson, basing his 
analysis on Mandel’s account of the third technological revolution,” stresses the 
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fact that the Sixties constituted a “momentous transformational period” in 
which “systemic restructuring” took place on a “global scale.”18 The specific 
problem-complex addressed by systems art should therefore also be referred to 
problem complexes in other social and intellectual domains. Rather than any 
simple argument about the determination of superstructural cultural forms by 
an economic base, here the principle will be to hold to Adorno’s insistence that, 
given the artwork’s status as a commodity (albeit a commodity both like and 
unlike any other), society is immanent to art. In such a reading, an art-
immanent account of artist’s turn to the use of systems is also, necessarily, a 
social account:  
 
The elements of an artwork acquire their configuration as a whole in 
obedience to immanent laws that are related to those of the society external 
to it. Social forces of production, as well as relations of production, return in 
artworks as mere forms divested of their facticity because artistic labour is 
social labour… Scarcely anything is done or produced in artworks that does 
not have its model, however latently, in social production.19 
 
Michael Corris has commented on the way in which “the concept of a 
‘system’… became part of the lingua franca of the 1960s.”20 Systems discourse 
colonised diverse academic disciplines from biology to sociology. To name 
some of the most influential examples: Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s General 
Systems Theory, Norbert Weiner and Ross W. Ashby’s Cybernetics, Claude 
Shannon’s Information Theory, Talcott Parsons’ Sociology.21 Systems thinking 
was quickly applied to management theory and, thereby, to corporate practice. 
Here the most notorious example was Robert McNamara’s use of systems 
analysis to turnaround Ford’s profitability (literally inaugurating postfordism) 
and, subsequently, strategic priorities at the Pentagon. It was systems thinking 
as applied by McNamara and lesser technocrats that prompted the colloquial 
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sense of “the System” as it came to be understood in the Sixties and Seventies, 
that is, as shorthand for the post-War development of the Western nation state 
as a Military-Industrial Complex. Nevertheless, systems thinking also found its 
way into oppositional artistic and political movements. Corris stresses the 
political multivalence of systems thinking in the 1960s, noting that it “was not 
destined to remain the exclusive property of a technologically minded elite of 
engineers, scientists, and mathematicians. In the hands of intellectuals, artists, 
and political activists, it would become an essential ideological component of 
the ‘cultural revolution.’”22  
 
Consequently, the systems discourse adopted or internalised by the systems art 
of the late 60s was marked by a profoundly ambiguous character – potentially 
progressive or reactionary, depending on its deployment within individual art 
works. Peter Osborne has commented on the “inherent ambiguity of systems 
art in the 1960s” given that “it opposed the traditional (Romantic bourgeois) 
conceptions of art and the artist using the latest methodological tool of social 
control.”23 Hans Haacke’s work perhaps best captures this ambiguity and it is 
for this reason that Fredric Jameson has referred to the “homeopathic” quality 
of his practice.24 Jameson’s insight can, however, be applied more generally. 
Michael Corris insists that: “Conceptual art recoded the scientistic theories that 
helped drive the technological revolution of the 1960s as an aesthetic 
ideology.”25 Such an ideology might nonetheless be more accurately designated 
anti-aesthetic since artists discarded formalism and theorised art by means of 
repurposed “systems” theories derived from outside art’s traditional support 
structure in philosophical aesthetics. 
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While Corris’ argument is clearly helpful as a symptomology, we need to 
develop his line of questioning by considering in more detail the reasons why 
artists embraced the positivist theories and outlook of the natural and social 
sciences. What was it about systems thinking that seemed worth, or even 
amenable to, appropriating and “recoding”? Others were more sceptical about 
the possibility of repurposing positivistic, purportedly “value-free” theory for 
political ends. Frankfurt School theory protested the historical triumph of a 
technocratic, systematizing positivism. Marcuse noted the emergence of a 
“total empiricism in the treatment of concepts” observing that “the new mode 
of thought was “the predominant tendency in philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, and other fields,” and drawing the political conclusion that 
positivism “forms the academic counterpart to the socially required 
behaviour.”26  
 
It was in opposition to the “socially required behaviour” demanded by the 
burgeoning technocracy of the Sixties that conceptual art developed, in tune 
with a wider counter-culture.27 Rather than adhering to Buchloh’s well-
established, if no longer hegemonic, developmental narrative which finds 
conceptual art’s origin in an “aesthetic of administration” and traces its 
development into a “critique of institutions,” an alternative genealogy can be 
outlined which argues for conceptual art’s origins in a postformalist systems art 
and notes its development into a fully-formed systematic conceptual art. This 
alternative genealogy focuses on conceptual art’s critical relation to Herbert 
Marcuse’s concept of “technological rationality” (borrowed by Jack Burnham 
in his theory of systems aesthetics) rather than insisting on its affirmative, even 
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if inadvertently so, relation to the logic of “administration” (as borrowed from 
Max Weber by Buchloh). Conceptual art’s “systematic” mode focused on the 
way in which “the laws of positivist instrumentality and the logic of 
administration” could be made to work on and against their own internal 
contradictions, even as these “laws” were also encoded in social “institutions.”28 
For as Marcuse had observed of Weber’s concept in 1965, administration had 
its own limits: 
 
The specialized scientific administration of the apparatus as formally rational 
domination: this is the reification of reason, reification as reason, the 
apotheosis of reification. But the apotheosis turns into its negation, is bound 
to turn into its negation. For the apparatus, which dictates its own objective 
administration, is itself instrument, means – and there is no such thing as a 
means “as such”… But if the bureaucratic administration of the capitalist 
apparatus, with all its rationality, remains a means, and thus dependent, then 
it has, as rationality, its own limit.29 
 
Systems art aimed to work against “the System” by mimicking technological 
rationality; it absorbed and redeployed systems theory, cybernetics, and 
information theory as the anti-art component in its dialectical sublation of 
formalist modernism. In this sense then, artists’ “recoding” of positivist 
discourse can be thought of as opposing the prevailing technological rationality 
with an (anti-aesthetic) aesthetic rationality. This paradox defines the character, 
strengths and limitations of systems art.  
 
In One-Dimensional Man (1964) Marcuse extended Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
account of instrumental rationality by giving an account of its intensification 
into a form of “technological rationality.” Claus Offe has succinctly 
characterised Marcuse’s concept as “an interpretation of the social process of 
rationalization according to which bureaucracy and technology have been 
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released from the control of particular interests and have themselves become 
institutions of domination. No longer a purely ‘neutral’ potential for power, 
abstract rationality expands into the total structure of society.”30 Marked by the 
deepening of the dialectic of enlightenment, the technocratic society that 
resulted from the generalisation of technological rationality was characterised 
both by increasing affluence and increasing domination: 
 
As the project unfolds, it shapes the entire universe of discourse and action, 
intellectual and material culture. In the medium of technology, culture, 
politics, and the economy merge into an omnipresent system which swallows 
up or repulses all alternatives. The productivity and growth potential of this 
system stabilise the society and contain technical progress within the 
framework of domination. Technological rationality has become political 
rationality.31  
 
Marcuse attributed an autonomous and totalitarian political agency to 
technological rationality, one which challenged more traditionally-conceived 
accounts of the form of totalitarian domination: “Not only a specific form of 
government or party rule makes of totalitarianism, but also a specific system of 
production and distribution…”32 Given the emergence of such social 
conditions under advanced industrial capitalism, Marcuse noted the risk that 
technological rationality might subsume the aesthetic rationality which, while 
necessarily mimicking it, had traditionally been conceived as the primary 
means of resisting its dominance.  Such a process would constitute the 
“repressive desublimation” of art: “The developing technological reality 
undermines not only the traditional forms… it tends to invalidate not only 
certain ‘styles’ but also the very substance of art.”33  
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Marcuse, however, wrote One-Dimensional Man before he had had any 
substantive involvement with the counter cultures. Marcuse was, following 
Habermas’ characterisation, habitually “the most affirmative amongst those 
who praised negativity,” and exposure to the seditious energy of the counter 
cultures led him, to develop, albeit cautiously, a more optimistic account of the 
prospects for artistic resistance to the totalitarian development of technocratic 
society.34 Marcuse later modified the argument he had advanced in One 
Dimensional Man in a companion article entitled “Art in the One Dimensional 
Society” (1967). Here he insisted more strongly on the liberatory potential of 
art:  
 
When I saw and participated in their demonstration against the war in 
Vietnam, when I heard them singing the songs of Bob Dylan, I somehow 
felt, and it is very hard to define, that this is really the only revolutionary 
language left today. Now, this may sound romantic, and I often blame myself 
for being too romantic in evaluating the liberating, radical power of art… 
And still, the survival of art may turn out to be the only weak link that today 
connects the present with hope for the future.35 
 
In this article Marcuse developed a dialectical alternative to his own account of 
art’s repressive desublimation, namely the thesis that art might enact a 
liberating sublimation of technique (and vice versa) thereby constructing a new 
rationality for a new society: “Has the time come for uniting the aesthetic and 
the political dimension, preparing the ground in thought and action for making 
society a work of art? … Do not the achievements of technological civilization 
indicate the possible transformation of art into technique and technique into 
art?”36 
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The advanced “systematic” art of the late 1960s did constitute itself, in part, by 
attempting just such a “transformation of art into technique.” Decisively 
inflected by its exposure to the counter cultures, Marcuse’s thought 
subsequently became one of the leading theoretical resources for them by way 
of its influence on New Left politics.37 Jeff Wall has acknowledged that “the 
ideas of Marcuse” were “among the dominant influences upon the New Left 
critique of culture and art after 1968” and, as was discussed in chapter one, has 
offered a reading of the emergence of conceptual art that is indebted to 
Frankfurt School theory:  
 
Its first response to the political upheaval which began in the 1960s, was an 
appropriation of mechanical and commercial techniques in an assault upon 
‘Art’, and constitutes the basis of both its radicalism and its faculty of 
historical memory. But insofar as it was unable to reinvent social content 
through its socialization of technique, it necessarily fell prey to the very 
formalism and exhibitionism it had begun by exposing (though it managed in 
the process to drive that formalism to a new level of internal 
decomposition).38 
 
Though Wall stresses the fact that conceptual art was “unable to reinvent social 
content through its socialization of technique” it is also notable that he insists 
on the “incomplete” character of conceptual art. For Wall conceptual art 
remains unresolved and thus susceptible to being reactivated in the present.39 
Furthermore, on Wall’s account, it was the inability to reinvent social content, 
rather than the failure to socialize technique, which was at the heart of the 
failure of historical conceptual art.40  
 
For Wall, the “socialization of technique” was precisely what a recognisably 
conceptual art first constituted itself around: “Conceptual art emerged from the 
disappointment and dissatisfaction with these art movements [minimalism, 
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pop] over the fact that the social forces and ideas which had been stirred and 
revived by the aggressively mechanistic and anti-expressive aspects of the new 
art, did not extend into the kind of radically explosive and disruptive expression 
desired within the cultural New Left.”41 In this sense Wall’s account partially 
mirrors Marcuse’s own reading of the developmental trajectory of the new art, 
as expressed in his 1970 essay “Art as a Form of Reality:” “The development of 
Art to nonobjective art, minimal art, antiart was a way toward the liberation of 
the subject, preparing it for a new object-world instead of accepting and 
sublimating, beautifying the existing one, freeing mind and body for a new 
sensibility and sensitivity which can no longer tolerate a mutilated experience 
and a mutilated sensibility.”42 Wall’s account adds the caveat that such hopes 
were frustrated. 
 
However, what Marcuse would not countenance, even though he acknowledged 
“the cognitive function of Art,” was that the anti-art of the 1960s, and specifically 
conceptual art, posed its challenge as an enduringly anti-aesthetic art.43 Marcuse 
relied on an account of art’s indivisibility from aesthetic form: “The antiart of 
today is condemned to remain Art, no matter how “anti” it strives to be. 
Incapable of bridging the gap between Art and reality, of escaping from the 
fetters of the Art-Form, the rebellion against “form” only succeeds in a loss of 
artistic quality: illusory destruction, illusory overcoming of alienation.”44 
Ultimately, Marcuse would not go beyond a traditional attachment to art as 
aesthetic, with the result that anti-art was seen merely as the short-term means by 
which the sublation of art into life was sought in order to achieve a long-term 
aestheticisation of reality. The aesthetic was to “migrate” from art into life 
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thereby invalidating the category of art. This was Marcuse’s materialist recasting 
of Hegel’s end of art thesis.  
 
Ultimately, though, for Marcuse, given the repressive character of the existing 
reality, it was traditional aesthetic art that held open the promise of freedom in 
an unfree society: “the affirmative power of art is also the power which denies 
this affirmation. In spite of its (feudal and bourgeois) use as a status symbol, 
conspicuous consumption, refinement, art retains that alienation from the 
established reality which is at the origin of art.”45 As Gregory Battock remarked 
in a contemporary assessment of Marcuse’s relevance to the art of the Sixties: 
“Unfortunately, he assumes a rather traditional aesthetic orientation that,  
I believe, is flatly rejected by many new artists.”46 Jack Burnham sought to 
develop Marcuse’s work, applying his concepts to an anti-aesthetic postformalist 
art and thus beyond the limits of Marcuse’s aesthetic traditionalism.  
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Systems Aesthetics 
 
Jack Burnham’s views on systems and art were first set out in print in 
“Sculpture as System,” the second part of his first book Beyond Modern Sculpture 
(1968). Against what he perceived to be the continued dominance of an 
idealistic art history informed by Alois Riegl’s concept of the kunstwollen, 
Burnham sought to produce an alternative, materialist account of art’s 
development for which historical precedent was to be found in the works of 
Gottfried Semper and Siegfried Gideon (that is to say precisely those theorists 
whose kunstmaterialismus Riegl had rejected). In Beyond Modern Sculpture Burnham 
outlined an alternative to what he described as the “weary vocabulary” of 
formalist modernism in “systems consciousness” which he held to enact a shift 
“from the direct shaping of matter to a concern for organizing quantities of 
energy and information. Seen another way, it is a refocusing of aesthetic 
awareness—based on future scientific-technological evolution—on matter-
energy information exchanges and away from the invention of solid 
artefacts.”47  
 
Yet the weaknesses of Beyond Modern Sculpture as a viable alternative to formalist 
aesthetics were manifest. Burnham limited his analysis to the development of 
sculpture (which had been his own medium as an artist) and developed an 
explanatory schema that was wildly teleological.  Burnham’s concluded his 
book by outlining his “Teleological Theory of Modern Sculpture” which 
culminated with the resolution of the art/life dichotomy through a fantastical 
sci-fi fusion of the two: “The stabilized dynamic system will become not only a 
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symbol of life but literally life in the artist’s hands and the dominant medium of 
further aesthetic ventures. In retrospect, we may look upon the long tradition of 
figure sculpture and the brief interlude of formalism as an extended psychic 
dress rehearsal for… intelligent automata…”48  
 
Proceeding on the basis that (what he took to be) Marx’s concept of reification 
was the most salient characteristic of the “capitalist system,” Burnham, 
produced an account of sculpture’s development in terms of its progressive 
reification: “Reification moves sculpture from its passive state as contemplative 
art toward more precise approximations of the systems which underlie 
operational reality.”49 Here Burnham mistook reification for a Marxian 
concept (it actually results form Lukàcs’ conflation of Marx and Weber) and, 
more pertinently, produced a confused account of art’s relation to reification.50 
Burnham exemplified, although apparently unknowingly, Weber’s account of 
reification as rationalization by arguing that art was progressively subjected to 
the logic of instrumental, means-ends rationality. However, Burnham failed to 
recognise that reification was intrinsic to autonomous art from the beginning. 
As Adorno remarked:  
 
Works of art which by their existence take the side of the victim of a 
rationality that subjugates nature are even in their protest constitutively 
implicated in the process of rationalization itself. Were they to try to disown 
it, they would become aesthetically and socially powerless: mere clay. The 
organizing, unifying principle of each and every work of art is borrowed 
from that rationality whose claim to totality it seeks to defy.51 
 
Reification then is intrinsic to art and to art’s ability to protest the social 
conditions it is subject to. Burnham in a sense symptomatically reproduced, 
rather than argued for, the conditions that an autonomous art was obliged to 
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negotiate under social conditions marked by technological rationality. 
Burnham’s work exemplified the “aporetic” situation of art as understood by 
the Frankfurt School.52 
 
Krauss’ critique of Beyond Modern Sculpture as “technocratic” was therefore 
apposite: “The technocratic premise of Beyond Modern Sculpture regards the aim 
of re-creating life… as natural to both science and art and therefore as morally 
neutral. But many liberal and Marxist historians and social philosophers have 
labored to show us that these technocratic goals are not value-free, but are 
products of a social and economic system for which “control” of that kind is the 
logical corollary.”53 However, Krauss’ critique was made in Passages in Modern 
Sculpture (1977) which was published nine years after the first appearance of 
Beyond Modern Sculpture. Here Krauss made no reference to any of Burnham’s 
subsequent theoretical work, and consequently her critique appears partial. 
Burnham’s attempt to develop postformalist art theory as a “systems aesthetics” 
is only worked out after Burnham takes on board criticisms levelled at Beyond 
Modern Sculpture, criticisms made well before Krauss’. Not unsurprisingly 
Burnham dropped his teleological claims in his later work but nonetheless 
remained attached, albeit in a sublimated form, to the vision of a “fusion” 
between art and technics that had stood at the end of his teleology.  
 
Burnham published a series of “systems” essays between 1968 and 1970: 
"Systems Esthetics" (1968); Art in the Marcusean Analysis (1969); “Systems and 
Art” (1969); "Real Time Systems" (1969); "The Aesthetics of Intelligent 
Systems" (1970); and "Notes on Art and Information Processing” (1970).54 
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Though “Systems Esthetics” was the first “systems” article published by 
Burnham, and proved subsequently to be the most influential, it is important to 
establish the context of the claims he made there with reference to Art in the 
Marcusean Analysis and “Systems in Art” (which recounted Burnham’s formative 
pedagogical experience teaching an “Art and Systems” course at the 
Technological Institute of Northwestern University).  
 
Burnham’s Art in the Marcusean Analysis was written in September 1968 but was 
not presented until January 1969 as a lecture at The Pennsylvania State 
University.55 Art in the Marcusean Analysis consisted of an extended exegesis and 
critical commentary on Marcuse’s thought up to 1968, largely focused on his 
aesthetics. Though he referred to earlier works by Marcuse, Burnham’s 
interpretation concentrated on One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of 
Advanced Industrial Society and “Art in the One-Dimensional Society.”56 
Marcuse’s intellectual influence on Burnham has passed almost unremarked in 
the existing scholarship.57 The theoretical influences that have been 
enumerated include Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, 
Norbert Weiner’s Cybernetics and Claude Shannon’s Information Theory. 
Burnham himself encouraged such oversight by not acknowledging Marcuse’s 
influence on his most widely known essay “Systems Esthetics,” despite the fact 
that it was published in September 1968 and was thus closely contemporaneous 
with the composition of his lecture on Marcuse. 58  
 
Reading Art in the Marcusean Analysis it becomes clear that Burnham drew on 
Marcusean theory in constructing his theory of systems aesthetics while at the 
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same time attempting to rectify what he considered to be deficiencies within 
Marcuse’s thought.  Burnham took up Marcuse’s insight about art’s resistance 
to technological rationality and its possible role in effecting an aestheticisation 
of technique, turning this in to the stronger, deterministic claim that “art will 
become an important catalyst for remaking industrial society.”59 Burnham 
correctly observed that “the emergence of an artistic technology rather than the 
emphasis on technical art was the essence of Marcuse’s hopes” yet nevertheless 
objected to Marcuse’s aversion to technical art: “Somehow Marcuse, a master 
of the dialectic, never consciously comes to the conclusion that newer media 
are the critical instruments of social liberation.”60 Here then Burnham revealed 
his own residual, utopian hopes for art: “A fusion of artistic and technical 
reason is inevitable once art ceases to function as illusion and ideal 
appearance.”61   
 
In so doing he misunderstood Marcuse’s speculative claims for the potential 
sublation of technological rationality by aesthetic rationality, mistakenly arguing 
for the possibility of a “fusion” between, or “synthesis” of, incompatible 
rationalities: “His most subtle speculation is directed towards the traditional 
antipathy between art and technology… the dialectical synthesis becomes a 
technology based on esthetic values.”62 Burnham took Marcuse for a social 
democrat arguing for a gradualist, rather than a revolutionary, process of 
artistically led social reform. Hopefully venturing the critique that Marcuse 
failed to recognise “that cultural forces of assimilation are just as often 
assimilated by forces which they have sought to engulf,” Burnham missed, or 
chose to ignore, Marcuse’s insistence that “‘Art as a form of reality’ means not 
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the beautification of the given, but the construction of an entirely different and 
opposed reality. The aesthetic vision is part of the revolution.”63 The 
consequence of Burnham’s (mis)reading was a deradicalisation of Marcuse’s 
claims.  
 
It is important to stress that what is most notable about Burnham’s theory 
today is precisely the friction generated by his attempt to integrate Herbert 
Marcuse’s critical account of technological rationality with the ostensibly 
“value-neutral” positivism characteristic of the systematic empirical and social 
sciences. Here Burnham was no doubt effected by his social context, namely, as 
Jeff Wall has described it, the socially affirmative character of an American 
“university system” that had been “purged of Marxism during the ‘Cold 
War’.”64 Burnham’s theorising was marked by an awkward, and to some extent 
disavowed, syncretism. The incompatible tensions marking Burnham’s theory 
of systems aesthetics proved to be one of the major reason’s for its eclipse by 
emerging strains of art historical postmodernism. Yet by returning to 
Burnham’s engagement with Marcuse we insist on the revealing tensions that 
originally animated his theorising. They are tensions that resonate with the 
contradictions found within conceptual art’s attempt to “recode” positivistic 
discourse. Burnham’s awkward elision of Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s Systems 
Theory and Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory formed a central part of his 
alternative to Greenberg’s formalist modernist aesthetics. Here then there is an 
interesting structural parallel between Burnham’s work and Habermas’ attempt 
to reconcile Talcott Parsons and Western Marxism as a central strategy in his 
project to continue the incomplete project of modernity.  
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Burnham’s “Art and Systems” course, first proposed to Northwestern 
University in 1965, set out almost all of the issues that he would subsequently 
explore in Beyond Modern Sculpture and the later “systems” essays. Burnham 
describes his experience of developing and teaching the course in  his article 
“Systems and Art.” The course derived from the frustration Burnham had 
conceived as early as 1962 while trying to teach students how to produce 
kinetic art (which had been his own form of practice when working as an artist). 
Burnham asserted that he “came to realize that most educational approaches to 
this medium degenerate into technique courses… and that aesthetic 
development tends largely to be forgotten.”65 Reflecting on his frustration 
Burnham concluded that “the essential task lies in defining the aesthetic 
implications of a technological world.”66 In such a technological world 
Burnham found little of relevance in the making of traditional aesthetic art, nor 
in the traditional, Bauhaus-derived, pedagogic methods that were used to 
inculcate the requisite artistic competence to do so.  
 
Seeking an alternative, contemporary and holistic methodological ground for 
his teaching Burnham seized upon the “systems analysis and design approach 
to problem solving.”67 Recognising from the very first that systems analysis was 
tainted in the popular imagination by its association with the strategic and 
operational imperatives of the Military Industrial Complex (he referred to 
systems analysis being understood to possess an “icy Pentagon-esque logic”), 
Burnham was nevertheless persuaded that “the systems approach” seemed “to 
be the one technique which can embrace an understanding of the span of 
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present-day technology and its consequences.”68 Furthermore, he insisted “the 
trend in research and industry to conceive of machines, information processing 
equipment, and personnel as a single totality has a distinct affinity with some of 
the more sophisticated happenings and art environments of the past few 
years.”69 Burnham’s teaching was marked by the attempt to enact a 
reconciliation between art and technology and his pedagogic goal was making 
different social systems functionally and aesthetically compatible. Burnham’s 
ultimate aim, as he expressed it, was a “future rapproachment [sic] between art 
and technology.”70 The telling Freudian slip affected by the typo, whether it 
was Burnham’s or the copy editor’s, perfectly condenses the tensions that 
marked Burnham’s project for a “systems aesthetics.”  
 
Though it was published in the same year as Beyond Modern Sculpture, “Systems 
Esthetics” constituted a significant extension of the claims that Burnham made 
in the book as well as acting as a proactive corrective to some of its deficiencies. 
Principally, “Systems Esthetics” attempted to extend Burnham’s position on 
the development of one medium (sculpture) into an overarching and coherent 
postformalist aesthetics. The article appeared to reject the teleological scheme 
underlying Beyond Modern Sculpture. Burnham was careful to situate his claims in 
the contemporary moment, avoiding projecting his claims into the future: “The 
emergence of a “post-formalist esthetic” may seem to some to embody a kind of 
absolute philosophy, something which, through the nature of its concerns 
cannot be transcended. Yet it is more likely that a “systems esthetic” will 
become the dominant approach to a maze of socio-technical conditions rooted 
only in the present. New circumstances will with time generate other major 
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paradigms for the arts.”71 Drawing on an analogy with Kuhn, Burnham sought 
to explain the paradigm shift represented by the new art of the late 1960s.  
 
The critical focus of systems aesthetics was on precisely the “unobjects” of post-
minimal practice, namely, “either environments or artefacts which resist 
prevailing critical analysis.”72 Explicitly repudiating Fried’s formalist objections 
to “theatrical” art, Burnham asserted, “the term systems esthetic seems to 
encompass the present situation more fully.”73 Arguing that “current 
technological shifts” explained the paradigm shift in the visual arts, Burnham 
sought to apply the “systems analysis” that had emerged in concert with these 
technological shifts to elucidate the “unobjects” of contemporary artistic 
practice.74  
 
At no point then did Burnham explicitly restrict his theory of systems aesthetics 
to the theoretical elucidation of the post-minimal systems art with which it was 
contemporary. However Haacke’s work was undoubtedly central to the 
development of Burnham’s thinking on systems: “As a close friend of Hans 
Haacke since 1962, I observed how the idea of allowing his ‘systems’ to take 
root in the real world began to fascinate him, more and more, almost to a point 
of obsession.”75 Haacke even helped edit Burnham’s Beyond Modern Sculpture.76 
Haacke openly acknowledges his debt the other way around, explaining that 
Burnham “introduced me to systems analysis,”77 and that “the concept of 
‘systems’ is widely used in the natural and social sciences and especially in 
various complex technologies. Possibly it was Jack Burnham, an artist and 
writer, who first suggested the term… for the visual arts.” For Haacke, systems 
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aesthetics helped to “distinguish certain three-dimensional situations which, 
misleadingly, have been labeled as ‘sculpture.’”78  
 
It is not clear that Burnham’s systems aesthetics captured the ontology of the 
art which it purported to describe any more successfully than the indeterminate 
“postformalism” of which he asserted his theory constituted a development. 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy was called upon to furnish Burnham with a definition 
of a system as a “complex of components in interaction” which was so loose as 
to disqualify nothing much except for the Juddean “specific object”. 
Furthermore the precise status of his concept of “aesthetics” was left entirely 
undefined within the scope of the essay. Burnham defined the art that a systems 
aesthetics was supposed to describe only negatively: “the emerging major 
paradigm of art is neither an ism nor a collection of styles. Rather than a novel 
way of rearranging surfaces and spaces, it is fundamentally concerned with the 
implementation of the art impulse in an advanced technological society.”79 The 
closest he came to defining “unobject” art was via a relational ontology, 
conceptually defined. Hence “the specific function of modern didactic art has 
been to show that art does not reside in material entities, but in relations 
between people and between people and components of their environment” 
and “conceptual focus rather than material limits define the system.”80  
 
The suppressed teleological schema from Beyond Modern Sculpture resurfaced in 
“Systems Esthetics” as a phantasmatic projection of art’s dissolution into life in 
the present. In fact, rather than defining art, Burnham seemed more interested 
in pursuing an argument for art’s dissolution under conditions of advanced 
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industrial capitalism: “In an advanced technological culture the most important 
artist best succeeds by liquidating his position as artist vis-à-vis society.”81 
Burnham thus proposed what might be described as a technocratic neo-
constructivism, that is a constructivism without the revolutionary 
transformation of society.82  
 
Burnham’s subsequent systems essays developed some of the themes introduced 
in “Systems Esthetics” without significantly advancing any of them. “Real 
Time Systems” analysed the operation of the entire “art system” including “art 
movements,” “stylistic trends” and “business, promotional and archival 
structures,” by means of a cybernetic analogy with real-time information 
processing systems.83 Though the analogy was worked too hard to convince, 
Burnham did suggest that “There are two kinds of artists: those who work 
within the art system and those who work with the art system.”84 In so doing he 
hinted at the political potentiality of interference with the mechanics of the art 
system, an insight that would be taken up by Haacke. In “The Aesthetics of 
Intelligent Systems” Burnham alluded to the affinity between his theory of 
systems aesthetics and an emergent “conceptualist” art: 
 
The traditional notion of consecrated art objects and settings will gradually 
give way to the conclusion that art is conceptual focus, and that the boundary 
conditions of form as process and system transcend the more literal notions 
of geometrically defined form. Thus any space-time fragment of reality may 
serve as subject matter. The breakdown and confusion between canonical art 
forms will continue until it is agreed that they place a false emphasis on 
physical and sensual isolation as prerequisites for aesthetic valuation.85 
 
Burnham further developed this parallel between systems aesthetics and 
conceptual art in his “Software” exhibition at the Jewish Museum. Here he 
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showed early works of conceptual art alongside the latest developments in 
computer technology asserting in his catalogue essay for the show, “Notes on 
art and information processing,” that his curatorial principle was to “make no 
distinctions between art and non-art.”86 The impetus underlying his curatorial 
protocol was thus exactly the same as the rationale that supported his theory of 
systems aesthetics: “Software makes none of the usual qualitative distinctions 
between the artistic and technical subcultures. At a time when esthetic insight 
must become a part of technological decision-making, does such a division still 
make sense?”87  
 
In pursuing a fusion of art and technics Burnham’s theory of systems aesthetics 
would ultimately founder on the fact that it failed to recognise and account for 
the character and  critical priority of systems art as an emergent form of 
conceptual art. This proved to be the case even though his attempt to produce 
a postformalist aesthetics had initially looked to be in harmony with 
developments in the new art. Though Burnham noted the use of systems in art 
he did not provide a workable theory of systems art. The cultural revolution of 
the late 1960s, directed against the technocracy, sought to protest against the 
dominant culture by attacking traditional aesthetic art rather than 
promulgating the aestheticisation of technique that Burnham hoped for. 
 
Burnham had been one of the individuals Robert Morris recommended 
Patricia Norvell (then his graduate student at Hunter College) to interview in 
connection with her Master’s thesis on an emergent conceptual art. In his own 
interview with Norvell, Morris acknowledged the pertinence of Burnham’s 
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systems aesthetics while also expressing reservations about Burnham’s 
technological enthusiasms: “Well, I think there’s a lot in what he says… But a 
lot of things he says about… He seems to put a great weight on artists’ using 
certain kinds of sophisticated technology and developing that into a kind of 
aesthetic, and I don’t think that’s very relevant.”88 Morris’ concern about the 
relevance of Burnham’s residual technologism would prove well founded.  
 
Burnham’s account of artistic production as a systems aesthetics hinted at, but 
did not follow through on, the separation of systems analysis from systems 
science and its industrial deployment in systems technology. Even Bertalanffy 
had cautioned against conflating systems theory with systems science and 
technology: “The humanistic concern of general systems theory as I understand 
it makes it different to mechanistically oriented system theorists speaking solely 
in terms of mathematics, feedback and technology and so giving rise to the fear 
that systems theory is indeed the ultimate step toward mechanisation and 
devaluation of man and toward technocratic society.”89 Burnham’s failure to 
rigorously differentiate systems theory and systems technology caused him to 
swing between a productive, analogical deployment of systems thinking and a 
prescriptive insistence on art’s necessary fusion with technology. He may have 
declared, with proleptic accuracy, that art would come to be associated with 
“conceptual focus,” but he also regularly lapsed into a misguided technological 
determinism: “it now seems almost inevitable that artists will turn toward 
information technology as a more direct means of aesthetic activity.”90 
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Although Norvell did not in the end interview Burnham for her thesis, she did 
raise the question of the influence of his theory of systems aesthetics with many 
of the artists she interviewed in 1969. Douglas Huebler and Dennis 
Oppenheim responded favourably to Burnham’s work. Yet it was the negative 
responses from LeWitt and Smithson that resonate most powerfully today. Le 
Witt felt that Burnham’s theory was constructed too generally, and oriented too 
determinately, capturing only something of the art of the period: “It’s really 
impossible to make such sweeping statements… and expect them to be even a 
little bit true… I think that people that do objects, in many cases, do them with 
a system in mind. But they’re still doing objects and they’re still doing systems. I 
don’t think that one is necessarily going to replace the other.”91 Le Witt’s 
objection can of course be read as the legitimation of his own practice, one that 
remained tied to the realisation of objects. Smithson’s critique is the sharper 
and merits quotation in full: 
 
I don’t see the trace of a system anywhere. That’s a convenient word. It’s like 
“object.” It’s another abstract entity that doesn’t exist… there are things like 
structures, objects, systems. But, then again, what are they? I think that art 
tends to relieve itself of those hopes. Like, last year we were in an object 
world and this year we’re in a system world… Jack Burnham is very 
interested in going beyond and that’s a kind of utopian view. The future 
doesn’t exist, or if it does exist, it’s the obsolete in reverse… I see no point in 
utilizing technology or industry as an end in itself or as an affirmation of 
anything. That has nothing to do with art. They’re just tools. So if you make 
a system you can be sure that the system is bound to evade itself. So I see no 
point in pinning your hopes on a system. It’s just an expansive object, and 
eventually that all contracts back to points… to me there are only 
manifestations of thought that end up in language. It’s a language problem 
rather than anything else.92 
 
 
Given that Smithson’s own late minimalist works had been derived via 
systematic elaboration his claim that he “did not see a trace of a system 
anywhere” was evidently hyperbolic. Smithson’s Plunge (1966) [Fig.18] and 
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Fig.18. Robert Smithson, Plunge (1966).  
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Terminal (1966) clearly fall within a systematic rubric and Smithson had also 
memorably described the advanced art of the Sixties as entropic.93 Yet in 
drawing attention to the “language problem” Smithson raised the spectre of the 
“linguistification” of art that is still frequently held to characterise conceptual 
art. Even though he had predicted the emergence of art understood as 
“conceptual focus,” Burnham stopped short of attempting to extend his own 
theory of systems aesthetics to an emergent conceptual art. In his 1970 Artforum 
article "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual Art" (1970) Burnham took up 
Seth Siegelaub’s stable of artists (Joseph Kosuth, Douglas Huebler, Robert 
Barry, Lawrence Weiner) as his principle exponents of conceptual art (albeit 
offering a caveat indicating that other artists might legitimately be considered 
conceptual). Notwithstanding other artists “systematic” approach to conceptual 
art (even articulated from within the Siegelaub stable by Douglas Huebler) 
Burnham chose to focus on Joseph Kosuth as his principle exponent of 
conceptual art and as a result missed the significance of the systematic 
component of early conceptual art which his own theory, identifying art as 
“conceptual focus,” had gone some way to capturing.94 In an Artforum article on 
the problems of criticism written the following year Burnham would accept the 
“linguistic” definition of conceptual art: “The unpopularity of Conceptualism is 
to no small extent due to its blatant exploitation of the inherent linguistical and 
ritualistic nature of art.”95  
 
Burnham subsequently rejected his own theory of the aestheticisation of 
technics but also abandoned what he took to be its corollary, a revolutionary 
avant-garde art: “Most ironic is the art world’s rejection of science and 
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technology without realizing that the same ethos of ‘progress’ that 
characterized technological change in the 19th and 20th centuries is equally 
responsible for the illusion of avant-garde art.”96 Subsequently, based on his 
new conviction as to the linguistic nature of all art, Burnham took up 
structuralism as an explanatory methodology publishing The Structure of Art in 
1971.97 Consequently, it would be left to the theorist-practitioners of systems 
art to develop a more persuasive account of the character and significance of 
their practice. 
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Theorising Systems Art 
 
Adrian Piper’s early work draws out some of the most salient features of 
systems art as it developed into a recognisably “conceptual” form. Piper’s 
practice was deeply indebted to Sol Le Witt’s example. Reflecting on LeWitt’s 
contribution to the emergence of conceptual art, Piper elaborated important 
elements of the elder artist’s work, elements that he himself had left 
understated. Piper expanded Le Witt’s concept of the conceptual “idea” giving 
it a more determinate expression as a “conceptual system:”  
 
By using the permutation of selected formal properties of an object—its sides, 
dimensions, or geometrical shape—as a decision procedure for generating the 
final form of the work as a permutational system, Le Witt moved that system 
itself, and the idea of that system, into the foreground of the work as its self-
reflexive subject matter. Here it is not only the object as a unique particular that 
has primacy, but that object as the locus and origin of the conceptual system it self-
reflexively generates.98 
 
Piper noted the way in which LeWitt moved the system into “the foreground of 
the work” but also insisted that the object, despite no longer having “primacy,” 
remained the “locus and origin of the conceptual system” and thus, ultimately, 
the locus and origin of the work. Notwithstanding Le Witt’s own caveat that 
“Ideas alone can be works of art; they are in a chain of development that may 
eventually find some form. All ideas need not be made physical” as in LeWitt, 
so in Piper, realization, however systematically derived, remained integral.99 
Here art’s ontology was not constructed discursively but still via an 
understanding of art as aesthetic material, even though this materiality might 
be withheld. In a similar sense, Lawrence Weiner’s Statement of Intent (1968) 
argued that the idea of a work “may be fabricated” but “need not to be 
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built”—the ontology of the work was thus held to rely on the possibility of its 
material realisation. 
 
In fact, for Piper, formal aspects were particularly significant. She did not share 
LeWitt’s stated indifference to the formal outcome of his systematic method: 
“An example of a point on which I disagree with him concerns the importance 
of the perceptual presentation of the end product and its value in relation to the 
total conceptual process.”100 Piper insisted on the structural importance of the 
relation between the percept and the concept, the quality of the perceptual was 
held to inflect the coherence and artistic value of the conceptual. In this sense, 
Piper’s early work remained more conventional than LeWitt’s, more tied to 
formal concerns. In LeWitt and Piper the system was conceptualised as ideal 
(an independent order of relationships distinct from the perceptual realisation 
of the work) even as its ideality was still bonded to a material base. Realization 
thus remained essential to both LeWitt and Piper: not only was percept held to 
point to and determine concept, furthermore it was believed to delimit it. The 
conceptual system functioned as a restraining device. As Piper set it down in an 
early (at the time unpublished) statement of 1968: “I am presently interested in 
the construction of finite systems, that is, systems that serve to contain an idea 
within certain formal limits and to exhaust the possibilities of the idea set by 
those limits. This appears to me to be the best way of preventing the 
potentialities of an idea from extending into infinity…”101  
 
For LeWitt and Piper the “idea” had to be graspable as a discrete object in 
order that it could legitimately be verified as art. Both artists demonstrated this 
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in numerous works, each work involving closed, self-contained systems. In 
Untitled (1968), published in issue six of Vito Acconci’s 0-9 magazine, Piper set 
out a rectangular matrix alongside a long list of every co-ordinate on the 
matrix, plotting them out in imitation of a computer printout.102 Le Witt’s 
Incomplete Open Cubes (1974) [Fig.19] is a classic later example of such a self-
contained systematic work.  In their production of bounded systems-derived 
objects, LeWitt and Piper’s art remained within an object-specific paradigm, 
despite their post-specific object emphasis on art as idea as “conceptual 
system.”  
 
By 1970, in what now reads as a hypertrophic development of her desire to 
bound the system, Piper attempted to systematise not just the production of an 
individual work but also the entire process of art production. Three Models of Art 
Production Systems (1970), first published in the exhibition catalogue to Kynaston 
McShine’s “Information” exhibition, aimed to logically systematise the 
production of all art.103 This attempt to explain the production of art by means 
of a system extended LeWitt’s project to generate specific artworks from ideal 
systems (whether logical or mathematical) into a project to derive art from ideal 
systems. In Three Models of Art Production Systems Piper gave only three example 
systems by which art could be produced: “Other models may be constructed 
using the same four components in varying functional positions.”104 Yet here 
the clear implication was that more systems could be iterated out of these 
components in order to present a schematic account of all the possible means 
by which art might be made.  
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Fig.19. Sol LeWitt, Schematic Drawing for Incomplete Open Cubes (1974). 
3. Systems Art and the System                           
 
 166 
What is most notable about Piper’s Three Models of Art Production Systems is that 
the “art context” is definitionally external to her systematisation of art: “an art 
product (Pa) is defined as any product (p) that is presented in an art context.” 
Her model thus subconsciously relies on an institutional theory of art and is 
subject to the same problem of logical circularity. If “art” and an “art context” 
are reciprocally defined, then any systematic account of art production will 
need to reflect on the constitutive role of the “art context”. Piper’s model did 
not achieve this: the “art context” was not put in question at this stage of her 
work.105 Piper remained wedded to the belief that art depended on its 
objectivity: “Any kind of objectivity – whether it is in the formulation of a 
concretized system, a rational decision-making method, conceptual clarity – 
can serve only to facilitate the final emergence, in as pure a form as possible, of 
the artistic idea, which is almost always basically intuitive in nature… I believe 
very strongly in the necessity of the physical realization of an idea.”106  
 
It would be precisely the issue of how art was constituted with reference to a 
materially specific art context (rather than by art’s materialization as an object) 
that would form the grounds of the shift within systems art to a “conceptual” 
mode. It was not until artists’ use of conceptual systems became self-reflexive, 
inverting the percept/concept hierarchy (turning to art’s relation to the art 
system) that systems art emerged as “conceptual.”  
 
Victor Burgin’s work played a mediating role between a residually object-
dependent systems art and a self-reflexive systematic conceptual art. Burgin 
minimised the systems-derived object to the perceptual limits of the percept-
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concept distinction. This move was exemplified in his work Photopath (1967-69) 
[Fig.20], included by Charles Harrison in his English version of “When 
Attitudes Become Form” (1969) presented at the ICA. Burgin extrapolated the 
implications of Photopath in his 1969 article “Situational Aesthetics.” The 
residual influence of “Art-Society Systems” (1968), as discussed in chapter two, 
operated in the background of this later and more substantial piece of 
theoretical work. Burgin began “Situational Aesthetics” by summarising the 
post-object trajectory of the advanced art of the period, moving the debate on 
from Le Witt and Piper’s residual attachment to the primacy of physical 
realization: “Some recent art, evolving through attention both to the conditions 
under which objects are perceived and to the processes by which aesthetic 
status is attributed to certain of these, has tended to take its essential form in 
message rather than materials.”107 Burgin, recognised the implications of the 
move away from the intrinsic significance of artistic materials: “In its logical 
extremity this tendency has resulted in a placing of art entirely within the 
linguistic infrastructure which previously served merely to support art.”108  
 
Burgin, however, was not prepared to accept that the logical extremity of such 
a trajectory constituted a logical necessity: “In its less hermetic manifestations art 
as message, as ‘software,’ consists of sets of conditions more or less closely 
defined, according to which particular concepts may be demonstrated. This is 
to say, aesthetic systems are designed, capable of generating objects, rather 
than individual objects themselves.”109 So far then, Burgin simply described 
work such as LeWitt and Piper’s. Yet Burgin’s locution—“aesthetic systems”—
more accurately reflects the percept-concept hierarchy within 
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Fig.20. Victor Burgin, Photopath (1967-69). 
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Piper’s formulation: though Piper anticipated an art of “conceptual systems” 
her systems were residually aesthetic. It is, however, in the conclusions that 
Burgin drew from his survey of the field that we find his distinctive contribution 
to the debate: “Two consequences of this work process are: the specific nature 
of any object formed is largely contingent upon the details of the situation for 
which it is designed; through attention to time, objects formed are intentionally 
located partly in real, exterior, space and partly in psychological, interior 
space.”110 Peter Osborne has elaborated Burgin’s claim: 
 
The artistic significance of materials (medium) is reduced to their productive, 
communicational or signifying functions (message). However, there is no 
attempt to restrict art to linguistic materials, since it remains “aesthetic,” in 
the classical sense of working via spatio-temporal aspects of perceptual 
objects. Nonetheless, this aesthetic dimension functions primarily negatively, 
directing attention away from itself towards conceptual structures of 
perception…111 
 
It was in the shift to a primarily negative function of the aesthetic in Burgin 
(drawing attention away from itself and towards the conceptual), as compared 
to the principally positive functioning of the aesthetic in LeWitt and Piper 
(drawing attention towards itself and away from the conceptual) that Burgin 
innovated. Osborne also expands on Burgin’s concept of the aesthetic system: 
“Aesthetic systems may be understood here as sets of rules governing the 
formation of objects in perception out of the matrix or flux of space-time... The 
emphasis is thus on process, rather than the resultant objects, and hence upon 
‘objects’ in an expanded, phenomenological sense that includes the systems 
through which perceptual objects are generated as themselves ‘conceptual 
objects’.”112 
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Here then Burgin produced an account of the artistic use of “aesthetic systems” 
which demonstrated the way in which systems-derived objects were taken up as 
artworks at the same time as the systems generating the objects were also taken 
up themselves as “conceptual objects.” This, combined with his contextualist 
insight that “the specific nature of any object formed is largely contingent upon 
the details of the situation for which it is designed” (this being what imparted 
the “situational” character to Burgin’s theory) meant that Burgin, with 
Photopath, took the use of systems in art just to the limit, without reaching it, of 
setting the ontological status of the work at the level of the system itself. As he 
observed the following year: “Perhaps it is time for a moratorium on things – a 
temporary withdrawal from real objects during which the object analogue 
formed in consciousness may be examined as the origin of a new generating 
system.”113  
 
Subsequently Burgin changed the focus of his own artistic practice from art’s 
situational/contextual character to art’s “less hermetic function as message,” 
conceived along semiotic lines. However other artists including Hans Haacke, 
Douglas Huebler and Mel Bochner, extended Burgin’s situational aesthetics 
without dropping its contextual aspects. Here, for example in Huebler’s Location 
series [Fig.21] or Bochner’s Measurement series [Fig.22], the conceptual system 
was still regarded as the ontological ground of the artwork but the “situational” 
qualification was not relinquished.  
 
If we compare Burgin’s Photopath (1969) and Haacke’s Gallery Goer’s Birthplace and 
Residence Profile (1969), the differences between the two approaches can be 
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Fig.21. Douglas Huebler, Location Piece Number 7,  (1971).
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Fig.22. Mel Bochner, Measurement Room (1969). 
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clarified. Gallery Goer’s Birthplace and Residence Profile, while prioritising the 
systematic ontology of the work above its material realisation (the profile must 
be filled in in order to become art), also began to articulate a (nascent) critique 
of the contextual character of artistic meaning (the profile depends on the 
gallery to be recognised as art). By revealing the restricted ethnic and socio-
economic constitution of the gallery’s audience base, Haacke suggested that the 
ontology of an artwork could not be defined without taking into account its 
social determination. Haacke contextualised art understood as a conceptual 
system. He treated the system as an expanded and updated form of the 
readymade—beyond a specific object and beyond determination by the 
immediate art institutional context alone: “If you work with real-time systems, 
well, you probably go beyond Duchamp’s position. Real-time systems are 
double agents. They might run under the heading “art,” but this culturalization 
does not prevent them from operating as normal.”114 Huebler also shared a 
similar conception of the system as an expanded readymade: “A system existing 
in the world disinterested in the purposes of art may be ‘plugged into’ in such a 
way as to produce a work that possesses a separate existence and that neither 
changes nor comments on the system so used.”115 Haacke’s and Huebler’s work 
moved away from the residually percept focused conceptual systems of Le Witt 
and Piper. This shift was marked by an increasing attention to the social 
context of art.  
 
Mierle Lademan Ukeles’ work offered a caveat to the system-as-readymade 
strategy while nonetheless employing it. Challenging Haacke and Huebler’s 
claims that social systems could be neutrally appropriated without changing or 
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commenting on them, Mierle Lademan Ukeles insisted on the politics encoded 
in any such “appropriation.” In “Maintenance Art Manifesto: Proposal for an 
Exhibition, ‘CARE’ (1969),” Ukeles insisted on the hierarchy obtaining 
between the art system (understood within the broader category of social 
“development”) and other social sub-systems (understood within the broader 
category of social “maintenance”). Herein “development” was clearly 
privileged over “maintenance,” despite their interdependence: 
 
Two basic systems: Development and Maintenance. The sourball of every 
revolution: after the revolution, who’s going to pick up the garbage on 
Monday morning?  
   Development: pure individual creation; the new; change; progress; 
advance; excitement; flight or fleeing.  
   Maintenance: keep the dust off the pure individual creation; preserve the 
new; sustain the change; protect progress; defend and prolong the advance; 
renew the excitement; repeat the flight: show your work — show it again 
keep the contemporaryartmuseum groovy keep the home fires burning.  
   Development systems are partial feedback systems with major room for 
change.  
   Maintenance systems are direct feedback systems with little room for 
alteration… 
   Conceptual & Process art, especially, claim pure development and change, yet employ 
almost purely maintenance processes.116 
 
Ukeles was later to realise her manifesto in works including Hartford Wash: 
Washing, Tracks, Maintenance: Outside (1973) [Fig. 19] and I Make Maintenance Art 
One Hour Every Day (1976). In these works, Ukeles directly staged maintenance 
work as art. In so doing she produced a reciprocal version of the “systems” 
readymade, one which foregrounded the privileges accorded to art workers 
over and above other “social” workers. 
 
However, a shift toward the (critical) consideration of art’s social context was 
not comprehensive. Even as a work such as Photo-Electric began to think the 
relation between art and (control) society, Haacke continued to experiment  
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Fig. 23. Mierle Lademan Ukeles, Hartford Wash: Washing, Tracks, Maintenance: 
Outside (1973). 
3. Systems Art and the System                           
 
 176 
with physical and biological systems before coming to focus more concertedly 
on social systems. Nor did this shift toward the social stand as the uncontested 
ground of development for a properly “conceptual” art. It conflicted with forms 
of conceptual art characterised by the production of “imperceptible” artworks 
(artworks made from materials beyond the limits of unaided human sensory 
perception) and by the related, post-Duchampian strategy of nominating real-
world places, situations, actions or contexts as artworks (principally undertaken 
by Robert Barry, Douglas Huebler and Lawrence Weiner), as well as with the 
(eventually) dominant, tendency toward construing the artwork’s ontology in 
analytical or linguistic terms (principally articulated, albeit with many 
disagreements, by Joseph Kosuth and Art & Language).117 Nevertheless, the 
system stood as one of the first things that was conceptualised by the art of the 
late 1960s such that it became possible to speak of a “conceptual” art. 
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Limit Cases 
 
Charles Harrison has noted that the “normal procedure” of art history is “to 
represent the art of the past as enabling the art of the present: we can 
understand the meaning and significance of the former, it is normally implied, 
insofar as its potential and its implications are discovered in the latter.”118 
Stressing “explanation of the experience of failure or of misapprehension or of 
disappointment is not generally looked for in historical accounts,” Harrison, in 
contrast, seeks to proceed “without presuming that an adequate representation 
of the past can be achieved in terms of the prevailing ratifications of the 
present.”119 Yet, though he wishes to insist on a radical unrealised potential 
inhering within the past, Harrison’s historical account is still straightforwardly 
teleological (the settled “significance” of the art of the past is, or is not, available 
within the art of the present). What, though, if we were to insist that the art of 
the past is not straightforwardly settled, such that it can “enable”, or fail to 
enable, the art of the present? What if, on the contrary, the art of the present is 
always putting the art of the past in question, just as surely as the inverse is the 
case? Here, the relations between past and present art remain perpetually at 
stake, to be renegotiated as new circumstances demand. It is in this sense that 
the previously marginal historical category of systems art can appear with new 
vigour and urgency.  
 
Even though the conclusions he draws are notoriously partisan, the criteria that 
Harrison has elaborated by means of which conceptual art “proper” might be 
distinguished from the more inclusive category of postformalism are less 
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sectarian and, consequently, more useful: “In the search for grounds on which 
to isolate a Conceptual Art tendency from both previous and concurrent 
developments, the significant indicator will be some characteristic form of 
difference in the disposition or activity predicated of the spectator and in the 
forms of matching or reference by means of which the work of art is 
distinguished.”120  
 
According to these criteria, Photo-Electric might be designated a work of 
conceptual art. First, by dramatically removing objects from the work 
altogether (the grid of infrared beams is invisible to the human eye) Haacke 
establishes a different form of “matching or reference by means of which the 
work of art is distinguished.” Photo-Electric takes away the specific object while 
retaining perhaps the principal achievement of the specific object, namely the 
phenomenological activation of the space of its display: “A “sculpture” that 
physically reacts to its environment and/or affects its surroundings is no longer 
to be regarded as an object. The range of outside factors influencing it, as well 
as its own radius of action, reach beyond the space it materially occupies. It 
thus merges with the environment in a relationship that is better understood as 
a “system” of interdependent processes.”121 Second, Haacke incorporated the 
“viewer” of the work directly into its production (the “art” here does not 
meaningfully precede its actualisation by one or more interacting members of 
the public), thus establishing a “characteristic form of difference in the 
disposition or activity predicated of the spectator.” Without the interaction of 
the viewer, Haacke’s work is simply a black box. 
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It is with the realisation of the ineliminability of the aesthetic dimension of art 
attendant upon the market’s recuperation of conceptual art as a “period style” 
that claims for a systematic conceptual art must be understood. Analytic 
conceptual art no longer looks so secure in its historical status (hence its limited 
influence on today’s art). Yet one of the fundamental claims we have advanced 
here is that conceptual art is something more than a period style, that its 
recuperation is incomplete. Conceptual art, and more precisely systematic 
conceptual art, resists reduction to the status of a “style.” Its critical force 
remains extant in its influence on artists making use of social systems in their 
work today, artists who understand art’s ontology to be relationally or 
contextually determined. The unresolved problems of conceptual art thus 
continue to structure the field of advanced art. Historically, the shift from the 
use of aesthetic systems to generate artworks to the understanding of art as a 
conceptual system marked the transition from a more nebulous postformalist 
systems art to a demonstrably systematic mode of conceptual art.  
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Indexing 
 
Looking back on the art of the late Sixties and early Seventies Mary Kelly has 
described the way in which a “systemic approach to art” was pursued by herself 
and others, an approach that could be summarised by the formula “‘art 
interrogating the conditions of the object’ and then going to the second stage 
and interrogating the conditions of the interrogation itself…”1 Produced in 
successive years, Haacke’s Shapolsky et al. (1971), Art & Language’s Index 01 
(1972) [Fig.24] and Mary Kelly, Kay Hunt and Margaret Harrison’s Women and 
Work (1973) [Fig.25], though sharing a certain visual affinity, stand as sharply 
differentiated markers in the development of conceptual art. Though all three 
could be described as employing a “systemic” approach, each represents a very 
different interpretation of what this means. Women and Work formulates a 
critique of Shapolsky et al. and Index 01, two works which themselves represent 
divergent approaches to a particular artistic problem, namely the challenge of 
defining the ontological ground of (autonomous) art after the collapse of 
formalist modernism.  
 
The differences between these works can be understood by considering the 
differing ways in which they conceived the challenge of “interrogating the 
conditions of the interrogation” of postformalist art. Haacke’s Shapolsky et al., 
embodied systematic self-reflexivity about the sociological grounds of advanced 
art production. Art & Language’s Index 01 focused on systematic self-reflexivity 
about the discursive or, more strictly, the philosophical grounds of advanced art 
production (albeit with philosophy understood narrowly as Anglo-American 
Analytic philosophy).2 Yet Kelly found fault with both approaches explaining 
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Fig.24. Art and Language, Index 01 (1972).
4. Conceptual Art’s Heterodox Modes               
 
 183 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.25. Mary Kelly, Kay Hunt and Margaret Harrison, Women and Work (1973). 
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that there was “something very inadequate about the systemic approach to art, 
something wrong with the formula ‘art interrogating the conditions of the 
object’ and then going to the second stage and interrogating the conditions of 
the interrogation itself, but refusing to include subjectivity or sexual difference 
in that interrogation.”3 Though admitting that she had been influenced by 
Haacke’s approach—“you can see the Women and Work project looks a lot like 
Haacke’s ‘Shapolsky’ piece”—Kelly also stressed her awareness that 
“something wasn’t working in the strategy” employed by Women and Work.4 
Kelly describes Women and Work as “a document on the division of labour in a 
specific industry, showing the changes in the labour process and the 
constitution of the labour force during the implementation of the Equal Pay 
Act,” noting that in making the work she discovered “how the division of 
labour in industry was underpinned by the division of labour in the home and 
that the central issue for women was in fact reproduction.”5 For Kelly, 
however, the sociological approach of Women & Work failed to capture her 
subjects’ psychic investments in their social roles which was, for Kelly, both the 
cause of their social subjection and the site of their possibility for resistance. Art 
& Language also launched several polemics against what they perceived to be 
the “sociologism” of Haacke’s work, polemics which will be discussed in more 
detail below. Yet Kelly, who encountered Index  in its second incarnation as 
Index 02 in “The New Art” (1972) exhibition at the Hayward Gallery, was not 
persuaded that its philosophical self-reflexivity provided a more productive 
trajectory.6  
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Kelly’s response to the perceived failings of the “systemic approach” was to 
begin to make work that included subjectivity and sexual difference in the 
“interrogation.” The problems that Kelly discerned with Women & Work 
became the spur for her next major work, Post-Partum Document (1975) [Fig.26] 
“an on-going process of analysis and visualisation of the mother-child 
relationship.”7 Peter Wollen has commented on the way in which Post-Partum 
Document was conceived and presented as an inter-subjective artwork, observing 
that it consisted of “the discourse of an artist who was also a woman, 
constituting herself inter-subjectively as a mother and collaborating in a work 
with her own infant child.”8 Women & Work prompted Kelly’s self-reflexivity 
about the subjective ontological grounds of art production.9  
 
In her own account of her artistic development, Kelly has emphasised that the 
political upheavals of the late 1960s directly impacted the evolution of her 
work: “First of all, I was an artist making systems work without any political 
content, if you like. When the great upheavals of 1968 opened up areas of 
activism, none of us immediately responded at the level of our artwork. As 
Hans Haacke has said, for an interim period people just kept their art and their 
politics separate.”10 Yet Kelly, as with Haacke, did not keep her art and her 
politics separate for long. As a contemporary reviewer remarked of the Women 
& Work show, “The work on display is the result of two years collaboration 
between women who share a common commitment to the women’s liberation 
movement. Their project was to combine research on the sexual division of 
labour in industry with the techniques of informational art.”11 What the 
reviewer does not comment on is the link between the “division of labour in 
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Fig.26. Mary Kelly, Post-Partum Document (1973). 
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industry” and the “techniques of informational art” – systems art indexed 
changes in the system of advanced industrial capitalism. Kelly’s Women & Work 
marked the late moment of a politicised systematic conceptual art. Yet it also 
initiated the beginning of the breakdown of “systems work” as a viable artistic 
methodology prior to the widespread turn to a set of post-conceptual practices. 
By expanding on the relations between Haacke’s Shapolsky et al., Art & 
Language’s Index 01 and Kelly’s Women & Work we can track this development. 
In order to do so, we will be obliged to discriminate between different modes of 
conceptual art and to revisit their competing attempts to define, and in some 
cases to hegemonise, conceptual art practice. 
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Multiple Modes 
 
Though usually abridged to a shorter form, the full title of Lucy Lippard’s 
renowned conceptual art sourcebook runs Six Years: the dematerialization of the art 
object from 1966 to 1972: a cross-reference book of information on some esthetic boundaries: 
consisting of a bibliography into which are inserted a fragmented text, art works, documents, 
interviews, and symposia, arranged chronologically and focused on so-called conceptual or 
information or idea art with mentions of such vaguely designated areas as minimal, anti-form, 
systems, earth or process art, occurring now in the Americas, Europe, England, Australia and 
Asia (with occasional political overtones). Rather than group work in strict identity, 
Lippard held different bodies of work together via a loose concatenation of 
categories. As she stated in the preface “this is a book about widely differing 
phenomena within a time span, not about a ‘movement’…”12  
 
The fact that, even as late as 1973, Lippard was still referring to “so-called 
conceptual or information or idea art” indicates just how resistant this body of 
work was to conventional forms of art historical assimilation and categorisation. 
That “minimal” and “systems” art could also be grouped together as “vaguely 
designated areas” in 1973 is also surprising (the debates about minimalism at 
least were well-established by that date) but also indicates that systems art, 
though “vaguely designated,” was also perceived, at that time, to be of 
comparable standing to other postformalist practices such as anti-form, earth or 
process art – critical categories which have subsequently been subjected to 
considerably more art historical attention. The long-form title of Lippard’s 
anthology reinforces the porosity of the boundaries between postformalist 
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practices. That the boundaries were porous, however, does not mean that they 
were not contested.  
 
Charles Harrison has commented on the challenge that faced “normal art 
criticism and curatorship” when faced with the non-morphological approach of 
conceptual art “proper”: “One of the more interesting aspects of the best work 
was its critical disengagement from morphologically based concepts of style. 
Normal art criticism and curatorship tend to presuppose the security of such 
concepts for the purposes of grouping and demarcation. With this security 
undermined those slow on their feet were left grasping at straw categories, or 
listening anxiously for gossip with the ring of authority and authenticity about 
it.”13 Theorising the explosion of postformalist practices was the challenge 
presented by the breakdown of Greenbergian formalist aesthetics as the arbiter 
of advanced art. As discussed in chapter three, this was what led Jack Burnham 
to produce his theory of systems aesthetics: “The notion of a ‘Systems Esthetics’ 
appeared to have validity as momentum built up for Earth Art, Ecological Art, 
Body Art, Video Art, and the multitudinous forms of Conceptualism.”14 Yet as we 
also saw in the previous chapter, systems aesthetics failed as a unified theory of 
postformalist art. However, in pointing to the “multitudinous forms of 
conceptualism” Burnham, along with Lippard, drew attention to the fact that 
there were a wide variety of practices seeking to claim “conceptual” status.15 
How then to disambiguate these “multitudinous forms” meaningfully?  
 
Although Kelly considers her own early work alongside Haacke’s and Art & 
Language’s as examples of the “systemic” approach to art, such a claim reads 
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incongruously today. This is because of the divergent reception histories that 
these artists have been accorded: a questionable unanimity has been 
retrospectively projected on to their respective practices in order that their 
distinctiveness, even mutual exclusivity, can be “secured.” Haacke is normally 
taken to “stand for” institutional critique, Art & Language for analytic 
conceptual art and Kelly for the beginnings of identity politics. We will argue 
that such an approach misrepresents the complex relationship that obtained 
between these artistic practices. 
 
Addressing these issues will involve reformulating our critical vocabulary. In 
1972, the year in which conceptual art went mainstream at “Documenta V” 
becoming something like the agreed upon face of the international avant-garde 
and, in the process, peaking as a vital, creative and critical force, Lizzie Borden 
published an article on conceptual art in Artforum, explaining its “Three 
Modes” to the magazine’s readers.16 The substance of Borden’s article is no 
longer pertinent since she offered a loose definition of conceptual art and her 
three modes—“actions performed in the past and documented in the present;” 
“the body in space;” and “linguistic analysis”—are not persuasive.17 
Nevertheless, Borden’s proposal that conceptual art could be qualified in terms 
of modes remains a suggestive one. Modes enable us to develop a more 
substantive account of conceptual art than an overarching “movement” 
designation. Modes of conceptual art have also been a feature of the critical 
literature on conceptual art since Kosuth’s made his infamous distinction 
between an endorsed “Theoretical Conceptual Art” and a derogated “Stylistic 
Conceptual Art.”18  
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A mode, as “a way or manner in which something is done or takes place” is 
distinguished from a form, as “the visual aspect, especially the shape or 
configuration, of a thing.19 By using the term “mode” the sense that visual or 
morphological traits should be used to differentiate, or categorise a given 
artwork is played down. Instead the emphasis is placed on what the work does 
and how it functions. Bringing in a discussion of modes allows us to attempt to 
impart some organisation and conceptual distinction to the competing 
articulations of conceptual art – to disambiguate them to some degree and to 
give them greater critical specificity. Instead of “multitudinous forms of 
Conceptualism” we can instead begin to discriminate multiple modes of conceptual 
art. Doing so allows us to develop a more precise characterisation of conceptual 
art and thus to specify the conceptual genealogy of contemporary art more 
closely. Modes serve to emphasise the internal differences that existed within 
conceptual art as a result of the conflicts of self-understanding on the part of its 
most important practitioners. Significant debates play out between the multiple 
modes of conceptual art.  
 
The persistence of morphological categories does not do justice to art after 
conceptual art, that is art that is defined by the negation of the artistic 
significance of morphological categories. Developments in art after conceptual 
art have not been best characterised in terms of “movements,” as is empirically 
attested by the dearth of contemporary examples. If anything, art is moving 
towards a situation where artistic ontology is established at the level of the 
individual artwork, with the basis of its claim to art status being determined at 
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the level of its relation to “Art,” with no mediating intervening categories such 
as medium, style, genre or, as is at stake here, movement. Art history, with its 
residual reliance on the interpretative category of the movement, has often 
failed to keep pace with the art that it aspires to historicise.  
 
The modes of conceptual art are not however equivalent to the range of 
different terms originally proposed for it, e.g. “information” or “idea” or “post-
object” art. These terms tended to propose, albeit in various different 
formulations, that a “dematerialised” art material acted as a replacement for 
the Juddean specific object which had itself displaced the traditional media of 
painting and sculpture. These terms consequently failed to capture what was 
most pertinent about conceptual art, they remained focused on the first phase 
of conceptual art’s development (the interrogation of the conditions of the art 
object) at the expense of the second (the interrogation of the interrogation). It 
was only with the self-reflexive turn to the interrogation of the interrogation of 
the conditions of the art object that a fully recognisable conceptual art emerged 
and consequently it is at this level that differentiated “modes” of conceptual art 
should be distinguished. 
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What then are the modes of conceptual art? Without claiming to have 
generated an exhaustive classification, four significant modes of conceptual art 
can be schematised: 
 
1. Stylistic conceptual art  
2. Analytic conceptual art  
3. Systematic conceptual art  
4. Synthetic conceptual art  
 
Developing Kosuth’s position, we retain the opposition between a “stylistic” 
and a “theoretical” mode of conceptual art but argue that a theoretically 
informed conceptual art actually took the form of three distinct modes: analytic 
conceptual art; systematic conceptual art and synthetic conceptual art. Analytic 
conceptual art can be considered as broadly analogous to Kosuth’s conception 
of theoretical conceptual art (although we will make important qualifications to 
this schematic definition based on interventions made by Art & Language UK). 
The self-reflexive turn in systems art produced a mode of systematic conceptual 
art emphasising the relation between art (understood as a conceptual system), 
the art system and the social system. Synthetic conceptual art was a term 
defined by Mary Kelly and which insisted on the subjective ontological grounds 
of art that she found lacking in the “systemic” approach. Here we need to mark 
the fact that Kelly’s definition of synthetic conceptual art relies on a contentious 
definition of the “synthetic proposition,” an issue that will be be discussed later 
in the chapter. Nevertheless Kelly’s identification of a synthetic mode of 
conceptual art will be shown to have a certain historical force, explaining its 
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adoption here. The interrelation and competition between these modes can be 
used to characterise the way in which conceptual art plays out as a 
“movement.” 
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Analytic Conceptual Art and the Quest for Orthodoxy  
 
In his essay “Conceptual art 1962–1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration 
to the Critique of Institutions” Benjamin Buchloh makes an odd argumentative 
move. Initially he clearly states “the proposal inherent in Conceptual Art was to 
replace the object of spatial and perceptual experience by linguistic definition 
alone (the work as analytic proposition).” Yet in the next paragraph, he 
observes that conceptual art consisted of a “complex range of mutually opposed 
approaches” and that “precisely because of this range of implications of 
Conceptual Art, it would seem imperative to resist a construction of its history 
in terms of a stylistic homogenization, which would limit that history to a group 
of individuals and a set of strictly defined practices and historical interventions 
(such as, for example, the activities initiated by Seth Siegelaub in New York in 
1968 or the authoritarian quests for orthodoxy by the English Art & Language 
group).”20  
 
Buchloh’s argument, one that has been perhaps the single most influential work 
of scholarship on conceptual art, is thus puzzling in a major regard. He asserts 
that it is “imperative to resist” a construction of conceptual art based on a 
specific set of historical interventions immediately after doing exactly that 
himself since it is precisely Joseph Kosuth and Art & Language who are 
strongly associated with the definition of conceptual art as “the work as analytic 
proposition.”  It was not a definition of conceptual art shared by, for example, 
Sol Le Witt: “Since no form is intrinsically superior to another, the artists may 
use any form, from an expression of words, (written or spoken) to physical 
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reality, equally.”21 If anything, it is Buchloh’s article that has taken on the status 
of orthodoxy. Certainly, as we saw in chapter one, it is with Buchloh’s 
argument that most historians and critics of conceptual art have taken issue, 
from Kosuth and Siegelaub, through Jeff Wall and on to the present generation 
of scholarship.  
 
The participants in these debates would not deny that conceptual art was riven 
by intense, frequently acrimonious, internal debate. What has been contested is 
the claim Art & Language staged explicit “quests for orthodoxy.”22 Charles 
Harrison observes that “Conceptual Art was necessarily ad hoc, syndicalist, 
dialogical and inquisitive.”23 Art & Language, in the early issues of their Art-
Language journal at least, sought to stage encounters between interested parties 
with different views about what (conceptual) art was or might be. Art-Language 
staged an intensive series of debates about what constituted an artwork, and 
these were discussions that tended to polarise viewpoints. Outlining their 
approach in the first Art-Language editorial, they clearly stated: “The essay will 
point out some differences in an indirect way between American and British 
Conceptual art, but it should not be seen to indicate a clear and definite 
boundary between them.”24 Making good on such claims, the first issue 
contained Sol LeWitt’s “Sentences on Conceptual Art,” (an extension of his 
earlier “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art”), Dan Graham’s Poem-schema and 
Lawrence Weiner’s Statements alongside the various “Notes on M1” by David 
Bainbridge and Michael Baldwin. 
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Instead of approaching the various debates in conceptual art principally 
through individual artists we will instead pursue them through the interaction 
of the different “modes” of conceptual art set out above. The advantage of this 
approach is that it does not artificially restrict specific artists to invariant 
positions—artists moved between modes and from earlier, more didactic 
positions to later, less didactic ones. Here Kosuth is exemplary. Frequently 
caricatured as the most intransigent of the conceptual artists his position 
regarding his own work did change over time, as he has admitted: “The 
‘demystification’ of early conceptualism collapsed into style because of the 
naiveté of its scientistic, instrumental, tools. Located in the trajectory of an 
architectonic model, it couldn’t see itself; it internalized its belief in the ‘progress’ 
of science and modernism.”25 Rather than the forced opposition of individual 
artists or groups of artists—the British versus the Americans, the Siegelaub 
Stable versus Art & Language (an opposition which is obliged to pass over 
Joseph Kosuth’s more complex mediating role between the two “camps” 
despite his eventual expulsion from the latter)—we can instead look at the 
tensions between the different modes of articulation of conceptual art, modes 
which coincide with different phases of different artists’ individual practice. 
Such an approach does not, however, prevent us from strongly associating 
certain artists with a particular mode of conceptual art. As has been discussed,  
particular artistic practices instantiate the distinct modes. 
 
Taking such an approach, we can make finer discriminations than Buchloh’s 
overly simplified contention that “Conceptual Art was to replace the object of 
spatial and perceptual experience by linguistic definition alone (the work as 
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analytic proposition)” will allow.26 By so doing, we observe that the relative 
priority accorded to the different modes of conceptual art shifts over time, as 
conceptual art itself emerges, consolidates and declines as a coherent project. 
Before considering analytic conceptual art’s relation to systematic conceptual 
art it is important to clarify in greater detail exactly how art historians have 
been able to speak of a strictly linguistic, analytic conceptual art. What was 
analytic conceptual art, how did it come to be, and why did it predominate? 
For if analytic conceptual art is considered to be the critically hegemonic 
version of conceptual art against which alternate claims on the name are 
obliged to articulate themselves, then it is imperative that we revisit its 
construction as a critical category, or, in the terms that we have outlined here, 
a mode of conceptual art.  
 
Analytic conceptual art was largely a product of the hardening of the debates, 
and deepening of the tensions, that occurred within and around the Art-
Language journal. These debates were predominantly conducted between Joseph 
Kosuth and the various individuals making up the English and American Art & 
Language collectives (ALUK and ALNY respectively), but also drew in Sol 
LeWitt, Victor Burgin and Adrian Piper, among others. Notoriously, the 
outcome of these debates resulted in deep factionalisation and the splintering of 
ALNY from ALUK with the foundation of The Fox in 1975 (a journal that was 
itself subject to rapid and terminal factionalisation).27  
 
It is with Kosuth that any account of analytic conceptual art is obliged to start. 
Though it is typically through a reading of his 1969 essay “Art after 
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Philosophy” (published in three parts in successive volumes of Studio 
International) we will focus on his first contribution to Art-Language, the 
“Introductory Note by the American Editor” (1970) in the second issue of the 
journal.28 This introductory note is shorter and more strongly argued than “Art 
After Philosophy.” Kosuth’s remarks in the “Introductory Note” can be simply 
summarised. Here Kosuth schematised the entire field of “current American 
art activity” into three categories—aesthetic, reactive and conceptual—and 
then proceeded to elaborate definitions of these categories. Thus “aesthetic art” 
was defined as that which adhered to the orthodox Greenbergian account of 
art (and which Kosuth objected to precisely because, in such a conception, “the 
artist” was “omitted from the ‘art activity’ in that he or she was considered 
merely “the carpenter of the predicate” and thus was not held to “take part in 
the conceptual engagement.”29 “Reactive art” was a loose category, catching 
almost every postformalist tendency falling between formalist modernism and 
conceptual art: “What this art attempts is to refer to a traditional notion of art 
while still being ‘avant-garde’. One support is placed in the material (sculpture) 
and/or visual (painting) arena, enough to maintain the historical continuum 
while the other is left to roam about for new ‘moves’ to make and further 
‘breakthroughs’ to accomplish.”30 Finally, “Conceptual art” at its most “strict 
and radical extreme” was defined by Kosuth as being “based on an inquiry into 
the nature of art” and was consequently “not just the activity of constructing art 
propositions, but a working out, a thinking out, of all implications of all aspects of 
the concept ‘art’.”31  
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Having offered his definition of conceptual art, Kosuth proceeded to add three 
important qualifications to it. First, he suggested that conceptual art no longer 
required an audience other than that of its participant observers (because art no 
longer contained any aspect of “entertainment”), nor a mediating critic (since 
the distinction between perception and conception, art and criticism had 
dissolved). Second, Kosuth asserted that art had to be thought linguistically 
“Fundamental to this idea of art is the understanding of the linguistic nature of 
all art propositions, be they past or present, and regardless of the elements used 
in their construction.”32 Third, Kosuth claimed that the “strict and radical” 
conception that he proposed was the only one that could be designated 
conceptual art “proper” because it was the point at which American and 
British conceptual artists were purportedly in agreement.  
 
In one short editorial, Kosuth both reemphasised and hardened the claims that 
he had made in “Art After Philosophy.” He stressed the linguistic nature of all 
(conceptual) art propositions; attempted to dispense with any consideration of 
art’s relation to its actually existing social and institutional context (the “artist-
critic-audience” system); and moved to reduce the range of application of the 
term conceptual art. In “Art After Philosophy” Kosuth had been prepared to 
acknowledge the work, or at least elements of the work, of a number of artists 
as conceptual: Terry Atkinson, Michael Baldwin, Christine Kozlov, Iain 
Baxter, James Byars, Frederic Barthelme, Bernar Venet, Hanne Darboven, Ed 
Ruscha, Bruce Nauman, Barry Flanagan, Bruce McLean, Richard Long, 
Steven Kaltenbach, Ian Wilson, Mel Bochner, Jan Dibbets, Eric Orr, Allen 
Ruppersberg, Dennis Oppenheim, Donald Burgy, Saul Ostrow, Adrian Piper, 
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Perpetua Butler, Ian Burn, Mel Ramsden, Roger Cutforth. In the 
“Introductory Note,” however, he narrowed his scope: “this concept of 
American ‘conceptual’ art is, I admit, here defined by my own 
characterisation.”33 The “Introductory Note” might then legitimately be 
described as the outlines of a Kosuthian quest for orthodoxy.  
 
There are, however, several problems with Kosuth’s claims, claims that 
ultimately resulted in tension between Kosuth and the British conceptual artists 
with whom, at this stage, he proclaimed himself to be in agreement. These 
tensions undermined Kosuth’s ability to produce an “orthodox” or “pure” 
analytic conceptual art.  His claims proved susceptible not only to internal 
critique but also to the demonstration that his own “strict and radical” 
conception of conceptual art was not ultimately compatible with the work of 
ALUK. Regarding its susceptibility to internal critique, Peter Osborne has 
summarised the “three main components of Kosuth’s conception” of 
conceptual art as “linguistic reduction, psychologism, and the collapse of the distinction 
between art and criticism.”34 Osborne has also advanced a persuasive critique of 
these three claims whereby he demonstrates that Kosuth’s linguistic reduction 
amounts to an “aestheticization of logical positivism,” that his psychologism 
was a misguided version of the fallacy of artistic intentionalism, and that the 
collapse of the art/criticism distinction was obviated by the fact that Kosuth 
continued “to produce object-instantiated work as the means for the 
communication of his propositions.”35  
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Examining the shared concerns of ALUK and Kosuth it quickly becomes clear 
that their positions diverged, even at their ostensible point of solidarity. Charles 
Harrison has described the evolution of the term conceptual art in light of its 
exhibition history: “During the earliest… exhibitions ‘Conceptual Art’ was 
merely one designation among many tried on in reference to a broad and 
various international avant-garde… By 1970 a number of critics and curators – 
the present author among them – were staging shows specifically addressed to 
‘Conceptual Art’… “36 Though we can agree with the broad trajectory 
Harrison describes, too much is elided in his claim that: “Within the wider 
groupings of the avant-garde then, Conceptual Art was distinguished by the 
relative absence of physically robust material and by the recourse to linguistic 
specification and description which that absence entailed…”37 It is the “and” 
that is most problematic here, running together as it does different modes of 
conceptual art. By means of such a description, self-admittedly an 
“approximate characterization,” Harrison attempts to restrict his definition 
such that it excludes “enterprises such as interventions in the landscape, or 
installations or markings upon the body which… depend for their effects on 
some first-order physical characteristics” but still includes work such as the 
conceptual paintings of Atkinson and Baldwin and the nomination works of 
Robert Barry.38  
 
Yet for Harrison, assimilated to Art & Language as official historian and often 
guilty of running together the history of Art & Language with the history of 
conceptual art, it remains the case that conceptual art and linguistic 
specification are logically determined correlates, the “recourse to linguistic” 
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specification is read as the logical result of the deprivileging of materials and 
object status. Elsewhere he is even more specific: “The ‘crisis of the object’ 
supposed to have occurred during the 1960s might more appropriately be 
thought as a crisis in the critical relations between ‘art’ and ‘language’ – a crisis 
brought about by the collapse of those protocols that had previously served to 
keep the two apart.”39  
 
Harrison is too summary here. If we look again at the editorial from the first 
issue of Art-Language, (a text which looks back over the early, pre-journal, history 
of the group) we find significantly more diverse opinions on view as to what 
conceptual art involved as far as its practitioners were concerned. Given that 
the journal was one of the principle sites where the contest for the proper name 
of conceptual art was staged it seems appropriate to revisit its pages. It is clear 
that this contest was not as narrowly conceived within the journal (at least 
initially) as it has been in its retrospective accounting. Indeed, an earlier 
historical account of Art & Language by Harrison himself is more at ease with 
the artistic differences within the group: “Inevitably there have been anomalies 
within the workings of Art-Language itself, within the relationship between the 
journal… and the other work of its contributors… within different positions 
taken by different contributors at the same time or the same contributors at 
different times. Consistency is not, however, what one necessarily strives for in 
a context of theoretical discourse to which there are several contributors. 
Something more like ‘defensibility’ is what one might aim at…”40 
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The editorial of the first issue of Art-Language featured an in-depth discussion of 
Crane (1966), a work extending the consequences of Duchamp’s contextual 
investigation of the readymade. Designated a “Made-made” by Bainbridge and 
Atkinson, the work involved a reversal/extension of the Duchampian 
readymade strategy: a crane, manufactured within the art context of St 
Martin’s College, was de-designated as art and put into direct practical use.41 
Subsequently it was re-designated as both crane and art object. Here then, 
there was clearly an interest in object status and institutional contextualisation 
that are not features of the linguistic restriction of conceptual art.42 Similarly, 
the editorial discussed another early project, the “Air Show” (1967) [Fig.27], a 
series of hypothetical exhibitions involving “a series of assertions concerning a 
theoretical usage of a column of air comprising a base of one square mile and 
of unspecified distance in the vertical dimension.”43 Here, the concerns were 
with nomination and the spatial boundaries of a possible/theoretical art object.  
 
Reflecting on the usage of writing as the “object” upon which the “Air Show” 
was formulated, the editors observed that it became possible to see how such a 
deployment of writing opened up additional possibilities: “having gained the 
use of such a wide ranging instrument as ‘straight’ writing, then objects, 
concrete and theoretical, are only two types of entity which can count, a whole 
range of other types of entities become candidates for art usage.”44  This can be 
seen as the founding insight for the development of a “linguistic” conceptual 
art, as Harrison has acknowledged: “Kosuth and the British artists’ work had 
developed independently since 1966 to a position of obvious compatibility. In 
particular the interest in linguistic analysis shared by Atkinson, Baldwin and  
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Fig.27. Terry Atkinson, Air Show (1976). 
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Kosuth both distinguished them from other artists in the late sixties and 
prepared considerable common ground between them.”45 
 
However, that writing presented itself as a candidate for art usage did not 
indicate that it should be advanced as the exclusive art entity and in the early 
(and later) stages of Art & Language’s practice it was not taken as such. 
Notwithstanding the shared interest in “linguistic analysis” Harrison has 
recognised as much: 
 
The fruits of the Art & Language project in the years 1968-72 were inchoate, 
obscure and occasionally paranoid. Insight alternated with irony, 
embarrassment and bathos – often in the same particle. No coherent or 
consistent aesthetic system could be wheeled on to demarcate between 
various forms of production: for instance, between such forms of display as 
machines, prints, diagrams and posters, and such forms of texts as essays, 
‘proceedings,’ transcripts and jottings. Strategies were adopted and 
defeated.46 
 
The anomalous character of Art & Language’s practice can be seen in 
Harrison’s own “Idea Structures” exhibition at the Camden Art Centre in 
1970. Conceived by Harrison as a corrective Harald Szeeman’s more broadly 
focused exhibition “When Attitudes Become Form” (1969), “Idea Structures” 
was intended to showcase conceptual art “proper”, that is the kind of art that 
Harrison sought to champion.47 Yet noting his inclusion of Bainbridge and 
Hurrell’s Lecher System within the show suggests the less clear-cut developmental 
arc of Art & Language’s work, revealing an involvement with cybernetics that 
once linked even Art & Language’s “purist” project to other modes of 
conceptual art.  
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Looking back on this period, ALUK have refused the idea that conceptual art 
ultimately constituted a linguistic reduction: “Conceptual art does not 
correspond tout court to some sort of linguistic turn in artistic practice. It does 
represent an appropriation of certain dialogic and discursive mechanisms by 
artists who sought thereby to empower themselves and others, and to that 
limited extent it represents a linguistic turn. But Conceptual Art did not reduce 
(or attempt to reduce) the pictorial to the linguistic (or textual).”48 Mel 
Ramsden has put it even more directly: “Conceptual Art doesn’t have to do 
with words on walls. It’s about finding alternatives for critical inquiry and it’s 
about a sense of corrosive irony.”49  
 
In the same issue of Art-Language as Kosuth’s “Introductory note,” Terry 
Atkinson’s “From an Art & Language Point of View” set out to “point out 
some of the inconsistencies which the Art-Language artists feel to be involved 
in much recent work.”50 Here Atkinson seemed to present Kosuth’s work as in 
(moderated) solidarity with ALUK’s: “Kosuth’s view, despite obvious 
shortcomings which he (Kosuth) has pointed out to me with respect to these 
articles is very much the view of the rest of the Art and Language artists.”51 
However, within the course of the essay it becomes clear that Atkinson’s, and 
by extension ALUK’s, conception of analytic conceptual art diverged from 
Kosuth’s.  
 
Such a conflict was anticipated in Atkinson’s original 1970 definition of the 
“analytic approach” taken by conceptual art. For Atkinson, “analytic” named a 
much broader relation between conceptual art and (British) analytic philosophy, in 
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contrast to Kosuth’s more restricted reading of “pure” conceptual art as an art 
of the analytic proposition: “The analytic approach I am pressing as being in 
some ways, commensurate with the British philosophic method, and this latter 
term only holds out in contrast to the Continental philosophers.”52 He also 
stated: “Those following the tendency which I have attempted to hold out as 
analogous in some ways, to what I have called British Philosophical method, I 
have chosen to call here analytical.”53 
 
Atkinson proceeded to develop an analogy between analytic and continental 
philosophy and UK and US conceptual art. Here he revealed anxieties about 
how to locate Kosuth in relation to the division between US and UK 
conceptual art, noting that although the fact that Kosuth was based in New 
York had led him to be “seen as an integral member of the Siegelaub stable” 
nevertheless “it seems his natural tendency is toward the more analytic 
approach.”54 The battle for Kosuth’s artistic soul can be read as an indication 
of the stakes at play in the attempt to define conceptual art.  
 
Atkinson understood “Existentialism” to be a synonym for Continental 
philosophy and defined it thus: “Existentialism has its roots in German 
Romanticism, which was a protest in the name of individuality against the 
rationality of 18th century enlightenment… Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
were opposed systematically to systematic philosophy, existentialism in many of 
its forms is anti-philosophical.”55 Atkinson concluded that “The contrast 
between the Siegelaub stable and the Art & Language stable might be viewed 
to some extent in the light of the above. Barry, Weiner, et al, seem to generally 
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look toward the more ethico-mystical sector, the Art and Language artists place 
their methodological emphasis upon the analytic approach.”56  
 
Unpacking these claims a little, we can restate Atkinson’s self-proclaimed 
“analytic-existential dichotomy analogy” as a broad claim that British (but not 
exclusively British) conceptual art, like British (but not exclusively British) 
Analytic Philosophy, was more systematic, and therefore more rigorous, than 
American “ethico-mystical” conceptual art, which was similar to Existentialism 
in its anti-systematic impetus.  
 
Philosophically this is highly problematic: Existentialism cannot be used as a 
synonym for Continental Philosophy; Logical Positivism (Atkinson’s model for 
British analytic Philosophy) was as opposed to systematic philosophy as 
Existentialism had been (albeit on opposed grounds); Existentialism was not 
“mystical.” Given the level of philosophical crudity demonstrated by Atkinson 
here we are obliged to note the problematic character of his analogy. 
Nevertheless, we can also assert that analytic conceptual art constituted a mode 
of conceptual art that conceived of itself along the lines of a rigorous, rational and 
philosophical investigation of the concept of art, by art.  That “Continental 
Philosophy” was understood so crudely also helps explain the reasons why 
modernism was also understood so narrowly (as Greenbergian formalism), a 
reading that contact with the more substantive European aesthetic tradition (as 
mediated by Marcuse, for example) would have challenged. 
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Ultimately, despite its manifest failings as an account of philosophy, Atkinson’s 
broad definition of analytic conceptual art as the critical artistic investigation of 
art’s ontology undertaken in the manner of Anglophone analytic philosophy is 
more useful than Kosuth’s. It is more flexible than Kosuth’s narrower 
definition of the work of art as analytic proposition.57 As Osborne has noted, 
“unlike Kosuth, Art & Language appreciated the open character of 
philosophical enquiry as an ongoing task.”58  
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Systematic Conceptual Art and Politics 
 
The tensions between Joseph Kosuth and ALUK within the analytic mode of 
conceptual art regarding its self-understanding are, however, less significant for 
our argument than earlier tensions within Art & Language before the analytic 
mode of conceptual art came to be settled upon. For in the same issue that 
Kosuth and Atkinson offered their respective definitions and clarifications of 
analytic conceptual art, we also find extensive discussion of early ALUK 
projects that do not obviously fit this model. Rather, they share some of the 
concerns of systematic conceptual art.  
 
In “Concerning Interpretation of the Bainbridge/Hurrell Models,” Terry 
Atkinson referred back to two works produced by other members of ALUK, 
David Bainbridge’s M1 model (including the various “Notes on M1” published 
in the first issue of Art-Language) and Howard Hurrell’s Fluidic Model.59 He 
proceeded to offer a proto-critique of both: “To put the point somewhat 
aggressively, with Bainbridge/Hurrell the shift of emphasis is toward art 
producing engineering rather than engineering producing art. Whether such a 
policy can be developed into a prima facie instrument in expanding the 
concept of visual-art rather than simply expanding the types and range of 
objects produced for a static evaluative framework remains to be seen.”60 For 
Atkinson, Bainbridge and Hurrell’s work fell within the tradition of kinetic art 
(though it aimed to extend its claims) and, as a direct result of this genealogy, 
and its concomitant attachment to engineering (a discipline which would seem 
to preordain the realisation of material works), risked simply producing more 
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objects in the world without doing any analytic work on the concept of art. 
Atkinson implicitly associated Bainbridge and Hurrell’s work with the 
systematic conceptual art emerging, predominantly in the US, from a 
negotiated relation between tech art, minimalism and pop.  
 
Hurrell’s defence of his position is revealing and opens up the debate. Initially, 
he asserted that his and Bainbridge’s work should be understood in relation to 
cybernetic, rather than kinetic, art: “M1 and Fluidic Device have more in 
common with cybernetic objects than with kinetic objects, though this does not 
invalidate Atkinson’s comments… Cybernetic works can be considered to differ 
from kinetic works in that the system employed in the latter is ‘closed’ to 
information… whereas the system employed in the former is ‘open’ in this 
respect.”61 He also objected “Cybernetic Art propositions are not about objects 
(or appearances) but processes.”62 Hurrell argued that the cybernetic art 
object’s openness to sensory input differentiated it strongly, along with its 
openness to time and change, from conventional art objects and therefore 
constituted a genuine development of the concept of art. Furthermore, Hurrell 
insisted, “Fluidic Device serves particularly to draw attention to the importance 
of the unimportance of ‘working’ as a prime requirement in Cybernetic Art 
propositions.”63  
 
By insisting on the acceptability of “redundancy” in and for the cybernetic art 
object, Hurrell sought to distance his conception of cybernetic art from the sons 
et lumiérès spectacles of artists such as Nicholas Schöffer. Bainbridge and Hurrell 
had been exploring cybernetic work from their earliest “Hardware” (1967) 
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show at the Architectural Association and had consistently worked to minimise 
any sense of the spectacular. Rather, they asserted that their use of engineering 
was analogical to other Art & Language members’ use of analytic philosophy: 
“There is a sense in which, for us engineering operations and referential 
discourse has served as analogical source material; the process of differentiating 
this material has worked analogically with differentiating art material as source 
material.”64 He continued, “The point is that one respect’s one’s analogues and 
their inherent limitations but one is not offering the source’s attributes per se to 
be marvelled at.”65 For Hurrell, there was no difference between “engineering 
operations” and “referential discourse” as analytical tools for exploring the 
concept of art. He made this point even more explicitly in a second article in 
the journal, “Sculptures and Devices,” immediately following on from the first. 
In reference to Fluidic Device Hurrell claimed that the work was “analytic 
throughout.”66 In this sense, Hurrell assimilated his and Bainbridge’s practice to 
the analytic mode of conceptual art. Atkinson was sceptical of granting 
“analytic” status to their work precisely because of a general scepticism toward 
technology as a viable resource for making advanced art: “art tells technology 
what to do, technology does not make art.” 67  
 
For Atkinson, conceptual art had moved on from the simple interrogation of 
the (art) object (of formalist modernism), a practice associated with various 
postformalist tendencies and decisively embarked on an interrogation of the 
interrogation of the (art) object (of formalist modernism), a project unique to 
analytic conceptual art “proper”. For Hurrell, in contrast, engineering could be 
used as “analogical source material” for such an interrogation of the 
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interrogation, and still be understood as an analytic practice. Charles Harrison 
acknowledges as much by grouping all of the artists together as analytic: “The 
analytic tendency in the work of Atkinson, Bainbridge, Baldwin, Hurrell and 
Kosuth has been justifiably seen – particularly since the publication of the 
second part of Kosuth’s ‘Art After Philosophy’ and of Atkinson’s ‘From an Art 
& Language Point of View’… to be directly at odds with, and antipathetic to, 
the more picaresque, whimsical and extravagant forms of ‘conceptual’, 
‘dematerialised’ or ‘post-object’ art.”68 
 
As we have seen, in terms of the later history of Art & Language, a more 
restrictive view of what constituted an analytic practice was to prevail. Art 
ontological questions would be viewed through the lens of Anglophone analytic 
philosophy, and therefore in logico-linguistic terms: 
 
The nature of the claims made and criteria considered relevant within Art-
Language is generally pretty distinct from the more ‘conventional’ claims 
and criteria upheld in art now. One is concerned, above all, to establish 
some kind of common-sense ontology without at the same time making 
ontological commitments that are simple minded. This may sometimes lead 
to something like lack of tolerance. The kinds of tools of criticism developed 
within the essentially British tradition of analytic philosophy have proved 
useful in this context.69 
 
However, as we have also seen, in its earliest phases, members of the group 
were also interested in engineering and cybernetics as practices that could be 
used to investigate (quite practically) the ontology of art. This had once been 
acknowledged by Harrison (at this time not exclusively privileging analytic 
philosophy) as a case of art profitably opening itself to external discourses: 
“One of the consequences of questioning the hermetic status of the art object 
has been to open the ideology of art once again, after at least two decades of 
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academicism (i.e. of self-conscious absorption in essentially formal problems), to 
the influx of ideas and information from other disciplines.”70 Harrison gave the 
example of Thomas Kuhn as one example within Art & Language’s own 
practice “of the fruitful employment of an influential heuristic from an area of 
controversy outside art.”71 More recently Harrison reneged on his earlier 
optimism with regard to the “fruitfulness” of the strategy: 
 
Here perhaps was a solution to the problem of art’s apparent loss of its 
traditional media… All that was needed was for artists to reconceive 
themselves as kinds of radical systems analysts within the institutions of the 
art-world… by the early 1970s it was already quite possible to conceive of art 
in terms of a systems-based interface with science, or technology, or 
economics or whatever. That model has had a long life… The assumption at 
work in such enterprises, of course, is that the relevant artistic purpose is 
virtuously oppositional… the career of the systems interventionist is sustained 
by a romantic view of the artistic individual – as someone significantly free of 
institutionalisation.72 
 
The development of recognisable modes of conceptual art can in fact be 
clarified in terms of the relation that each of these modes took to other 
disciplines and the way in which these disciplines were used to offer an 
ontological ground for art that could no longer be (or was perceived to no 
longer be able to be) grounded aesthetically. Thus we see a number of 
statements following the form of the definition “Art is x” or of the analogy “Art 
is like x.” Art is (like) information; art is (like) an analytic proposition; art is (like) 
process. However, confusion between analogy thinking and identity-thinking 
also produced theoretical problems in the reconceptualisation of art. Kosuth’s 
attempt to think the analogy “art is like an analytic proposition” collapsed into 
the inaccurate and restrictive claim that “art is an analytic proposition.”  
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Despite some of its own founding members having been involved with 
cybernetics, analytic conceptual art practice became increasingly hardened 
against the contribution to be made by discourses “from other disciplines” which 
did not happen to be analytic philosophy. Such a hardening of artistic position 
can be traced in ALUK’s relationship to other conceptual artists, artists who 
were prepared to experiment with a broader array of conceptual systems. In 
this way the distinction and tension between analytical conceptual art and 
systematic conceptual art became manifest.  
 
If analytic conceptual art succeeded in debarring everything except analytic 
philosophy as its legitimating discourse then systematic conceptual art’s 
legitimating discourse must be thought in the plural, as a series of legitimating 
discourses employed by different practitioners at different stage of their careers 
and in different (and admittedly not always theoretically compatible) 
combinations:  Systems Theory; Cybernetics; Information Theory; Sociology; 
and (Marcusean) Critical Theory. In contrast, stylistic conceptual art, a purely 
pejorative category that no artist actually laid claim to, had no legitimating 
discourse (remaining unwittingly formalist) whereas synthetic conceptual art, in 
its determination to “include subjectivity in the interrogation” and to “refer to 
things outside itself” became concerned with Psychoanalysis, Feminism and 
Semiotics.   
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We can now specify in greater detail the characteristics of the different modes 
of conceptual art, tabulating the result:  
 
Mode of conceptual art  Legitimating discourse  
Stylistic conceptual art    N/A 
Analytic conceptual art   Analytic philosophy 
Systematic conceptual art Systems Theory; Information Theory; 
Cybernetics; Sociology; Critical Theory 
 
Synthetic conceptual art Psychoanalysis, Feminsim, Semiotics 
    
Analytic conceptual art found fault with systematic conceptual art’s self-
reflexive relation to other social systems. The accusation was that, in self-
reflexively relating to other social systems, art itself was collapsed into or made 
coterminous with these systems, ceding its autonomy as art. This issue became 
particularly pointed during the so-called “political turn” within Sixties art 
practice prompted by the Vietnam War.73 Many artists, Hans Haacke, Mierle 
Lademan Ukeles, and Mary Kelly among them, began to produce artwork that 
aimed at direct political engagement by means of a systematic engagement with 
politically charged social sub-systems: Factory Work (Kelly); Real-estate 
speculation (Haacke); Public Maintenance/Sanitation (Ukeles).  
 
Hans Haacke’s work, much of which focused on the art system itself as a social 
sub-system, came in for the heaviest criticism from analytic conceptual art. 
Charles Harrison stated the basic objection – that Haacke’s work was not 
politically effective – as early as his review of “Projekt ‘74” (1974), an 
international avant-garde survey from which Haacke’s work Manet-Projekt ’74 
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(1974) [Fig.28] had been excluded at a late date: “A few American artists 
withdrew in support of Hans Haacke – as part of a now familiar ritual in which 
institutions fail to cope with ideologically null ‘political’ contributions, involving 
‘revelations’ which should surprise no one, and Haacke has his cake and eats 
it…”74 Mel Ramsden developed Harrison’s critique in a broadside against 
Haacke published in The Fox in 1976: “Hans is a talented-but-indignant-
Künstler-exposing-petty-bureaucrats-with-socio-logical-systems-analysis… The 
work sometimes reminds me of counter-culture, that is, it exists in the same 
space as the institutions it apparently is fighting. It is negative to the institutions, 
but in the same space. Thus he not only serves the institutions veneer of 
‘freedom,’ he also disappears if the institutions disappear.”75 Here Ramsden 
repeated the accusation that Haacke’s work was politically ineffectual but 
added greater specification as to the reasons for this ineffectuality by way of an 
analogy to the counterculture. Given Ramsden’s equation of counterculture 
with the dominant culture (effectively foreclosing its ostensibly negating force) it 
is not made clear from which social or cultural location an effective critique 
could be articulated. Ramsden acknowledged this problem when he stated, 
“The greatest subversion of the privileged Kunstwelt would be to refuse to make 
art for that Kunstwelt whilst making an art as ambitious as that usually seen in 
the Kunstwelt. I have no idea of course how to do this.”76  
 
Joseph Kosuth has made the most extensive critique of Haacke’s work. Going 
beyond Ramsden’s suggestion that Haacke’s practice should be thought as 
analogous to counterculture, Kosuth has gone as far as to suggest that Haacke’s 
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Fig.28. Hans Haacke, Manet-Projekt ’74 (1974).
4. Conceptual Art’s Heterodox Modes               
 
 220 
work made no challenge to the formalist conception of art and constituted 
nothing more than a stylistic conceptual art: 
 
From the political cultural point of view Hans Haacke’s work, for example, 
regardless of the critical potential of his content within its temporal context, 
does not fundamentally challenge the self-conception of institutionalised art 
forms. While Haacke’s adoption in the early seventies of a conceptual-style 
format as the carrier of his political content was successful as a device for 
questioning society, it was incapable of questioning its own participation in 
that society as an institution itself. Worse, by positing political consciousness 
as content and locating it outside of the questioning process of art itself he 
helped reinforce formalistic presumptions about art and left for the public 
perception the political eunuch of a conceptual art style; some works with 
political content and some without. This not only reinforced traditional 
presumptions about art, it thwarted the radical heuristic of conceptual art, 
safely locating ‘political’ outside of art’s deeper institutional structure.77 
 
Even if Kosuth did not feel Haacke challenged formalist modernism, its 
gatekeepers certainly did. Famously, Haacke executed two major new works for 
his proposed solo show at the Guggenheim in New York: Shapolsky et al. 
Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971) 
and the less frequently cited Sol Goldman and Alex DiLorenzo. Manhattan Real Estate 
Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971). Both pieces set out in 
forensic detail the slum property interests of New York families, cross-held in 
shadowy corporations. Haacke was able to reconstruct a schematic 
representation of a systemic network of social and financial exploitation from 
his own street photography and records freely available in the New York 
County Clerk’s Office (to the few who would have had the patience, skill and 
free time to reassemble them). Ostensibly of most concern to Thomas Messer, 
the then Director of the Guggenheim, was that this sociologically inclined 
analysis was to be presented as art. It was notionally on these grounds that 
Messer justified his decision to decline Haacke permission to exhibit these 
works in his own show.78 The artist offered to compromise by changing real 
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names to invented ones, but even this softening of the works’ impact was not 
enough to change Messer’s mind. The situation escalated and Haacke’s show 
was cancelled—an infamous act of censorship that still resonates today.  
 
Why then has Haacke, and by extension systematic conceptual art, been 
subjected to such intense and frequently ill-founded critique by the 
representatives of analytic conceptual art? Analytical conceptual art’s own 
manifest lack of political agency perhaps motivates these challenges to an art 
that has demonstrably produced political effects of an order it has not.  
Kosuth’s critique is obliged to discount the actual effects of Haacke’s work 
(“regardless of the critical potential of is content within its temporal context”) in 
order to focus on a formalistic argument regarding its failings, its reinforcement 
of “traditional presumptions about art.” Yet most of the flaws with which 
Kosuth charges Haacke are at least as applicable to analytic conceptual art. 
Certainly, it is hard to see how a work such as Index 01 was more critical “of 
art’s deep institutional structure” than Shapolsky et al. Both works relied on non-
traditional forms of matching or reference for their art status and both required 
a direct engagement from the spectator that went well beyond formalist 
appreciation. Yet Haacke’s work was arguably far more provocative to its 
institutional context than Art & Language’s. Today Index 01 looks like the 
presentation of good intentions with crypto-minimalist allegiances.  
 
How Shapolsky et al can be held not to challenge “the self-conception of 
institutionalised art forms” is perplexing. It could be argued that analytic 
conceptual art, in taking an “apolitical” Anglophone analytic philosophy as its 
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model, cedes political effectiveness in advance. Analytic philosophy is not set up 
to challenge the politics of the institutions which enframe it, as Critical Theory 
has had cause to observe. Kosuth has reflected on the problems attendant upon 
analytic conceptual art’s hybridisation with analytic philosophy: “the paradox 
of realising the context dependency of art on one hand, while on the other, 
taking for granted the location of that context: the abstract, ahistorical space of 
modernism. Such space is the ‘objective’ realm of science culture, and, of 
course, the language of logical positivism was aptly suited, ‘expressive’ for the 
task.”79 Might this not contribute to the reasons why The Fox group’s attempts 
to graft a Marxist politics on to analytic conceptual art practice resulted in such 
notable failure, and the implosion of analytic conceptual art? Kosuth 
acknowledged this fundamental problem in the final issue of The Fox, 
“Revolution as a professional niche which isn’t mediated through a meaningful 
anchoring within the social reality (work) becomes idealistic, elitist, messianic, 
and finally unreal.”80  
 
In contrast, systematic conceptual art’s recognition that it was already 
embedded within the art system led it to attempt an immanent critique. 
Furthermore, in conceiving the art system beyond the museum or the gallery, 
the critique proposed by systematic conceptual art went beyond the narrow 
problematic of the institution alone. 
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Synthetic Conceptual Art and Subjectivity 
 
Mary Kelly proposed a modification of the “formula” of both analytic and 
systematic conceptual art, by suggesting that an understanding of both 
“subjectivity and sexual difference” were integral to the interrogation of the 
conditions of the interrogation that conceptual art staged.  She defined a mode 
of conceptual art sympathetic to this modification, namely “synthetic” 
conceptual art. Kelly proposed that it might be “possible to put the so-called 
synthetic proposition back on the agenda, that is, to reverse Kosuth’s dictum 
that art is an analytical proposition, and to say art isn’t confined to speaking 
about art; it can refer to things outside itself, it can have what you would call 
“social purpose.”81 
 
Kelly thus formulated synthetic conceptual art as a straight inversion of 
Kosuth’s definition of analytic conceptual art. Kosuth, however, had taken his 
distinction between an analytic and a synthetic proposition from A.J. Ayer: 
“A.J. Ayer’s evaluation of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic is 
useful to us here: ‘A proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on 
the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is 
determined by the facts of experience.’”82 Ayer’s empiricist reading of Kant is, 
however, a contentious one and consequently a problematic foundation on 
which to build a definition of analytic conceptual art, or to construct an 
opposition to it via a “synthetic” conceptual art.83  
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What Kelly had in mind by “synthetic” was not, however, ultimately based on 
a philosophically stringent definition of its distinction from the “analytic” at all: 
“What I had assumed to be inevitable—that interrogating the conditions of 
existence of the object would necessarily include the question of the subject and 
sexual difference—was not the case. Although there was a move to expand the 
analytical method beyond the exclusive parameter of aesthetics (for example, 
Art and Language in the mid-1970s), it stopped dramatically short of 
synthesizing the subjective moment into that inquiry.”84 What Kelly meant by 
“synthetic” then was a form of art practice that rejected Kosuth’s approach by 
insisting that subjectivity be factored back in to any comprehensive 
investigation of art’s ontology. The mode of conceptual art that Kelly identified 
was then “synthetic” in a more straightforward sense, it synthesised ideas 
drawn from disciplines other than those considered “proper” by analytical 
conceptual art, namely Feminsim, Psychoanalysis and Semiotics. 
 
Reflecting on the motivations that shaped Post-Partum Document (1973-79), Kelly 
has stated that “it drew attention to the question of ‘women’s practice in art,’ 
which had been anticipated in the aftermath of conceptualism with the return 
of ‘synthetic propositions’ and the imposition of ‘social purpose’… it became at 
least expedient, if not necessary, to acknowledge that the art world had a 
second sex.”85 For Kelly then, synthetic conceptual art’s “social purpose” was 
to raise the issue of art’s sexual politics.86 Kelly’s goals were, of course, shared 
ones. Feminist practice would emerge as one of the defining issues in 1970s 
art.87 In New York, Adrian Piper began her Catalysis series [Fig.29], a group of 
performance works investigating art’s gender and race politics (a theme that 
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Fig.29. Adrian Piper, Catalysis IV (detail) (1970-71). 
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would come to predominate in her later work). Piper has also described her 
work in terms of a development from a systematic conceptual art to one 
concerned with the particularities of individual subjectivation. However, given 
that LeWitt, rather than Haacke, was Piper’s model this produced a different 
approach to Kelly’s, one directly focusing on the self-conscious staging of the 
artist’s body. Mary Kelly has reflected on both approaches: 
 
The art object’s “dematerialization” was affected on the one hand by a 
systematic displacement of its spatial integrity, and on the other by a 
substitution of the body as its temporal metaphor. The ephemeral yet 
emotive presence of a work “performed” subverted phenomenological 
reduction as well as philosophic ordering by introducing the unpredictable 
dimension of spectatorial transference. And the body, however rigorously 
deployed within that representational schema, signified as feminine.88 
 
The relations between analytic, systematic and synthetic conceptual art have 
been less commented on than the breaks. Piper, however, traces a genealogy of 
conceptual art stemming from Sol LeWitt’s intimation of art as a “conceptual 
system” and which includes all of the modes of conceptual art discussed above: 
 
From there it was only a short step to conceptual art’s insistence in the late 
1960s on the self-reflexive investigation of concepts and language themselves 
as the primary subject matter of art. And because self-consciousness is a 
special case of self-reflexivity, it was then an even shorter step to the self-
conscious investigation of those very language users and art producers 
themselves as embedded participant in a social context: For Joseph Kosuth 
and the Art & Language group, this natural progression was from linguistic 
analysis of the concept of art to discursive Marxist critique of the means of 
production; for Hans Haacke, it was from self-sustaining material systems to 
self-sustaining political systems; in my own work, it was from my body as a 
conceptually and spatiotemporally immediate art object to my person as a 
gendered and ethnically stereotyped art commodity.89 
 
For Piper then, the trajectory of conceptual art runs from “conceptual system” 
to “social context” and includes analytic, systematic and synthetic conceptual 
art as part of the same broad developmental continuum. Though, in contrast, 
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Mary Kelly clearly favours a developmental model based on the break between 
the modes of conceptual art, her art nevertheless figures its residual relation to 
the systematic and analytic conceptual art of which it was both a critique and 
an extension.  
 
As is well-known, Kelly used psychoanalytic and feminist theory to introduce 
an interrogation of the gendered artist-subject into art. What is less frequently 
commented on is the positivist residuum within Post-Partum Document, a trait that 
figures its residual relation to other modes of conceptual art. Dan Graham 
draws attention to this aspect of Kelly’s work; explicitly distinguishing it’s 
scientific presentation from the artist’s interest in “female subjectivity:”  
 
Of course I was fascinated by female subjectivity that was also conceptual 
art. Because I saw all the problems of didacticism in the law of official 
conceptual art. Specifically, the Art & Language style work. But I also think 
what I liked about PPD was the ‘do-it-yourself’ science. My parents were 
scientists, and I liked art being partly about education and partly about 
increasing your own understanding of your subjective life situation. PPD was 
somewhere between two normally irreconcilable positions, it was totally 
scientific and subjective.90  
 
In remarking on the co-presentation of the scientific and the subjective, “two 
normally irreconcilable positions,” Graham captures the fundamental 
ambivalence of Post-Partum Document: it employed positivist methodology, but 
against itself.  
 
From the perspective of the present it is hard not to interpret Kelly’s obsessive 
investigations (including conducting detailed tabulations of faecal smear 
patterns left on nappies) as, at least at some level, a satire on positivism. 
Whether Kelly would share such a reading of her work is, however, less clear. 
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Kelly’s original reaction to the hostile tabloid response to Post-Partum Document 
(predictably fixating on the aforementioned faecal smear patterns) was to stress 
that her work was entirely in earnest: “I know… that it makes people hostile, 
but I want this to be taken seriously. I am not doing this as a joke.”91 Yet a 
satire is not the same thing as a joke since it always has critical intentions.  
 
The synthetic mode of conceptual art also marked the end of conceptual art as 
an active response complex: as art turned to more directly engaged issues of 
identity politics and institutional critique, the question of what art was (the 
foundation of conceptual art) became less directly staged. “Social purpose” and 
“social context’ become more pressing than ontological enquiry. Yet it was also 
in the abandonment of ontological questioning that synthetic conceptual art 
(and post-conceptual art more generally) met its own limits.  
 
Though the critique of systematic conceptual art undertaken by analytic 
conceptual art and synthetic conceptual art was not theoretically decisive it was 
nevertheless the case that artists making systematic conceptual art did 
relinquish their commitment to this artistic position. “Systems-speak” was no 
longer invoked by artists much beyond the mid-seventies. Individual artists’ 
reasons for relinquishing their systematic conceptual art practice varied in 
relation to the internal logic of their own work and their particular 
circumstances. Broader socio-historical forces effected artists’ decision making. 
This went well beyond the conventional pressure on artists to develop their 
practice, avoiding working in an outmoded “style.” The direct implication of 
the positivist natural and social sciences with the martial imperatives of the 
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Military Industrial Complex meant that the countercultural potential of 
systems theory, cybernetics, information theory and their cognate disciplines 
suffered in the artistic imagination. They were no longer seen as potentially 
emancipatory, art was no longer perceived to be able to “recode” them for 
progressive aims. The prevailing artistic climate had changed. As most of the 
art world sought, broadly and rather simplistically, to oppose “the System” and 
its technocratic apparatus, systematic conceptual art’s promise as a viable 
artistic strategy seemed to disappear. 
 
In a telling reflection of this situation, Hans Haacke planned a work entitled 
Norbert: All Systems Go (1971) [Fig.30]. The work was to have consisted of a 
caged mynah bird parroting the phrase “All Systems Go” repeatedly and 
indiscriminately. Norbert in fact can only be accessed imaginatively: the bird’s 
reluctance to parrot the phrase and the cancellation of Haacke’s planned 
Guggenheim show of 1971 (which was to have been entitled “Systems”) 
prevented this work-in-progress from leaving the studio. Here cybernetics’ 
founding father was to have been parodied; his optimistic feedback-steered 
path of human progress undermined. The affirmative “All systems go!” of the 
Space Age translated, through the sardonic refrain of a caged bird, “All systems 
go…” (i.e. run down, no longer fit their intended purpose, fail).92  Here Haacke 
seemed to undermine the emancipatory rhetoric habitually associated with 
technological development in favour of an emphasis on entropy more familiar 
from the resolutely sceptical body of work produced by Robert Smithson. 
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Fig.30. Hans Haacke, Norbert: All Systems Go (1970). 
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Haacke’s position was, however, more hopeful than Smithson’s. Haacke 
certainly intended Norbert to parody a strain of cybernetic theory dominant in a 
technocratic world. Yet the apparently cynical and technophobic exercise of 
trying to train a mynah bird to endlessly announce the principle of entropy can 
also be thought in less negative terms. Might there not have been an invitation 
here, however covert, to free the caged bird? Surely the transgression of 
opening the cage door and letting the bird escape is a possibility that the piece 
countenances? Particularly when we consider Ten Turtles Set Free (1970) 
[Fig.31], a piece broadly contemporary with Norbert that Haacke did realize and 
document. Such an action might constitute a real act of liberation, a 
symbolically loaded and institutionally unsanctioned ethical choice. Rather 
than submit to the tedium of passively engaging the piece on its ostensible, 
institutionally sanctioned, terms, the viewer might step in and realign the 
rules.93 The system could be opened along with the cage. Furthermore, the 
individual might find suggested his or her own potential for emancipation along 
with Norbert. As Haacke has insisted: “Works of art, like other products of the 
consciousness industry, are potentially capable of shaping their consumers’ 
view of the world and of themselves and may lead them to act upon that 
understanding.”94 The ambiguity of Norbert: All Systems Go both comments on 
and reflects the society that called the work forth. 
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Fig.31. Hans Haacke, Ten Turtles Set Free (1970). 
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All Systems Go 
 
The renunciation of systems thinking did not automatically imply a progressive 
artistic or political position. In order to gain some purchase on the dissolution 
of systematic conceptual art it is necessary to consider what it was abandoned 
for, what discourse or discourses artists replaced systems thinking with.95 Mel 
Bochner, having returned to painting conventionally construed (despite starting 
has career with a strong rejection of the practice) might thus be considered an 
artist whose work is regressive with respect to the conceptual project and its 
historical achievements. Bochner has retrospectively insisted that: 
 
Without the history of the practice of painting as the background for all my 
work, it becomes a series of disparate gestures... once you recognize that my 
work is an analytical attempt to rethink painting’s functions and meanings, 
you realize that it’s all one continuous investigation. In my own mind, my 
project has always been a kind of research based on the idea of bracketing 
and unbracketing. When you bracket you set something aside, you don’t 
eliminate it.96  
 
Bochner’s “return to painting” cannot simply be associated with the 
reactionary Neo-Expressionist painting prevalent in the culturally conservative 
climate of the 1980s since Bochner’s claim is to have worked through conceptual 
art and back to painting. Such claims nevertheless explicitly modify his own 
earlier description of his project, as given to Data magazine in 1972. Here the 
question of an ontological ground for art was left open and in debate, art was 
precisely the process of enquiring into its own ontological ground: “The ‘art’ is 
the demonstration of the network of supports that forms the system...”97 
Although it should be acknowledged that in the 1960s Bochner was still 
working in relation to a formalist, medium-specific framework—he makes work 
entitled A Theory of Painting; A Theory of Sculpture; A Theory of Photography—it 
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should be understood that formalist categories were radically put in suspension 
by the theory in these works.  
 
Yet in his later practice Bochner returned to canvas-based painting, via a 
transitional phase of systematic wall painting, without any convincing 
theoretical elaboration of why this might be a legitimate artistic, rather than 
simply regressive or market-oriented, move. When pressed on this issue by 
James Meyer in interview Bochner could only offer the unconvincing claim 
that “In some way, I have always thought of myself as a painter… a painter 
who just didn’t happen to paint” while at the same time also acknowledging 
that this constituted a retrospective narrativisation of his own practice “what I 
can see in retrospect is that it’s the absence of painting that gives definition to 
the Photo Pieces, the Measurements, the Theory of Boundaries. They all circulated 
around that missing signifier.”98 
 
A more plausible explanation for Bochner’s return to painting would seem to 
lie in his rejection of conceptual art, a double refutation of both its systematic 
and analytic modes. Bochner’s Language is Not Transparent (1970) [Fig.32] staged 
a refutation of an understanding of analytic conceptual art (as linguistic), by 
means of an insistence on the materiality of the signifier.99 For Bochner, the 
revelation of the materiality of the signifier seemed to spark a renewed concern 
for materiality in art that was taken up as a renewed affection for paint as the 
exemplary artistic “material.” Bochner has been even more explicit about the 
reasons for his departure from systematic conceptual art: 
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Fig.32. Mel Bochner, Language is not Transparent (1970). 
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Seriality was a search for a new type of certainty, because it’s about one 
thing being necessarily after another. The following being predicated on the 
preceding eliminates choose, and therefore doubt… Because there is no 
decision making after the initial choice of systems. Everything is pre-
executive. But when you reach the point where you question that whole 
apparatus of thought, you realize that doubt is inevitable in art or, for that 
matter, in anything one does.100 
 
Bochner concluded with the observation that “Systemic thinking repressed the 
spontaneous and the intuitive…”101 This was surely the point, reacting against 
the definition of art as the emanation of the genius, originality or taste of the 
individual artistic subject. Yet for Bochner painting, qua painting, authorised 
the return of the spontaneous and the intuitive in art (through the back door of 
“doubt”). Thus, despite his protestations to the contrary, the legitimating 
discourse for Bochner’s painting (as art) remains (implicitly) formalist 
modernism. As such, his later work looks historically regressive with respect to 
the earlier. It does not even put the practice of painting in question. 
 
The development of Victor Burgin’s practice also involved a rejection of 
analytic conceptual art but was more ambiguous than Bochner’s in its relation 
to systematic conceptual art. Quite early in the debates surrounding Art-
Language it became clear that Burgin did not share the analytic conceptual art 
line as articulated by ALUK. Burgin addressed the criticisms that had been 
levelled against him by Michael Baldwin and Terry Atkinson in their article 
“Unnatural Rules and Excuses:” 
 
As there is no particular sense to be made of such expressions as ‘turn 
language into paint’… then I can hardly answer this particular pseudo 
charge… If the term ‘analytic’ is not being used in a technical sense to 
indicate a l’art pour l’art position then it has not been made at all clear just 
what is being analysed by artists of declared ‘analytic’ intent. To claim to 
analyse ‘art’ would be essentialist nonsense. While we may analyse ‘the 
concept of art’ which empirically means this or that use of the term ‘art’ and 
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whatever synonyms we might ascribe to it, the empirical study of word-uses 
belongs increasingly to linguistics.102 
 
What was not at issue in these exchanges was that Burgin’s alliance was 
increasingly with a semiotic model of meaning and that he broke with analytic 
philosophy’s narrow ontological enquiries: “I believe we must accept the 
responsibility of producing an art which has more than just Art as its content, 
and which carries the possibility of becoming more than just the rejectementa 
of our economic surplus…”103 After the early, albeit satiric, interest in systems 
theory and cybernetics demonstrated in Carton Programme and “Art-Society 
Systems” and the limit-phenomenological inquiries of Photopath and 
“Situational Aesthetics”, Burgin turned to Althusserian Marxism, semiotics and 
psychoanalysis as the legitimating discourses for his work. Burgin’s break with 
analytic conceptual art occasioned a further critique from Art & Language 
“Exit overly formalistic Vic – the Old Vic… Enter the New Vic in the 
Emperor’s new clothes… Enter the New Vic with a semiotique g-string…”104 
Burgin’s relationship to structuralism, that is art considered as part of a 
signifying system, leaves his work in a more ambiguous relationship to 
systematic conceptual art. This is evidenced by the odd mix of references to 
both semiosis and circuitry, Levi-Strauss and Ervin Laszlo, in the context of his 
article “Rules of Thumb.”105  
 
Hans Haacke also shifted his theoretical register and preferred lexicon. From 
the early 1970s onwards, as systems theory became unhappily elided with the 
System, Haacke increasingly framed his artistic concerns in relation to Pierre 
Bourdieu’s sociological analyses of art as a “field” of cultural production.106 
The adequacy of Bourdieu’s sociological account of art will not be broached 
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here. What is crucial to note is that Haacke’s turn to Bourdieu did not 
represent a fundamental change in his artistic self-conception. His early interest 
in systems thinking and systematic conceptual art subtends his later work, as he 
has acknowledged: “One could argue that ‘institutional critique’ cannot be 
performed without an understanding of the ‘system’ or ‘field’ of the art 
world.”107  
 
Institutional critique (exemplified by Haacke), an art of social context, and 
identity politics (exemplified by Kelly), an art investigating subjectivity and 
social relations, arguably two of the most immediately influential post-conceptual 
practices, can be seen to share a genealogical root in systematic conceptual art. 
The ends of systematic conceptual art comprised new beginnings. Following 
LeWitt, “The conventions of art are altered by works of art.”108 
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A Test Case 
 
In 2006 Carsten Höller realised Test Site [Fig.33], the seventh in the Unilever 
Series of large-scale commissions for the turbine hall of the Tate Modern. The 
work comprised five theme park slides, each descending from one of the 
museum’s upper levels to its ground floor. What is the status of an artwork that 
consists of a slide? Answering this question will prove convoluted.  Höller 
encapsulated Test Site in the exhibition pamphlet which accompanied his 
installation—“A slide is a sculpture that you can travel inside”—but qualified 
his own account with the caveat that—“however, it would be a mistake to think 
that you have to use the slide to make sense of it. Looking at the work from the 
outside is a different but equally valid experience.”1 We catch a wry note in 
Höller’s account, switching priority as it does between emphasising the work’s 
functional and aesthetic claims.  
 
Contributing to the confusion is the fact that Höller has also stressed the 
provisional  status of this work, insisting that it was simply his largest scale-
model to date.2 Ever since the appearance of his first slides (Valerio I & II, 
produced for the Berlin Kunst-Werke in 1998) [Fig.34 & Fig.35], Höller has 
repeatedly claimed that all of them are merely works-in-progress: the artist’s 
stated end-goal being to integrate his slides into everyday urban life. For the 
Tate exhibition Höller commissioned Foreign Office Architects to undertake a 
case study, including detailed proof-of-concept drawings, for a “Hypothetical 
Slide House” (a skyscraper latticed with slides).3 Höller also had General Public 
Agency (a planning and regeneration consultancy) conduct a full, London-
5. Institution as Contexts and Relations               
 
 241 
 
  
Fig.33. Carsten Höller, Test Site (2006). 
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Fig.34. Carsten Höller, Valerio I (1998). 
 
Fig.35. Carsten Höller, Valerio II (1998). 
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based feasibility study for “slides in the public realm.” [Fig.36]4 Ultimately, his 
broader project is to thread the fabric of the city with slides, within and 
between buildings, and in so doing produce for the public a daily moment of 
thrill that would offer “relief or even freedom” from the pervasive utilitarianism 
of contemporary capitalist existence.5 As such, Höller’s project seeks to 
intervene in and alter both the conventional social context of art and the 
conventional social relations associated with its “appreciation.” Yet, given the 
fact that this broader project has not been realised (and may of course never 
have seriously been intended to be) the institutional nexus in which Höller’s 
work appears thus remains integral to the work. The social relations and the 
social context that Test Site intervenes in are internal to the artworld’s 
institutional frame. Höller’s amusement park ride is a long way from 
Rodchenko’s Worker’s Club.  
 
To what extent then does Höller’s project intend to intervene and alter art? Or, 
in other words, what are its ontological stakes as well as its critical stakes? The 
convoluted status of Test Site can be used as a test case by means of which to 
introduce a wider critical assessment of a broader set of “context” and 
“relational” art practices that have established the grounds of a contemporary, 
post-postmodern art.  
 
As was established in chapter one, Höller’s work has been characterised as both 
relational and context art. Here we need to develop the provisional remarks 
advanced in the first chapter into a more substantive account of the character 
of relational and context art. There it was suggested that the two tendencies 
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Fig.36. General Public Agency, Slides in the Public Realm (2006). 
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should be considered as related, but not congruent, strategies within the artistic 
problematic of critique, specifically the problem of how to produce an 
autonomous, post-postmodern, contemporary art. For Bourriaud there was 
little to separate relational art and context art whereas for Andrea Fraser 
(perhaps the principal theorist of context art as well as one of its most important 
practitioners) context art should be strongly distinguished from relational art. 
Fraser’s objection to relational art is that it is essentially affirmative whereas 
context art is critical: “the mythologies of voluntarism freedom and creative 
omnipotence… have made art and artists… attractive emblems for neo-
liberalism’s entrepreneurial, “ownership-society” optimism… such optimism 
has found perfect artistic expression in… relational aesthetics.”6 Whose claims 
are justified? We will approach this issue by considering the genealogy of 
relational and context art.  
 
Given that we have claimed that contemporary art can best be characterised 
with reference to its distinctively post-conceptual character, it is through the 
relationship to conceptual art that relational and context art must be assessed. 
Addressing the consolidation of context kunst as an artistic category Gillick 
confirms the relevance of so doing: “The legacy of second order conceptual art 
also had an effect – art beyond the initial desire to define a possibility or a set of 
truisms through brief action or statement. Douglas Huebler, Hans Haacke and 
others constructed more complex structures that acknowledged the socio-
political constructions that determine and value art production and interaction 
beyond a challenge to the formal state of the art objects alone.”7 Gillick’s use of 
the term “structure” in relation to the distinctive contribution of “second order 
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conceptual art” is directly analogous to the term “system” as it was utilised in 
the Sixties and Seventies. It is from systematic conceptual art that relational 
and context art inherit their focus on the social relations and the social context 
of art.  
 
That this has not been more readily recognised is a function of the obscurity 
that has been generated by the use of the term “institutional critique” to 
designate so-called “second order” conceptual practice. Both relational and 
context artists acknowledge that many of their concerns descend from a 
negotiated relation to institutional critique. Yet the very term “institutional 
critique” is problematic: in privileging “institution” over “system” it obscures 
the origins of institutional critique. Such terminological confusion has had, and 
continues to produce, conceptual confusions that characterise contemporary 
art, affecting its ability to comprehend the challenges attendant upon the 
production of autonomous artworks today. The institutional form, like the 
commodity form (though abounding in far fewer metaphysical subtleties and 
theological niceties), obscures the social context and the social relations of its 
producers.  
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Challenging the Institution of Institutional Critique 
 
Andrea Fraser’s article “In and Out of Place” (1985) stands as an early 
landmark in the reception of Louise Lawler’s work but also, and more 
importantly for our argument, in the conceptual elaboration of “institutional 
critique” as a critical category.8 Fraser’s article was written at the beginning of 
her artistic career and introduced many of the concerns that continue to inflect 
her work today.9 The first generation of Institutional Critique practitioners is 
conventionally held to comprise Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren, Michael Asher 
and Marcel Broodthaers; second generation artists include Louise Lawler, 
Jenny Holzer, Barabara Kruger and Martha Rosler; third generation artists 
number: Greg Bordowitz, Tom Burr, Clegg & Guttmann, Stephan Dillemuth, 
Mark Dion, Renée Green, Chrisitan Phillipp Müller, Nils Norman and Fraser 
herself.10 As such, Fraser’s article embodies a hinge between what have been 
historicised as “second” and “third” generations of “institutional critique”. 
 
Before examining the discursive construction of institutional critique as a 
critical category in more detail, it is important to note the general challenge 
involved in discriminating different “orders” or generations of institutional 
critique (a “movement” that is already a sub-set of conceptual art). This 
challenge centres around the opposition, perhaps even factionalisation, 
between those critics who conceive contemporary art in terms of its 
constitutively post-conceptual character (such as Peter Osborne, Charles 
Harrison and Jeff Wall) and those who conceive contemporary art in terms of 
possible “neo” relations of recovery or development of historical—that is, earlier 
5. Institution as Contexts and Relations               
 
 248 
generation—conceptual art (such as Blake Stimson and Alexander Alberro). An 
added complication here, given a reading of conceptual artists as the last 
partisans of the avant-garde, is that the possibility of a neo-conceptual art also 
gets run together with issues surrounding the ongoing possibility of an avant 
garde. As Blake Stimson specifies: “Whether… [conceptual art’s] legacy as the 
art of 1968 will be to pass its inherited ideal forward through neo-
conceptualism and on to a future moment when avant-gardism might once 
again be viable, or whether it will mark a point in the history of modernism 
when that ideal passed into irrelevance, remains an open question.”11 
 
The problem with this way of framing the problem is that it suggests that the 
challenge of producing an autonomous art can be understood as an historically 
invariant activity (“its inherited ideal”), a matter of passively waiting for the 
tenor of the times to once again summon the critical spirit (“when avant-
gardism might once again be viable”), rather than of actively forging critique in 
relation to the exigencies of the present. Beyond the problems of its political 
passivity, such a presentation of the issue does not account for the decisive 
change to art effected by conceptual art. Art after conceptual art is not the 
same as art before conceptual art and speaking of successive “generations” of 
conceptual art, even if only as a hypothetical possibility, misrepresents the 
break effected by conceptual art, suggesting continuity where there is rupture. 
Here then contemporary art will be understood as constitutively post-
conceptual: contemporary art qua autonomous art is post-conceptual because it 
is obliged to have recognised and responded to the challenge to art posed by 
the various modes of “historical” conceptual art. Given this situation, it is 
5. Institution as Contexts and Relations               
 
 249 
necessary to ensure that the critical history of conceptual art is sufficiently 
nuanced to have captured the original complexity of conceptual art such that 
the full critical specificity of the “post” in post-conceptual art is recognised and 
accounted for.  
 
Recovering the systems genealogy and systematic mode of conceptual art 
provides a richer conceptual genealogy of contemporary art. Here then it will 
be argued that institutional critique is a strategy rather than a genre or 
movement, one that falls within conceptual art proper, as part of its systematic 
mode. Consequently, art after conceptual art is ontologically inflected by 
conceptual art without being “neo-conceptual”. We reject an approach which 
seeks to write the historiography of conceptual art in terms of successive 
generations or orders. The term “neo-conceptual” is thus reserved as a 
pejorative label for art with the “look” of conceptual art but none of the 
(ontological) substance.12 
 
Conventionally, however, institutional critique is held to begin at the end of the 
developmental arc of conceptual art as influentially traced by Buchloh, an 
account that traces conceptual art’s evolution from an early “aesthetic of 
administration” to an end point in a “critique of institutions.”  
 
Paradoxically, then, it would appear that Conceptual Art truly became the 
most significant paradigmatic change of postwar artistic production at the 
very moment that it mimed the operating logic of late capitalism and its 
positivist instrumentality in an effort to place its auto-critical investigations at 
the service of liquidating even the last remnants of traditional aesthetic 
experience. In that process it succeeded in purging itself entirely of imaginary 
and bodily experience, of physical substance and the space of memory, to the 
same extent that it effaced all residues of representation and style, of 
individuality and skill. That was the moment when Buren's and Haacke's 
work from the late 1960s onward turned the violence of that mimetic 
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relationship back onto the ideological apparatus itself, using it to analyze and 
expose the social institutions from which the laws of positivist instrumentality 
and the logic of administration emanate in the first place. These institutions, 
which determine the conditions of cultural consumption, are the very ones in 
which artistic production is transformed into a tool of ideological control and 
cultural legitimation.13 
 
Yet the historical critique of institutions that Buchloh describes here is not 
equivalent to a formalised genre of work understanding itself as “institutional 
critique.” Although Buchloh’s work provides the spur for the definition of the 
term, Buchloh does not originally set it down in print. Andrea Fraser has laid 
claim to its first published usage in her essay on Lawler. However, Fraser 
acknowledges Buchloh’s work, particularly his “Allegorical Procedures” essay 
of 1982, as the foundation for her own thinking.14 She also allows for the 
possibility that Buchloh, or one of her other tutors on the Whitney Independent 
Study program, may have coined the term orally: “Having studied with 
Buchloh as well as Craig Owens, who edited my essay on Lawler, I think it’s 
quite possible that one of them let ‘Institutional Critique’ slip out.”15 
Nevertheless, Fraser has speculated that it was her and her colleagues at the 
Whitney – Gregg Bordowitz, Joshua Decter and Mark Dion – who effectively, 
though unwittingly, constructed a canon in support of her newly minted term: 
“Not having found an earlier published appearance of the term, it is curious to 
consider that the established canon we thought we were receiving may have 
just been forming at the time. It could even be that our very reception of ten- 
or fifteen-year-old works, reprinted texts, and tardy translations, and our 
perception of those works and texts as canonical, was a central moment in the 
process of Institutional Critique’s so-called institutionalization.”16  
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Institutional critique, as presented by Fraser, is thus a retroactive critical term: it 
is only with the emergence of its purported “third generation” of artists that it 
gains programmatic currency. In this sense institutional critique can be 
distinguished from even the most contentious attempts to designate artistic 
“movements” which have tended to emerge at the same time as the art that 
they purport to bound. Were it to be effective as a critical category the 
retroactive status of Fraser’s term would not of course disqualify it — the 
problem is rather that it both misrepresents the historical work it claims to 
derive from and does so by largely ignoring the accounts of this work that were 
offered by its practitioners.  
 
It is the so-called “third generation” of theorist/practitioners who develop 
institutional critique as a distinctive genre of artistic work and no one has been 
more influential in this effort than Fraser herself. Such a situation, as the artist 
readily admits, leaves her in an ambivalent position: “And so I find myself 
enmeshed in the contradictions and complicities, ambitions, and ambivalence 
that Institutional Critique is often accused of, caught between the self-flattering 
possibility that I was the first person to put the term in print, and the critically 
shameful prospect of having played a role in the reduction of certain radical 
practices to a pithy catchphrase, packaged for co-optation.”17 Yet the 
ambivalence of Fraser’s position goes beyond simply embodying the intrinsic 
tension between autonomous critique and heteronomous recuperation that 
haunts any “radical practice.” Fraser’s position, in relying on Buchloh’s 
attenuated history of conceptual art, is historically inaccurate, perhaps even 
strategically amnesiac.  
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The first issue of The Fox (1975), one of the most significant publications in the 
American conceptual art context, explicitly advanced the claim, making it 
almost a programmatic statement, that the challenge for an art after conceptual 
art was to turn towards a critique of the institution of art. Sarah Charlesworth’s 
essay “A Declaration of Dependence” stands at the beginning of the first issue 
of the magazine and articulates its underlying themes: “If we speak significantly 
about art in modern European and American culture, we see that its meaning, 
function and value within society are clearly institutionally mediated; and that 
not only artistic values, but the intellectual and ideological forces which 
explain, interpret and legitimise art practice have their origins in the very same 
traditions that presuppose that institutional order.”18 In the same issue Mel 
Ramsden made the first published reference to “institutional critique” in his 
article “On Practice.”19 Ramsden’s article is published a full seven years before 
Buchloh’s “Allegorical Procedures” and ten years before Fraser’s “In and Out 
of Place.”  
 
Rather than focusing on who coined the neologism it is important to move the 
debate on from Fraser’s “self-flattering” concerns over terminological 
precedence and refocus on the substantive critical issues involved. The first 
issue of the The Fox is of central importance since here since it problematised 
the political effectiveness of institutional critique at its inception.  
 
Fraser’s concern about the “co-optation” of Institutional Critique is not the 
significant issue if it was always and necessarily co-opted. The question is rather 
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whether, with Ramsden, one believes that the political potential of institutional 
critique was neutralised from the start, or whether, with Haacke, one believes 
that some form of immanent critique of the art system is conceived to be 
possible. As has been discussed in chapter four, the debates generated by The 
Fox group led Mel Ramsden to identify what he saw as the problem with 
Haacke’s work, namely that, like the counterculture, it existed in the same 
space as the institutions it was apparently fighting, raising the spectre that it 
would disappear if the institutions disappeared.20 Consequently, for Ramsden, 
Haacke’s work was not genuinely political at all: “It’s normally assumed that 
Haacke’s work has political content. It doesn’t. It has political subject-matter. 
The content isn’t really all that controversial. Here again politics isn’t 
internalised, it’s illustrated. This isn’t merely caused by bad strategy, it’s a 
reflection of the way all art is muzzled today.”21  
 
It was not that Ramsden claimed to exempt his own work, or that of The Fox 
group, from the problems he identified. Rather, the issue translated into a 
reformist versus a revolutionary politics beyond the confines of the art 
institution. Charlesworth also pointed this out from the beginning, insisting that 
the institutional structures of the art world were inseparable from the larger 
socio-political systems which enframed them:  
 
The structural system of the art-world, which provides a context for the 
social signification of art, is itself contextually situated in a social system, the 
structure of which it in turn reflects. At this point, attempts to question or 
transform the nature of art beyond formalistic considerations must inevitably 
begin to involve a consideration not only of the presuppositions inherent in 
the internal structure of art models, but also a critical awareness of the social 
system which preconditions and dialectically confines the possibility of 
transformation.22 
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Fig.37. The Fox 2 (1975). 
5. Institution as Contexts and Relations               
 
 255 
In fairness to Fraser she does insist on the sophisticated conceptualisation of the 
“institution of art” developed in the work of certain practitioners in the late 
Sixties: “From 1969 on, a conception of ‘the institution of art’ begins to emerge 
that includes not just the museum, nor even only the sites of production, 
distribution, and reception of art, but the entire field of art as a social 
universe.”23 In this respect she repudiates the restricted understanding of the 
“institution” that operates in much of today’s generic, institutionally-
sanctioned, institutional critique where it frequently stands for something as 
simple as an “intervention” in or on the physical space of the museum or 
gallery. Yet even given her expanded definition of the institution of art Fraser 
neglects to emphasise the connection between art and other social systems, art 
as a system is treated autonomously, “the entire field of art as a social 
universe.”24 
 
Fraser exemplifies this problem when she identifies Hans Haacke as the pre-
eminent exponent of the more sophisticated understanding of the “Institution” 
from which her own practice departs: “Haacke… came to Institutional 
Critique through a turn from physical and environmental systems in the 1960s 
to social systems, starting with his gallery-visitor polls of 1969-73. Beyond the 
most encompassing list of substantive spaces, places, people, and things, the 
“institution” engaged by Haacke can best be defined as the network of social 
and economic relations between them.”25 Here the art system, and its “network 
of social and economic relationships” is not related to the social systems within 
which it inheres. 
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By focusing on the term “institution”, however expanded its self-conception, 
Fraser misses the interrelations between art and other social systems which 
were central to both Haacke and Buren’s politics. Haacke has asserted that 
institutional critique as a critical category depends on a broader 
“understanding of the ‘system’ or ‘field’ of the art world” in relation to other 
social systems.26 Daniel Buren has queried “what would it mean to take the art 
world itself as a political problem? Is that micro-system a total revelation or 
reverberation of the general system? If it is not, where does the weight of the 
political system make itself felt in the art world?”27 It is arguably from Michael 
Asher that Fraser derives the narrower “institutional” focus of institutional 
critique.  Asher described his practice as “an aesthetic system that juxtaposes 
predetermined elements occurring within the institutional framework, that are 
recognizable and identifiable to the public because they are drawn from the 
institutional context itself.”28  
 
Fraser’s summary of the achievements of the “first generation” of institutional 
critique artists is revealing in this regard and thus merits quotation in full: 
 
What they constituted as the fundamental practice of art was nothing less 
than work on the conditions and relations of production of artistic practice 
itself: not only the symbolic transformation of artistic positions…but their 
material transformation as well; the transformation not only of the positions 
artists represent within the paradigmatic frame of an aesthetic system, but the 
very positions they occupy and the economic and social relations that 
produce those positions and which they in turn reproduce… The material 
arrangements that artists of the past thirty years have endeavoured to put 
into place, both to secure the means to continue their activities and as an 
integral part of their works, are not only conceptual systems. They are also 
practical systems that fulfil, or fail to fulfil, the principles of artistic positions on 
the level of their social and institutional conditions. Far from functioning 
only as ideology critique, they have aimed to construct a less ideological form 
of autonomy, conditioned not by the abstraction of relations of consumption 
in the commodity form, but by the conscious and critical determination, in 
each particular and immediate instance, of the uses to which artistic activity 
is put and the interests it serves.29 
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On this account, the various practices subsumed under the misleading 
designation of “institutional critique” are reduced to a contestation, however 
“material,” of the isolated museum, gallery or private collection without 
acknowledging their own recognition that they were themselves implicated 
within, and dependent on, the wider capitalist system. Here institutional 
critique appears as reified rather than recuperated.30 
 
The problem has thus always been, as Michael Newman has suggested of 
staying one step ahead of reification.31 In this sense, it is possible to begin to 
outline an answer to Andrea Fraser’s open question: “Today, the argument 
goes, there no longer is an outside. How, then can we imagine, much less 
accomplish, a critique of art institutions when museum and market have grown 
into an all-encompassing apparatus of cultural reification?”32  
 
Fraser’s response to this crisis consists in accepting the reification of institutional 
critique as the condition of the development of a putative institution of critique: 
“Institutional Critique turned from the increasingly bad-faith efforts of neo-
avant gardes at dismantling or escaping the institution of art and aimed instead 
to defend the very institution for which the institutionalization of the avant-
gardes’ “self-criticism” had created the potential: an institution of critique.”33 This 
position has led Fraser to insist that the institution of art includes the 
subjectivity of the artist: “And this is also the basis for the ambivalence of 
Institutional Critique, because while these relations may be fundamentally 
social, they are never only ‘out there,’ in sites and situations, much less 
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Fig.38. Andrea Fraser, Museum Highlights (1989).  
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“institutions,” that are discrete and separable from ourselves. We are the 
institution of art: the object of our critiques, our attacks, is always also inside ourselves.”34  
 
In a perverse extension of Bürger’s claims for the failure and subsequent 
institutionalisation of the avant-garde, Fraser’s “solution” to the problem of the 
reification of institutional critique, is to insist on the all encompassing nature of 
the institution, up to and including artistic subjectivity: “So if there is no outside 
for us, it is not because the institution is perfectly closed, or exists as an 
apparatus in a ‘totally administered society,’ or has grown all-encompassing in 
size and scope. It is because the institution is inside of us and we can’t get 
outside of ourselves.”35  
 
Such an intensified understanding of the extent of the “institution” can be 
observed in the development of Fraser’s practice. Her early work Museum 
Highlights (1989) [Fig.38] involved Fraser posing as, and parodying, a museum 
docent. Fraser applied a theatrical verfremdungseffekt  to the ritualised form of the 
guided tour in order to unmask the ideology of the public collection which the 
tour is designed to seamlessly transmit. By the time Fraser made Untitled (2003) 
[Fig.39], a video document of her own sexual commission by a paying 
collector, she had abandoned all pretence of unmasking any ideology and 
instead submitted herself to the logic of the market in a self-consciously brutal 
troping of the artworld’s social relations.36 Here Fraser perversely attempted to 
validate her heteronomous position as an artist (subjected to a return to the 
oldest and most direct form of “patronage”) as the grounds of a “less ideological 
form of autonomy” for the artwork so produced (she stressed that the 
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Fig.39. Andrea Fraser, Untitled (2003). 
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collector did not pay for sex but in order to collaborate in the making of an 
artwork). Fraser thus mistake the level at which autonomy of art can be 
secured. The problem with Fraser’s work is that it produces ever more 
sophisticated critical interventions in and on the institution of art (itself 
understood ever more sophisticatedly and as ever more totalising) without 
proposing an alternative, either an alternative institutionalisation or an 
alternative to institutionalisation. 
 
Given Fraser’s focus on the “institution” invoked by institutional critique and 
the heteronomous artistic position this has led her to, the question presents 
itself as to whether Fraser has neglected to pay sufficient attention to the 
adequacy of “critique” as it is understood by institutional critique. Is there an 
affirmative quality to Fraser’s critical acceptance of the all-pervasiveness of the 
institution? Isabelle Graw has suggested that “it seems necessary to analyze 
how the artistic competencies usually associated with institutional critique 
(research, teamwork, personal risk-taking and so on) actually feed, sometimes 
quite perfectly, into what sociologists Luc Boltanski an Eve Chiapello have 
described as ‘the new spirit of capitalism.’”37 Reconceiving the history of 
institutional critique as the progressive opening of systems art to the art system 
and, crucially, the wider social systems which enframe and engage that art 
system (up to and including the totality of the capitalist system) allows us to 
think other possibilities of artistic critique and resistance, for example by 
revisiting the conception of artistic autonomy beyond Fraser’s rather narrow 
understanding of the term, overdetermined by her acceptance of Peter Bürger 
and Pierre Bourdieu as theoretical models.  
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By returning the focus to the problem of critique, rather than the problem of 
the institution, we focus on the ongoing possibilities of a critical art. Revisiting 
Ian Burn’s original analysis of the problem of critique, we might consider the 
most important challenge for a critical art as being one of transforming art’s 
reality by realizing its socialization. Running as subtitles through a trenchant 
Artforum article of 1975, “The Art Market: Affluence and Degradation,” Burn 
asserted that “While we’ve been admiring our navels / we have been 
capitalized and marketed,” yet proffered the suggestion “but through realizing 
our socialization / might we be able to transform our reality?”38 The issue of 
“realizing our socialization” was, for Burn, indivisible from questioning the 
political and economic system within which the art system operated: 
 
The emergence of the international art market along its present lines has 
been incontestably an arm of a necessary expansion of the United States 
capitalist system and consolidation of marketing areas after the Second 
World War… the consolidation of the business of art intuitively followed the 
lines of the model of bureaucratic corporate industry. This doesn’t mean we 
have a concretized bureaucracy; it means the people running the various 
parts of the business of art, indeed ourselves, have internalized the 
bureaucratic method so that it now seems ‘natural’ to separate functions, 
roles, relationships from the people who perform (etc.) them. So we 
intuitively achieve the corporate spirit of bureaucratic organization without 
any of its overt structures; by such means our ‘high culture’ has reified itself 
in a remote and dehumanizing tradition.39 
 
 
By emphasising from the beginning the problem of systemic interrelation 
(systems art—art system—social system/s—capitalist system) rather than 
institutional boundaries, systematic conceptual art can be seen as a productive 
artistic attempt to “realize our socialisation.” In this sense, viewing the history 
of conceptual art through its systematic mode is preferable to constructions that 
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lay claim to a tradition of institutional critique. The institution addressed by 
institutional critique is simply the infrastructural form of the structural social 
relations and social contexts constituting art, relations and contexts that were 
first thematised by systematic conceptual art. Given the loss of the (relative) 
autonomy of traditional museological institutions to global corporate capital, 
pursuing a strategy seeking to preserve an “institution of critique” is to 
underestimate the broader structural challenges that impinge on the production 
of autonomous art from within the confines of an emergent art industry.  
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Kontext Künstlers versus Artistes Relationnels 
 
In 1993 the art historian and critic James Meyer organised an exhibition at the 
American Fine Arts Gallery in New York entitled “What Happened to the 
Institutional Critique?” including the artists Andrea Fraser, Gregg Bordowitz, 
Tom Burr, Mark Dion, Renée Green and Christian Phillip Müller. Almost as if 
in response to Meyer’s question, Peter Weibel curated an exhibition in the 
same year entitled “Kontext Kunst. The Art of the Nineties,” including all but 
one of the artists in Meyer’s show within his own more extended survey.40 
Weibel’s exhibition, and the extensive catalogue essay that he wrote in support 
of it, though controversial—in that it grouped together a fairly disparate group 
of artists under the same banner and sought to take the credit for the 
grouping—is nevertheless broadly accepted as the moment at which “context 
art” crystallized as a critical term.41  
 
What was distinctive about context art such that it could apparently be 
curatorially coded as both a continuation and a development of institutional 
critique? As was discussed above, institutional critique is a retroactive critical 
term developed out of the Whitney Independent Study program context from 
which many of the generation of context artists (Fraser, Bordowitz, Dion) 
emerged. Indeed, Weibel at least situates context art within the wider 
problematic of the social construction of art.42 In a certain sense then, 
institutional critique, as a coherent movement rather than a coherent strategy, 
is a phantom effect of the emergence of the generation of context artists. Just as 
we have put pressure on the adequacy of the term institutional critique so it is 
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imperative to subject context art to similar scrutiny. The distinguishing feature 
of context art is often held to be that it developed the notion of institutional 
critique by renouncing the assumption that the artist maintained a critical 
distance from the art institution subjected to critique. Isabelle Graw exemplifies 
the way in which such a reconceptualisation is held to function: 
 
The term ‘critique’ has undergone… semantic shifts and practice-oriented 
reconceptualizations. For an earlier generation, such as Hans Haacke, the 
concept of critique seemed to depend on an ideal of critical distance. 
Younger artists, including Andrea Fraser, Christian Phllip Müller, Renée 
Green, and Fareed Armaly… based their work, in part, on an awareness that 
this assumption of distance or separation between the agent of the delivery of 
critique and its purported object has always been a fiction that could not and 
should not be reproduced in current circumstances. Their work proposed a 
renegotiated notion of critique based on the admission that ‘critical distance’ 
is compromised a priori.43 
 
Context art, then, is an art practice that apparently addresses Ramsden’s 
critique of Haacke’s systems art—existing in the same space as the institutions 
it claims to be fighting—by making a virtue of it.  
 
Yet this issue is more complex than Graw’s developmental account would 
suggest. Haacke’s work was always dialectically sophisticated, always aware of 
the way in which it consisted of both “framing and being framed” and Fraser’s 
account of institutional critique has recognised this fact, asserting that “first 
generation” institution critique artists never simply took up an ideal of critical 
distance.44 Just because Haacke did not formally thematise the social and 
economic grounds of his own practice it does not follow that he was not 
conscious of them. One of the questions in Haacke’s John Weber Gallery Visitors’ 
Profile (1973) [Fig.40] asked visitors to the show “Do you think the preferences 
of those who financially back the art world influence the kind of work artists 
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Fig.40. Hans Haacke, John Weber Gallery Visitors’ Profile (1973). 
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produce?” The majority of polled visitors answered this question affirmatively 
(either “yes, a lot” or “somewhat”) and we can assume that Haacke realised the 
likelihood of such an outcome in posing the question in the first place. Haacke 
did not exempt his own practice from the influence exerted by the financial 
backers of the art world.  This is precisely the reason why Ramsden accuses 
Haacke of being a reformist liberal. For Ramsden, Haacke was attempting an 
immanent critique of the art system and thus giving up on the possibility of 
fundamental social change in the wider social system which would change the 
art system from without. “Has adventuristic New York art of the seventies… 
become a function of the market system?” Ramsden demanded, concluding, 
“‘art and politics’ becomes one more thing subsumed as part of Modern Art’s 
internal complexity.”45  
 
Explicitly developing a critique of the vocabulary of systems theory, and thus 
indirectly invoking Haacke’s practice, Ramsden went on to speculate that “one 
of the best ways to maintain a system’s insular self-preservation is to 
continuously try and increase its internal complexity, hence its steering 
capacity, while decreasing the complexity of its environment.”46 Sarah 
Charlesworth was even more emphatic in her assertion that the artist was 
implicated in the art system: “We are ourselves, individually and collectively, 
the constitutive agents of the social complex that defines the values and 
significance of our work. In the same way that we as artists are responsible for the 
notion of art, by the formulation of art works or concepts, we are in turn 
responsible to the culture itself in the formulation of the notion and function of 
art.”47  
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All these examples then challenge Graw’s assertion that first generation 
institutional critique was marked by a belief in an ideal of “critical distance” 
and that context art’s specificity could therefore be secured by relinquishing 
critical distance in favour of some more self-consciously “implicated” stance. As 
Juliane Rebentisch recognises “criticism by artists since the 1970s” was “no 
longer articulated from some revolutionary standpoint, but quite literally from 
within.”48 
 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps in making a virtue of its own systemic entanglements 
within the form of the artwork that context art can be said to distinguish itself 
from earlier institutional critique as a practice. Fraser herself is one of the most 
incisive theorists of context art and an important example of her theoretical 
work was her attempt to codify professional best practice for context art (for 
which a historical parallel can be found in Seth Siegelaub’s Artists’s Transfer 
and Reserved Rights Agreement). Organised in conjunction with Helmut 
Draxler, Services: Conditions and Relations of Project Oriented Artistic Practice (1994) 
[Fig.41] was both an art project and a touring exhibition presenting the work. 
Fraser’s “Services” project was thus novel and hyper self-reflexive in that it 
comprised an exhibition presenting the work of a working group aimed at 
elaborating a contractual model for the production of the (service rather than 
goods-based) work that was presented in the exhibition.  
 
As Fraser and Draxler recognised, the need for such a contractual codification 
of service-based work emerged from the historical “success,” that is to say 
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Fig.41. Andrea Fraser, Services (1994). 
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reification, of institutional critique: “While curators are increasingly interested 
in asking artists to produce work in response to specific existing or constructed 
situations, the labour necessary to respond to those demands is often not 
recognized or adequately compensated.”49 In other words the success and 
consequent institutional assimilation of post-object, institutionally critical 
practices left the contemporary practitioners of Institutional Critique effectively 
exploited by the institution they were held to be critiquing (since their artistic 
practice no longer involved petty commodity production that could be sold on 
the art market, artists specialising in institutional critique became dependent on 
fees for critique). Fraser acknowledged the risks that directly contracting to art 
institutions presents to artists’ “relative freedom from the functionalization of 
our activity” but resolves this issue by insisting that traditional object-producing 
studio practice only obscured the degree to which artists were “always already 
serving:”  
 
As long as the system of belief on which the status of our activity depends is 
defined according to a principle of autonomy which bars us from pursuing 
the production of specific social use value, we are consigned to producing 
only prestige value. If we are always already serving, artistic freedom can 
only consist in determining for ourselves—to the extent that we can—who 
and how we serve. This is, I think, the only course to a less contradictory 
principle of autonomy.50 
 
 
The problem here is that Fraser’s conception of artistic autonomy lacks any 
recognition of the fact that autonomous art had always involved wrestling 
autonomy from a necessary moment of heteronomy. This is because Fraser 
understands autonomy narrowly as something like purposelessness, the absence 
of “specific social use value.” Fraser here again mistakes the autonomy of art 
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for the autonomy of the artist—it is at the level of the individual artwork that 
the autonomy of art is established, or not. There is something deeply 
questionable in Fraser’s claim that artists should aim to construct “a less 
contradictory principle of autonomy” by directing the “uses to which artistic 
activity is put and the interests it serves.” Given that art’s autonomy was 
afforded by its character as a commodity (and notwithstanding the fact that 
art’s commodity status has also always pulled it toward heteronomy) by 
returning art to direct relations of patronage by the art institution, Fraser and 
others risk constructing not a “less ideological” form of autonomy but rather 
producing art of a thoroughly dependent, neo-feudal character. The desire for 
“a less contradictory principle of autonomy” is a misunderstanding of the 
necessarily contradictory character of artistic autonomy.  
 
How does context art en tout (as theorised by Fraser at least) escape generalising 
the reformist tendencies with which Ramsden charged Haacke’s practice? The 
Services project does look like a form of bargaining for something like improved 
conditions of labour. Perhaps immanent critique is perceived to be the only 
possible strategy given the apparent foreclosure of the possibility of radical 
social change? Given that context art is the “kunst der neunziger Jahre” then it 
is necessarily an art marked by the post-1989 collapse of actually existing 
Communism and the global extension of neoliberal capitalism that was to 
follow in its wake. Does this perhaps make context art’s attempt at an 
immanent critique more plausible than first generation institutional critique’s 
when the possibility of fundamental and even revolutionary social change did 
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not appear foreclosed? The tensions within Fraser’s practice figure broader 
tensions within context art as a whole.  
 
* 
 
If context art was initially labelled, precipitously, the “art of the 90s” then with 
the emergence of relational art this claim came to require qualification.51 The 
widespread institutional success and rapid institutional assimilation of Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics, as a theory of relational art, retrospectively 
changed the landscape of nineties art. Consequently, context art could now be 
considered the dominant art of the early- to mid-nineties while relational art 
must be considered the dominant art of the mid- to late-nineties. Yet it should 
also be noted that both tendencies, and the tensions between them, were 
articulated throughout the nineties—such a periodisation marks only their 
relative artworld prominence. The grounds of the tension between relational 
and context art as response complexes were set out in chapter one in terms of 
their differing views on the viability of the available strategies for critical 
contestation. Gillick summarised these as “transparency” for context art (self-
reflexive immanent critique) versus “meanderings” for relational art (oblique 
immanent critique). Walead Beshty corroborates Gillick’s account of a break 
between context and relational art:  
 
This shift appears induced by an intellectual paralysis concerning the 
patterns and strategies available for contestation. From a theoretical 
perspective, classical models of critical opposition provide an untenable set of 
compromises, between institution and practitioner, between the opening up 
or revealing of dominant structures, and the counter adoption of didactic 
prescription, or more precisely, one conducive to the reification of inherently 
problematic subject positions constructed from positions of dominance (i.e. 
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one must assume the voice of authority in order to contest it), which re-
subordinates the viewer.52 
 
Beshty precisely diagnoses the “reification of inherently problematic subject 
positions” that inheres within Fraser’s concept of context art as a defence of the 
“institution of critique.” Relational art constitutes itself in part by its rejection 
of the idea of self-reflexive immanent critique proposed by context art, 
considering it a reification of critique. Yet the counter-charge to relational art is 
that it simply fails, in its amorphousness, to develop any meaningful critique at 
all and is thus de facto affirmative of the status quo, as Beshty also notes:  
 
In the rejection of strategies of Institutional Critique, which always reasserted 
the material conditions of space, the Relational Aesthetics conception of 
social interaction mirrors the recent shift in urban planning’s understanding 
of the city… The understanding… of these evolutions of subjectivity and 
space are important to consider in re-examining the subjectivity of the 
viewer, and how control can be disrupted, but relational aesthetics seems to 
go only so far as recreate these systems, literalize their movements, without 
providing any moments of resistance.53 
 
It is important to reassert that individual artists’ practices do not necessarily 
conform to the critical categories that they come to be historicised under. 
Rirkrit Tiravanija’s work is central to Bourriaud’s account of relational art but 
Beshty insists that the uncanniness of Tiravanija’s work destabilises the 
affirmative character of relational aesthetics, noting that this facet of the artist’s 
practice is not represented in Bourriaud’s account of it, precisely because it 
does not fit the model of convivial social relations there advanced.54  
 
Similarly we could object that Liam Gillick (another of Bourriaud’s preferred 
artist examplars) is fundamentally concerned with the problem of providing 
“moments of resistance.” Gillick insists on this motivation in the introduction to 
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his recently published collected writings: “How are we going to behave?... was 
a key question for some in the early 1990s, and the legacy of such an inquiry is 
still playing out in an increasingly striated art context. This… is a reflection of 
an ongoing collective discourse that attempted to escape from the hierarchical 
neo-conservatism of the 1980s without a return to the straightforward social 
mirroring of more strident forms of institutional critique.”55 Here then Gillick 
insists on his determination to pursue a critical strategy but without submitting 
to the strategies of “social mirroring” that he asserts characterise context art. If 
context art charges that relational art provides no moments of resistance then 
relational art’s response is to note the ineffectiveness of resistance conceived on 
the traditional model of negation.  
 
Part of the problem here is that the category of  relational art is too narrowly 
assumed to be adequately described by Nicolas Bourriaud’s rendering of it in 
Relational Aesthetics. Just as systems art need not be theorised by taking up 
Burnham’s account of a systems aesthetics, so relational art need not be 
understood exclusively through relational aesthetics. Though this is always the 
case with any theory of an art “movement,” the issue is all the more acute for 
Bourriaud since he also acted as the curator of many of the shows in which 
“relational” artists first appeared, raising the spectre of a conflict of interests. 
Here relational aesthetics looks as much like the theoretical justification of 
Bourriaud’s curatorial protocols as it does a convincing account of relational 
art. With the rise of the curator also comes the rise of the theory of curating 
and, with it, the conflation of curatorial and critical discourse.  
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Though only appearing in English translation in 2002, Relational Aesthetics 
represents an amalgam of essays originally written by Bourriaud on nineties art. 
The first texts were originally published in Documents sur l’art in 1995 and were 
assembled and published in France in 1998 as Esthétique relationelle. Bourriaud’s 
text has, in reception, taken on the curious quality of constituting a work of art 
criticism, art theory and art history. The problems here are evident. Initially we 
will outline Bourriaud’s high-level claims and the high-level criticisms that they 
have received. By briefly rehearsing these issues, it becomes clear that 
Bourriaud’s work requires deeper historical contextualisation. This historical 
contextualisation, once established, will form the ground of a more substantive 
critical engagement.  
 
Bourriaud has produced four works of art theory, the aforementioned Esthétiqe 
relationelle (1998)/Relational Aesthetics (2002) as well as Formes de vie: L'Art moderne et 
l'invention de soi (1999), Postproduction (2002) and The Radicant (2009).56 Relational 
Aesthetics has received most critical attention but it is through Postproduction that 
the clearest outline of Bourriaud’s position emerges (Formes de vie constitutes a 
piecemeal account of the historical precursors to relational art, set within 
Bourriaud’s version of the genealogy of modernist art while The Radicant 
constitutes a substantial extension of Bourriaud’s position and thus goes beyond 
the scope of a discussion of relational aesthetics). In interview, he has stated: 
 
In… Post-Production, the idea is that art has definitively reached the tertiary 
sector—the service industry—and that art’s current function is to deal with 
things that were created elsewhere, to recycle and duplicate culture. Art 
production now indexes the service industry and immaterial economy more 
than heavy industry (as it did with Minimalism). Artists provide access to 
certain regions of the visible, and the objects they make become more and 
more secondary. They don’t really “create” anymore, they reorganize…The 
common point between relational aesthetics and Post-Production is this idea 
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that to communicate or have relations with other people, you need tools. 
Culture is this box of tools.57 
 
Bourriaud further elaborates on the ‘common point’ between his theoretical 
works in his introduction to Postproduction: 
 
Relational Aesthetics, of which this book [Postproduction] is a continuation, 
described the collective sensibility within which new forms of art have been 
inscribed. Both take their point of departure in the changing mental space 
that has been opened for thought by the Internet, the central tool of the 
Information Age we have entered. But Relational Aesthetics dealt with the 
convivial and interactive aspects of this revolution (why artists are 
determined to produce models of sociality, to situate themselves within the 
interhuman sphere), while Postproduction apprehends the forms of 
knowledge generated by the appearance of the Net (how to find one’s 
bearings in the cultural chaos and how to extract new modes of production 
from it).58 
 
According to Bourriaud then, the context-specific practices of ‘relational’ artists 
deal not only with art’s relation to the attenuated social relations attending new 
forms of capitalist production in the West—“Art production now indexes the 
service industry and immaterial economy” —but also with the technological 
forces inflecting these relations and shaping their social subjects— “the 
changing mental space that has been opened for thought by the Internet, the 
central tool of the Information Age we have entered.”59 The first of these two 
key points has been widely commented upon, the second less so. Here then we 
find Bourriaud returning to the dialectic of the forces and relations of 
production that occupied Adorno and Marcuse and which have been central to 
debates around the viability of a Marxist and post-Marxist art history.    
 
Jacques Rancière, Hal Foster, Claire Bishop, Eric Alliez and Stewart Martin 
have all criticised the political and theoretical claims of Bourriaud’s work.60 
Rancière is prepared to leave open the question of the critical and political 
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effectiveness of relational art: “It’s as if the shrinking of public space and the 
effacement of political inventiveness in a time of consensus gave a substitutive 
political function to the mini-demonstrations of artists, to their collections of 
objects and traces, to their mechanisms of interaction, to their provocations in 
situ or elsewhere. Knowing if these substitutions can recompose political spaces, 
or if they must be content to parody them, is certainly one of the questions of 
today.”61 Foster, however, is more circumspect: “To some readers such 
‘relational aesthetics’ will sound like a truly final end of art. to be celebrated or 
decried. For others it will seem to aestheticise the nicer procedures of our 
service economy… There is the further suspicion that, for all its discursivity, 
‘relational aesthetics’ might be sucked up in the general movement for a ‘post-
critical’ culture…”62  
 
Bishop wonders about the quality of the social relations produced by relational 
aesthetics: “If relational art produces human relations, then the next logical 
question to ask is what types of relations are being produced, for whom, and 
why?”63 She concludes that Bourriaud misleadingly promotes relational art  as 
a micro-utopian domain (claiming to produce salvific social relations that 
counter an otherwise pervasive alienation) but objects that: “the relations set up 
by relational aesthetics are not intrinsically democratic… since they rest too 
comfortably within an ideal of subjectivity as whole and of community as 
immanent togetherness.”64 Bishop prefers, in contrast, a model of antagonistic 
relations (derived from the political theory of Laclau and Mouffe) which 
recognises the tension inherent to both art and society.   
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Eric Alliez focuses on critiquing Bourriaud’s “obstinate recuperation of Deleuze 
and Guattari (but above all of Guattari),” demonstrating that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work in fact anticipates and indicts the terms of Bourriaud’s project:   
“relational aesthetics is the postproduction brand corresponding to that moment, 
diagnosed and denounced by Deleuze and Guattari, when ‘the only events are 
exhibitions and the only concepts are products that can be sold.’”65 
 
Stewart Martin questions how relational art’s micro-utopian and purportedly 
autonomous relations escape heteronomous determination by the broader 
social relations they are necessarily inscribed within: ‘If… Relational Aesthetics is 
pre-eminently a theory of art as a form of social exchange, then the crucial 
question that must follow in order to consider its relation to commodification, 
is: how does relational art’s form of social exchange relate to the form of 
capitalist exchange?’66 Noting that Bourriaud proposes an ‘autonomous art of 
the social,’ Martin cannot find sufficient evidence of how this autonomy is 
achieved out of the dependent ‘capitalist exchange relations that… broadly 
encompass relational art.’67 These are all legitimate critiques. It is far from 
clear whether Bourriaud’s theory of relational aesthetics, is equipped to answer 
them.  
 
Yet while these critics have mounted stringent and perceptive criticisms of 
Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics none of them have put the strong claim 
Bourriaud makes for the historical novelty of relational art centre-stage.68 It is 
worth emphasising just how strong a claim this is: “We find ourselves, with 
relational artists, in the presence of a group of people who, for the first time 
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since the appearance of conceptual art in the mid-sixties, in no way draw 
sustenance from any re-interpretation of this or that past aesthetic moment. 
Relational art is not the revival of any movement, nor is it the comeback of any 
style.69  
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Periodisation: After Postmodern Art 
 
Bourriaud insists that the relational art of the 1990s constituted something 
genuinely “new;” not merely another “neo” act of recovery vis-à-vis the 
unfinished project of a 60s art movement, but something historically 
unprecedented. Bourriaud has also insisted that such genuinely new art 
demanded a genuinely new critical approach, one which “ceased to take shelter 
behind sixties’ art history”70 Bourriaud claimed to have just such an innovative 
methodological approach to hand in his own analyses of relational art. Yet 
Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics does not represent anything genuinely “new” 
at all.  
 
Having revisited Burnham’s systems aesthetics in detail in chapter three we are 
in a position to age Bourriaud’s theory by demonstrating its atavistic 
characteristics. Andrea Fraser and Hal Foster have challenged the originality of 
relational art, but neither makes a particularly convincing case. Fraser’s claim 
that relational art constitutes a “Neo-Fluxus” moment does not persuade 
though she is correct to look for the genealogy of relational art in the 60s.71 Still 
less persuasive is Foster’s genealogical role call: nouveau réalisme, arte povera 
and institutional critique.72 Such claims are not convincing because relational 
art does not conceive its social relations on the model of the Fluxist event, nor 
does it advance everyday objects or humble materials as themselves artistic in 
the manner of nouveau réalisme or arte povera. The invocation of institutional 
critique is closer to the mark but relational art, as we have discussed, 
distinguished itself from context art precisely by distancing itself from 
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institutional critique. Bourriaud claims that relational art has definitively 
reached the tertiary sector—in other words relational art does not claim to 
challenge its mediating institutions in any way that would permit comparison 
with institutional critique. 
 
The fundamental claim that Bourriaud makes for the novelty of relational art 
can be summarised in two related moments. For Bourriaud, what is “new” 
about relational art is that it: (i) produces social relations as art; and, in so 
doing, (ii) harmonises artistic and social technique. Elaborating the first 
moment of this claim, Bourriaud asserts that relational art constitutes “A set of 
artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure 
the whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an 
independent and private space.”73 Developing the second moment of this 
claim, Bourriaud states that the “operational realism which underpins many 
contemporary practices” consists in the relational artwork’s “wavering between 
its traditional function as an object of contemplation, and its more or less 
virtual inclusion in the socio-economic arena.”74 
 
Yet in “Systems Esthetics” Burnham had identified both the production of 
social relations and the harmonisation of artistic and social technique in the art 
of the 1960s. As was discussed in chapter three, Burnham asserted that “art 
does not reside in material entities, but in relations between people and the 
components of their environment” and also that “in an advanced technological 
culture the most important artist best succeeds by liquidating his position as 
artist vis-à-vis society.”75 Burnham also situated his argument about paradigm 
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changes in art within the larger context of paradigm changes in advanced 
industrial society: “We are now in transition from an object-oriented to a systems-
oriented culture. Here change emanates, not from things, but from the way 
things are done.”76 Burnham’s position preceded Bourriaud’s arguments about 
relational art’s response to the “Information Age” by thirty years. 
Consequently, we can situate relational art within precisely that context which 
Bourriaud insists it is to be most strongly distinguished (a “past aesthetic 
moment”) and using tools he expressly disavows (“sixties’ art history”).  
 
Context art recognises that it evolved out of the complex historical legacy of 
institutional critique. How then is Bourriaud able to make spurious claims 
concerning the novelty of relational art, claims which manifestly ignore the 
history of postformalist art? The simple answer to this question is that 
Burnham’s theory of systems aesthetics is absent from the mainstream historical 
record.77 The reasons why it is absent open on to the more substantive reason 
for Burnham’s relative obscurity, namely the obfuscations generated by the 
emergence of postmodernist art theory.  
 
As we have argued, although Burnham was prominent in the 1960s artworld, 
his relative contemporary obscurity is due in part to his own conviction that his 
theoretical work lost its critical character; that it grew old and died. Internal 
tensions within his own theory caused Burnham reject it. The tensions in 
Burnham’s theory were generated by his awkward elision of “systems” concepts 
drawn from both Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s positivist General Systems Theory 
and the explicitly anti-positivist Frankfurt School tradition, mediated through 
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Burnham’s engagement with Marcuse’s aesthetics. Burnham however always 
acknowledged the contingency of his theory of postformalist art— “The 
emergence of a ‘post-formalist esthetic’ may seem to some to embody a kind of 
absolute philosophy, something which… cannot be transcended. Yet... new 
circumstances will with time generate other major paradigms for the arts.”78 It 
was the emergence of postmodernism as a “major paradigm” which definitively 
aged Burnham’s systems aesthetics, obscuring what remained of value within it, 
namely that in Burnham’s awkward syncretic theoretical endeavour he 
mediated an alternative modernism to Greenberg’s. 
 
The stakes here are higher than contesting the originality of Bourriaud’s 
relational aesthetics via a historical recovery of Burnham’s systems aesthetics. 
Bourriaud has also recently sought to elaborate a broader theory of 
“altermodernism,” set out in the catalogue to his recent Tate exhibition 
“Altermodernism” (2009) and his latest theoretical text The Radicant. Here 
Bourriaud has developed claims first outlined in Relational Aesthetics and 
Postproduction. Having seriously raising the question of the “new” in relation to 
contemporary art, however unsubstantiated his claim may be, Bourriaud has 
moved on to argue for the possibility of a change in the regnant artistic 
paradigm, a movement beyond the post-postmodern “paradigm-of-no-
paradigm” that Hal Foster, until recently, gave as the definition of the 
contemporary cultural moment.79 Rather than pursue Bourriaud’s theory of 
altermodernism here we have focused on a historical contextualisation of his 
claims. Yet any comprehensive critique of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics is 
obliged at least to acknowledge the recently inflated terms of his theoretical 
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project. Bourriaud’s work lacks an awareness, or an acknowledgment, of the 
genealogy of relational art and of the historical debates around modernism of 
which it is but the latest symptom. Bourriaud should thus be encouraged to 
hold to his own insight that “the ‘now’ factor, which we are using under the 
name of the contemporary’ is ‘absolutely inseparable from the notion of 
modernism.”80  
 
If “postmodernism” is no longer adequate as a periodising term for 
contemporary art, one could argue, with Bourriaud, that it was the artistic 
developments of the 1990s, principally relational and context art that, in 
reacting against those 80s practices most strongly associated with artistic 
postmodernism (neo-expressionist painting, appropriation, installation), 
brought this situation about. Here the modernism/postmodernism dyad, one 
that has proved extremely tenacious would be superseded, and replaced by a 
triadic temporal succession of culturally periodising categories running: 
modernism—postmodernism—altermodernism. In this Bourriaudian schema, 
altermodernism apparently succeeds postmodernism, reprising modernism in 
line with contemporary spatial and temporal exigencies: “The time seems ripe 
to reconstruct the “modern” for the present moment, to reconfigure it for the 
specific context in which we are living… Let us bet on a modernity which, far 
from absurdly duplicating that of the last century, would be specific to our 
epoch and would echo its problematics: an altermodernity, if we dare to coin 
the term…”81 In Bourriaud’s schema, relational art emerges as the first artistic 
practices that could be described as “altermodern.” 
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Yet, as we have shown, relational art and context art in fact remain within the 
terms of the artistic problem complex addressed by systematic conceptual art. 
These problems—the residually aesthetic presentation of the artwork; the ontologically 
constitutive role of the situation for the artwork; the relation of artistic and social technique; the 
relationship of art to the art system; the relationship of the art system to other social systems—
have simply resurfaced in more recent “relational” and “context” art. 
Bourriaud’s theory of altermodernism was pre-dated by Burnham’s alternative 
modernism which was itself elaborated from his (incomplete) reception of 
Frankfurt School modernism mediated via Marcuse.  
 
The contemporary reprise of modernism throws into question whether (artistic) 
postmodernism ever constituted a meaningful periodising concept. As Osborne 
has suggested “The problem with this periodization [postmodernism]… is that 
it fails to endow the complexly interacting set of anti-‘modernist’ artistic 
strategies of the 1960s with either sufficient conceptual determinacy and 
distinctness or adequate historical effectivity.”82 On this account artistic 
“postmodernism” was never adequate as an artistic periodisation, precisely 
because it developed as the abstract negation of a narrow (Greenbergian) 
conception of modernism: “It has become conventional to periodize the art of 
the past fifty years in terms of a transition from ‘modernism’ to 
‘postmodernism’ – however vaguely or varyingly the second of these two terms 
is understood in this context. (Greenberg’s critical hegemony has tended to fix 
the meaning of the first term, albeit in a conceptually and chronologically 
restrictive manner, and thereby to open up the field of the ‘postmodern’ as the 
space of its abstract negation).”83  
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Osborne has also expanded on the oversight that resulted from Greenberg’s 
concept of modernism becoming hegemonic: “This is the problem of the 
relationship between two quite distinct, if none the less interconnected 
conceptions of modernism: a stylistic, formalistic, or what might be called an 
‘art historical’ conception of modernism, derived in most part, within the visual 
arts, from the work of Clement Greenberg; and a far wider (socio-cultural) and 
deeper (aesthetico-philosophical) conception of modernism, such as is to be 
found… in the work of the Frankfurt School and other theorists from within 
the German tradition.”84 In this account, Greenberg’s New York artworld 
hegemony obscured a more substantive European conception of modernism. 
Here, Greenberg not only stole the idea of modern art from Europe but also 
damaged it in transit.85 As Osborne notes “A philosophically adequate 
conception of modernism as a temporal logic of cultural forms would embrace 
the whole sequence; ‘postmodernism’ being the misrecognition of a particular 
stage in the dialectic of modernisms.”86  
 
For Osborne, the foremost shortcoming of the modernism/postmodernism 
dyad, above and beyond postmodernism’s narrow miconstrual of “modernism” 
as Greenbergian formalism, was the way in which it obscured the critical 
significance of conceptual art, missing the fact that conceptual art created an 
ontologically distinctive rupture in the definition of art which was constitutive 
for all art after conceptual art. Hence Osborne proposes “an alternative 
periodisation for art after modernism that privileges the sequence 
modernism/conceptual art/post-conceptual art over the modernist/ 
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postmodernist couplet, and treats the conceptual/post-conceptual trajectory as 
the standpoint from which to totalize the wide array of other anti-‘modernist’ 
movements – where ‘modernism’ is used here in its restrictive and ultimately 
mystifying, but nonetheless still critically ‘actual,’ Greenbergian sense.”87  
 
We can expand Osborne’s periodisation of the visual arts in line with the 
argument presented here such that it reads formalism/postformalism/ 
conceptual art/post-conceptual art. “Modernism” is thus split into 
Greenbergian formalist modernism (“formalism”) and post-Greenbergian 
postformalist modernism (“postformalism”). This clarifies the otherwise 
“mystifying” character of Greenbergian “modernism” while retaining the 
critical priority and ontological distinctiveness of the conceptual art/post-
conceptual art trajectory which is characterised by the four modes of 
conceptual art discussed in chapter four. This periodisation of the visual arts 
(formalism/postformalism/conceptual art/post-conceptual art) itself sits under 
a broader cultural periodisation characterised by the dialectic of modernisms. 
 
An issue with abandoning the term “postmodernism” as an adequate 
description of developments in art is that it begs the question of how to account 
for developments in architecture, literature and music, all of which have been 
central to the definition of “postmodernism” but which have no mediating 
disciplinary analogue to “conceptual art.” This would seem to disbar the 
sequence modernism/conceptual art/post-conceptual art from any claim to a 
wider cultural periodisation across the various arts and yet this is precisely the 
ground occupied by postmodernism in its canonical Jamesonian articulation, 
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namely a theory of the cultural logic of late capitalism. Jameson’s paradigm 
attempts to describe the socio-cultural and aesthetico-philosophical significance 
of postmodern culture in a way that goes beyond the mere abstract negation of 
Greenbergian modernism that was carried through by the postformalist art of 
the late 60s and early 70s.88  
 
Rather than attempt to construct alternative cultural periodisations for music, 
literature and architecture, here we will focus on demonstrating some of the 
problems with Jameson’s conception of a postmodern art: it is in Jameson’s 
treatment of conceptual art, and Hans Haacke’s conceptual art in particular, 
that his overarching postmodern paradigm reveals theoretical fractures. 
Though he is acutely conscious of the problems with any attempt at 
constructing a totalizing system, Jameson insists on the necessity of “some 
conception of a new systematic cultural norm” precisely in order that radical 
cultural politics have a clear point of critical orientation.89 For Jameson, 
postmodern culture can be characterized by its thoroughgoing 
commodification, the collapse of any distinction between culture and the 
culture industry: 
 
What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated 
into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of 
producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to 
airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly 
essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and 
experimentation. Such economic necessities then find recognition in the 
varied kinds of institutional support available for the newer art, from 
foundations and grants to museums and other forms of patronage.90 
 
He nevertheless asserts “I am very far from feeling that all cultural production 
today is ‘postmodern.’”91 Such an admission seems necessary if Jameson wants 
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to hold on to an emphatic concept of art given that, on his account, 
postmodern “aesthetic production” is no longer able to ground such a claim. 
Yet this immediately raises the problem of the possibility of postmodern art. 
Jameson stages this question, somewhat evasively, via the problem of politics in 
art. Here he uses conceptual art, and more specifically its later “political 
variant”, held to be exemplified by Haacke, as a case study. Jameson 
acknowledges that “To mention Haacke… is… to raise one of the fundamental 
problems posed by postmodernism generally… namely the possible political 
content of postmodernist art... “92  
 
For Jameson, Haacke disturbs the dominance of postmodernism’s cultural logic 
from within the paradigm: “his is a kind of cultural production which is clearly 
postmodern and equally clearly political and oppositional—something that 
does not compute with the paradigm and does not seem to have been 
theoretically foreseen by it.”93 Thus Jameson asserts that Haacke’s “kind of 
cultural production” is “clearly postmodern” at the same time as admitting that 
Haacke’s work “does not compute with the paradigm.”  
 
On such an account it remains unclear in what way Haacke’s work is 
postmodern, other than by being historically coincident with Jameson’s cultural 
periodisation. Rather than arguing persuasively for the possibility of a 
postmodern art (which already looked self-contradictory from the perspective 
of his own account of the postmodern condition) Jameson’s account of 
Haacke’s work actually undermines his own paradigm. Jameson later admits 
that Haacke’s work and the “political variant” of conceptual art more 
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generally, challenge his own totalising account of the deadly reciprocal 
legitimation between commodified postmodern art and its systemically 
integrated postmodern institutions: 
 
As for conceptual art and its evolution, however, it is worth adding that its 
later political variant—in the work of Hans Haacke, for example—redirects 
the deconstruction of perceptual categories specifically onto the framing 
institutions themselves… Indeed, in Haacke, it is not merely with museum 
space that we come to rest, but rather the museum itself, as an institution, 
opens up into its network of trustees, their affiliation with multinational 
corporations, and finally the global system of late capitalism proper, such that what 
used to be the limited and Kantian project of a restricted conceptual art 
expands into the very ambition of cognitive mapping itself (with all its 
specific representational contradictions). 94  
 
Here then the “political variant” of conceptual art that Jameson acknowledges 
is what we have discussed as systematic conceptual art. However we have 
argued that systematic conceptual art, with Hans Haacke as its most advanced 
exponent, constituted an alternative modernist practice, one within which 
modernity began to become self-reflexive about its own social bases. Haacke’s 
stated determination to “critique the dominant systems of beliefs while 
employing the very mechanisms of that system” might well stand as an elegant 
summary of the project of a reflexive modernism, one concerned to reform 
(technological) reason on its own grounds.  
 
Such a reading was intimated as early as 1975 by Jack Burnham in his most 
extensive essay on Haacke’s work “Steps in the Formulation of Real-Time 
Political Art.”95 That an understanding of systematic conceptual art has not 
been more prominent in the critical literature on the art of the 1960s and 1970s 
is a function of both the obscurity visited upon Burnham’s work for its 
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unresolved syncretism and the obscurity that institutional critique has visited on 
the relationship between art, the art system and the wider social systems in 
which art inheres.  
 
*  *  * 
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Towards a Genealogy of Contemporary Art 
 
 
As the endgame(s) of postmodernism in art appear to have wound up, and the 
“altermodern” alternatives of relational and context art reveal themselves to be 
enmeshed in problems introduced by systematic conceptual art, the challenge is 
to better understand and theorise the conditions of art’s playing on (as art). 
Such a challenge depends, at least in part, on a deeper understanding of the 
historical overthrow of formalist modernism, that is with the birth of the “New 
Art” of the 1960s in reaction formation to a modernism most clearly identified 
with the prescriptions of Clement Greenberg.  
 
This terrain, apparently so well covered by the historiography of Sixties art, 
continues to reveal patches of fresh ground. For while reaction against 
Greenbergian formalist modernism was clearly the primary determinant of the 
majority of the new art of the 1960s, there was a historically actual alternative 
modernism already in play in the 1960s, namely that pointed to, but not 
decisively theorised, by Jack Burnham’s conflation of postformalist motifs and 
the work of the Frankfurt School (specifically Marcuse) and more thoroughly 
developed in the work of systematic conceptual art, especially Haacke’s.  
 
Here though we have sought to go beyond Jack Burnham’s theory of “systems 
aesthetics,” noting, amongst other shortcomings, its inability to account for 
conceptual art. Instead we have generated an original theoretical schema, 
drawing on conceptual artists’ own accounts of what was at stake in systematic 
conceptual art. The stress on conceptual art’s “systematic” mode has reoriented 
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the canonical focus, producing a more inclusive and more pertinent account of 
the conceptual character and critical legacy of conceptual art. The 
development of conceptual art has been situated within three broader contexts: 
philosophical (the ongoing problem of the character of modernity), economic 
(the transition from fordist to postfordist industrial production) and social (the 
trajectory of the New Left and the ramifications of the cultural revolution). 
 
Conceptual art has been reconsidered in light of its nascence, emergence, 
consolidation and historical “overthrow.” The nascence of conceptual art has 
been relocated within the broader problematic of postformalism. The 
appearance of a distinctive “systems art” after the decline of minimalism (and 
out of a negotiated relationship between minimalism, pop and tech art) has 
been advanced as one of the contributing factors to the emergence of a 
distinctively “conceptual” art. We have shown the way in which the ideal 
systems of logical, mathematical and spatio-temporal relations that 
characterised early post-minimalist work were expanded in character to include 
physical, biological and, crucially, social systems. Conceptual art’s 
consolidation has been reconsidered by distinguishing its multiple modes, 
namely “stylistic,” “systematic,” “analytic” and “synthetic,” and the 
“systematic” mode of conceptual art has been argued to be of more 
contemporary relevance than the more critically established “analytic” mode. 
Finally, the “overthrow” of conceptual art has been revisited from the 
perspective of the present in order to demonstrate that contemporary context 
and relational practices revisit problems first articulated by systematic 
conceptual art. Recovering the systems genealogy and sytematic mode of 
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conceptual art provides a richer genealogy of contemporary art. It is from 
systematic conceptual art that relational and context art inherit their focus on 
the social relations and the social context of art. It is this tradition that 
continues to set terms for the artistic debates that recur today and it is this 
tradition that any autonomous contemporary art will be obliged to negotiate. 
 
Three immediate possibilities for future research are suggested by the 
conclusions we have drawn. First, to seek to test our systems genealogy of 
conceptual art against conceptual art beyond its Anglo-American articulation. 
Second, in light of the systems genealogy of contemporary art, to attempt to 
theorise the “context” and “relational” art of the 1990s more adequately. 
Third, to specify in greater detail the category of “contemporary” art.  
 
(I) The scope of this thesis has been limited to what might be described as 
“canonical” conceptual art, that is conceptual art as it was elaborated in the 
Anglo-American context. Within this context we have argued for a further 
differentiation of the category, one which reorients our understanding of the 
scope of the problem complex that was engaged by conceptual art, with the 
result that a more inclusive categorisation of conceptual art has been 
developed. We have sought to intervene in the “canonical” category, drawing 
out its shortcomings in light of the reception of conceptual art by contemporary 
practices. Systematic conceptual art has been defined as a distinctive mode of 
conceptual art. As such we might well expect systematic conceptual art to relate 
to the practice of conceptual artists outside England and America. Further 
work could be done by testing the systematic mode of conceptual art against 
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other conceptual practices and traditions, perhaps most obviously those 
originating in Latin America and Eastern Europe.  
 
(II) Having elaborated the systems genealogy of conceptual art as a significant 
mode, one that inflects the conceptual genealogy of contemporary art, and 
given our critique of the inadequacy of both Andrea Fraser and Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s theorisation of context and relational art, the task of elaborating a 
more convincing theoretical schema for relational and context art presents 
itself. Such a schema might well go beyond the putative opposition of context 
and relational art, a division that is strongly advocated by Fraser but largely 
rejected by Bourriaud. Here then we would aim to outline a theory that was 
informed by the historical practices of conceptual artists but which also sought 
to capture what was specific about the post-postmodern relational and context 
art that emerged in the 90s and which continues to inflect the terms of 
contemporary art.  
 
(III) The systems genealogy of contemporary art is not on its own sufficient to 
define contemporary art as a meaningful ontological and periodising category. 
Here we need to work out additional genealogies for contemporary art. If we 
understand contemporary art as distinctively post-conceptual then we can 
clearly identify three, post-movement specific, artistic strategies that understand 
themselves to have resulted from the “failure” of conceptual art:  
(i) “institutional critique” (the recognition that the ontology of art has to be 
thought by way of critical reflection on the institutions which enframe it);  
(ii) “installation” (the self-reflexive, if frequently uncritical, incorporation of the 
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specific context in which a work is realised within the terms of the work); and 
(iii) “participation” (the attempt to define a new model of the beholder in ways 
that go beyond kinetic and op art’s immediate experiential involvement of the 
audience in otherwise traditionally conceived works). Here we have sought to 
demonstrate that institutional critique fell within conceptual art proper, as part 
of its systematic mode. A similarly critical approach to the conceptual 
genealogy of installation and participation might also be developed in order to 
provide a more thorough specification of the post-conceptual character of 
contemporary art. Here, recalling Weiner’s joke, we might expect more 
surprises. 
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stage. Fried’s position is discussed substantively below. 
22 Harold Rosenberg, “De-aestheticization,” in The De-Definition of Art (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1972) 28–38, 29.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 35. 
25 Ibid., 37. Rosenberg’s (slightly) later assessment of the achievements of the art of the late 1960’s 
was less favourable: “Minimalist creations succeeded Pop art’s exact approximations of things that 
are not art, and they were in turn displaced, seriatim, by Anti-Form art, Earth art, Process art, 
Conceptualist art, and Information art. The philosophies on which these movements were 
founded are extremely shaky, at time fatuous, and they have not lasted, though this does not 
affect the vanguard status of the movements themselves.” Harold Rosenberg, “Myths and Rituals 
of the Avant-Garde,” Art International, September 1973, 67–68, 67. 
26 Greenberg, “Counter Avant-Garde,” 17. 
27 Ibid. 
28 How minimal or earth art might be interpreted as not relying on “extrinsic context” is unclear 
to say the least. 
29 Greenberg, “Counter Avant-Garde,” 19. My emphasis. 
30 Max Kozloff, “Critical Schizophrenia and the Intentionalist Method,” in The New Art, ed. 
Gregory Battock (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966) 123–35, 132.  Kozloff’s own proposal for 
an “intentionalist” criticism based on an “exploration of the intention of the artist” was not widely 
taken up (perhaps unsurprisingly, given his own acknowledgment of the inadequacies of 
intentionalist literary criticism).  
31 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 40–41. 
32 Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” in The Collected Essays and Criticism: Perceptions 
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Lynne Zelevansky (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 14–18.  
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Fundació Antoni Tàpies, Barcelona. 
45 Thwaites, “The Story of Zero,” 2. 
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Collected Writings (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 52–60, 52.  
60 Charles Harrison, “A Very Abstract Context,” Studio International, November 1970, 194–98, 198 
n.35.  
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Appendix 
 
Victor Burgin, “Art-Society Systems,” Control 4, (1968). 
 
In approaching the problem of social control in art it would seem necessary to first 
establish, in principle, the particular province of art within the broad area of social 
control in general. To then determine the degree to which this province has been 
explored; and only finally to reform the model of art activity in favour of a greater 
relevance to, and efficiency in, the cause of control. The history of socially oriented art 
projects however is one of hasty, albeit enthusiastic, leaps into irrelevancy. The 
engagement of artists in such disparate activities as political propaganda and 
technological inquiries into “new” media is the result of focusing on the message 
content and message-carrying capabilities of the object. Failure is inherent in this 
attitude due to the reverse polarity of object-viewer exchange. Before considering any 
particular function of an “art object” it would be as well to examine the process by 
which such a category even exists. 
 
Attempts to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions of aesthetic structure fail 
from an emphasis on the object rather than upon the perceiver. For example, the 
popular notion that “uselessness” is one of the defining attributes of a work of art is 
based in economical rather than aesthetic experience and has been well explained by 
Thorsten Veblen in terms of his “law of conspicuous waste” and “canon of pecuniary 
reputability.” All artists, unless they are independently wealthy, suffer from the conflict 
between intellectual and economic demands, the latter having cast them in their sub-
role as producers of objects for conspicuous consumption. 
 
The implications of a redirection of attention, from object to perceiver, are extensive. 
It may now be said that an object becomes, or fails to become, a work of art in direct 
response to the inclination of the perceiver to assume an appreciative role. As Morse 
Peckham has put it “… art is not a category of perceptual field but of role-playing.” 
From this it would seem that there is no objection to all of sensory experience being 
regarded as aesthetic. In principle there is not. (McLuhan’s suggestion that the entire 
earth may become an art object in the newly appreciated environment of space). In 
practice, some experiences are preferred above others. This is probably because the 
role of art perceiver, like most other roles, is a learned one. It is here, in the planning 
of perceptual roles, that the artist may hope to exert some degree of control in the 
wider, extra-aesthetic, sense. 
 
Flux in the aesthetic model of experience places demands on our perceptual 
behaviour. Change in any one aspect of our behaviour may affect any other of the 
behavioural traits with which it is organically integrated. Although, in language, we 
categorise behaviour for obvious referential purposes we have no direct experience of 
such tidy compartments. An analogy may be found in perception, where, for example, 
my appreciation of an unfamiliar piece of music may be conditions by the relative 
comfort of the chair in which I am sitting and the state of my digestion. A complete 
catalogue of conditioning peripheral experience around my focus on the music would 
be very lengthy. Accepting this we cannot rationally justify the continued application 
of old modes of response in which, in art, our learned roles dictate that we 
discriminate between the components of our perceptual field in favour of a particular 
object. This latter being itself the obsolete relic of a defunct role, that of the “painter” 
or “sculptor.” 
 
The conventional model of art activity, that of the “avant-garde,” is an unsatisfactory 
archetype of art activity at a high level. The comfort of the avant-garde lies in its self-
referential nature. Having closed the studio door behind him the painter excludes 
completely any considerations other than those of his canvas and his formalist dialectic 
with immediate art history. The illusion of “progress” is strongest and the 
embarrassment of a poor work is neutralised by free use of the word “experiment.” 
While wishing to avoid semantics it should be noted, if only in passing, that 
terminological transplants from one technical language into another can create havoc 
in the recipient area. The indiscriminate use of ill-considered scientific terms such as 
“progress” and “experiment” helps form the climate of irrelevance and falsity in which 
much critical opinion operates, and exposes the artist to accusations of scientism. Art, 
unlike science, does not investigate—it produces. These productions, at the highest 
levels, are made in response to the artist’s intuition of the future of society and not in 
response to the history of art. in forming his intuition and response the artist is 
involved in an exchange in which the important considerations are not of goals but of 
roles. 
 
A new archetype of art activity which might be proposed involves reciprocity. Art 
affects behaviour. Behaviour within society at large in turn affects art in that it 
provides the artist with an intuition of the future. By then designating for this projected 
situation the artist helps his hypothesis become reality. Specifically, art challenges the 
predominant mode of perceptual behaviour. After the initial shock of disorientation, 
society accommodates itself to the new perceptual role and the new ideas are 
assimilated into the common environment. The relationship between art activity and 
the other activities in society then settles into stability, or in cybernetic terms the 
“system” undergoes a process of “entropy.” If art were a true “control” as defined by 
in cybernetics then this state of stability, once achieved, would be maintained 
indefinitely. Art would then be defined as a “homeostat;” that is, a control device for 
holding some variable, in this case the relationship between our perceptual behaviour 
and the raw stuff of our perceptual experience, within particular bounds. Of course, 
what actually happens once entropy has been effected in the art-society system is that 
art reacts to the feedback of accommodation by again provoking disorientation in 
popular perceptual behaviour. So, although the art-society system is a suitable subject 
for cybernetic investigation in that it is complex, indeterministic, and apparently self-
regulatory, it would be wrong to say that art itself is a “control” in the cybernetic sense 
as it disrupts, rather than encourages, stability.  
 
Art is neither a control in the cybernetic sense nor in the strongest literal sense as “the 
power of direction and command.” Art may be honestly said to exert social control 
only within the limitations of its being a structuring factor in the perceived 
environment, responsible for modifications in our perceptual role-playing, and a 
general influence as an activity amongst the community of activities which constitute 
society. How surprising then that even within these bounds art has not yet realised its 
full potential. This can only be due to its being fragmented. 
 
The “limits” of individual art activities are related to experience in the way that 
“borders” of countries are related to natural terrain: distinctions of politics rather than 
of nature. A new art seems most likely to emerge from the integration of formerly 
discrete activities. The emerging artistic role is that of the designer of “activity clusters” 
formed for specific social and environmental situations. In ordering, as far as possible, 
the entirety of any given perceptual field, a complex of considerations is involved 
which far exceeds the present institutionalised practices of the artist. Institutional 
selectivity in art must make way for activity mosaics which will reflect the organic 
nature of perceptual experience. The discriminatory response to experience is 
appropriate if we are to avoid stepping on the cat but it is inappropriate to the 
development of a fuller sensibility. The artist who caters solely for that class of limited 
response not only fails to appreciate the radical changes our whole way of life is 
undergoing but serves to retard our adaptation to these changes. 
 
The prime function of art as a social control is to reactivate a sensory capacity in 
danger of atrophy. While we may agree that, through electronics, man has exteriorised 
and extended his nervous system, it is also a fact that his inherent, individual, sensory 
capability is in decline. In his transition from hunter to commuter man has allowed the 
machine to deputise for him to an ever-increasing degree. There is now a real danger 
that man will become a redundant component in the sensory circuit and so go into 
sensory decline, the final stage of which is defined as death. 
 
Snow’s “two cultures” are being replaced by a new dichotomy, that of man and robot, 
and in the ensuing confusion of roles we may face global psychic depression of we do 
not learn to render unto man what is his own. In a materially satiated and goal-less 
society the role-creating capacity of art might lead it into government! 
 
 
